CVE-2020-37248
OfflineIMAP before 8.0.3 trusts the server with their STARTTLS capability prior to authentication, which allows STRIPTLS/man-in-the-middle a
CVSS
6.5
Medium
EPSS
0.2%
p8
KEV
—
Exploit Today
3
0-100
Published: Jun 8, 2026 · Last modified: Jul 23, 2026 · CWE-348
0.2%EPSS · 30 days0.2%
2026-07-112026-08-07
OfflineIMAP before 8.0.3 trusts the server with their STARTTLS capability prior to authentication, which allows STRIPTLS/man-in-the-middle attacks, taking over the connection and extracting account credentials in cleartext.
- github.comhttps://github.com/OfflineIMAP/offlineimap/issues/669
- github.comhttps://github.com/OfflineIMAP/offlineimap3/commit/46505c53ef995455d66c685f9ec3ff6ea93dbb74
- github.comhttps://github.com/OfflineIMAP/offlineimap3/issues/222
- pypi.orghttps://pypi.org/project/offlineimap/#history
- www.openwall.comhttp://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/06/08/3
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-255523.7 LOW6.9%
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