CVE-2024-38226
Microsoft Publisher Protection Mechanism Failure Vulnerability
CVSS
7.3
High
EPSS
2.7%
p85
KEV
YES
Sep 10, 2024
Exploit Today
76
0-100
Published: Sep 10, 2024 · Last modified: Aug 10, 2026 · CWE-693
2.7%EPSS · 30 days2.7%
2026-09-182026-10-15
Product
Microsoft / Publisher
Vulnerability
Microsoft Publisher Protection Mechanism Failure Vulnerability
Added to KEV
Sep 10, 2024
Remediate by
Oct 1, 2024
Known ransomware use
No
Summary description
Microsoft Publisher contains a protection mechanism failure vulnerability that allows attacker to bypass Office macro policies used to block untrusted or malicious files.
Required action
Apply mitigations per vendor instructions or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable.
Notes
https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-38226; https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38226
Microsoft Publisher Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-774747.1 HIG—
———destructive_command_guard (dcg) is a command-line safety tool that blocks destructive shell commands before AI coding agents run them. Prior to 0.6.6, nested or unclosed substitutions are recursively rescanned after an inner scan returns unterminated, producing exponential-time work. The affected scanners are reached through split_command_segments in src/packs/mod.rs. a destructive command followed by nested or unclosed $( or $(( sequences. nested or unclosed $( and $(( sequences cause repeated rescanning of the remaining command suffix. a hung PreToolUse hook fails open, allowing the destructive command to proceed. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.6.4hCVE-2026-104024——
——0Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs (CWE-184) in the dangerous-extension confirmation of the archive object viewer (peach.pas, grid_obj_open) in PeaZip 10.5.0 through 11.2.0 on Windows allows an attacker who convinces a victim to open an entry of a crafted archive to execute a program, or an arbitrary command, with no confirmation dialog. The prompt (Do you want to run this file?) is gated by SECEXTCONST, a hard-coded list of seven extensions (exe cmd msi bat ps1 vbs reg); the check is an exact string comparison of the entry extension against that list, so it answers only whether the extension is one of the seven and never whether the shell will execute the file. Shell-executable and scripting-host types that Windows runs through ShellExecuteW are absent from the list, among them .url and .lnk. An archived Windows Internet Shortcut (.url) whose URL line is attacker-controlled is launched with no prompt, while the byte-identical content in an entry named .bat does raise the warning in the same session. A .lnk entry raises the ceiling from launching a program to running a command line, because a Windows shortcut carries arguments: a proof-of-concept shortcut targeting cmd.exe with an attacker-chosen command line executed with no prompt. The shortcut target is not confined to the local disk; the shell also resolved an attacker-named UNC path (fetching a remote payload was only attempted, not demonstrated). No privilege escalation; everything runs as the user who opened the archive.5hCVE-2026-104025——
——0Path Traversal (CWE-22) in the execute_obj function of the archive object viewer (peach.pas) in PeaZip 11.2.0 and earlier on Windows allows an attacker who convinces a victim to preview an entry of a crafted archive via the "Preview with... -> Associated application" action (Shift+Ctrl+O) to execute an arbitrary program already present on the victim's system, with no warning dialog. The function validates only outname (PeaZip's own temporary directory) with checkfiledirname, while the string actually executed is the concatenation outname+tempstring; tempstring is taken verbatim from the archive entry name (StringGridList.Cells[12,...]) and is never validated. checkfiledirname (list_utils.pas) rejects control and reserved characters in the file name but performs no ".." path-containment check, so an entry named ../../../../Windows/System32/calc.exe escapes the extraction directory and is passed to cp_open -> ShellExecuteW; the extracting backend (7-Zip) strips the traversal while the opener does not. In addition, the SECEXTCONST dangerous-extension confirmation prompt is implemented only in the double-click handler (grid_obj_open) and not on this preview route, so an executable inside an archive reaches ShellExecuteW unannounced, and where the prompt does fire it names the entry's display name rather than the resolved path that will run. Arbitrary code execution was demonstrated with a proof of concept against official PeaZip builds, confirmed on two archive formats (.zip and .tar) to show the defect is in PeaZip's own path handling and not in a single format parser.5hCVE-2026-1108664.7 MED10.4%
——3Renovate before 44.61.3 contains a protection mechanism bypass vulnerability that allows minimumReleaseAge checks to be skipped when a user requests a PR rebase via the rebase/retry checkbox. Attackers who publish a malicious dependency version can have it pushed into the PR and run in CI before the required release age elapses.6hCVE-2026-1106895.3 MED2.1%
——1A security flaw has been discovered in OpenClaw ClawScan up to 0.1.6. This impacts the function shouldSkipTargetPath of the file internal/runner/runner.go of the component Static Scanner. Performing a manipulation results in protection mechanism failure. Attacking locally is a requirement. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. Upgrading to version 0.1.7 will fix this issue. The patch is named 9f6a6fbb9f1137345566d0ab44c73893dfe112fa. The affected component should be upgraded.1dCVE-2026-668746.5 MED16.8%
——5For pull request events, Gitea reads workflow definitions from the pull request head and posts a synthetic skipped status when workflow branch or path filters exclude execution. A fork pull request author can supply a workflow matching a required status context but deliberately prevent it from running. Because skipped statuses count as success, branch protection or organization-required workflow checks can appear satisfied without the mandated workflow executing; no runner or maintainer approval is required for this path.2d