CVE-2025-6571
A 3rd-party component exposed its password in process arguments, allowing for low-privileged users to access it.
CVSS
6.0
Medium
EPSS
0.1%
p2
KEV
—
Exploit Today
0
0-100
Published: Nov 11, 2025 · Last modified: Oct 7, 2026 · CWE-522
0.1%EPSS · 30 days0.1%
2026-10-052026-11-01
A 3rd-party component exposed its password in process arguments, allowing for low-privileged users to access it.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-1057699.3 CRI—
———kaniko before 1.25.20 can send a Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) access token for Azure Resource Manager to an attacker-controlled registry host. kaniko uses the Azure Container Registry credential helper github.com/chrismellard/docker-credential-acr-env, which decides whether a host is an ACR registry with an unanchored regular expression, so any hostname containing .azurecr.io, .azurecr.cn, .azurecr.de or .azurecr.us is accepted. kaniko consults this helper for any registry that has no credentials in the Docker config and is not a Google or Amazon ECR registry, before contacting the registry. A Dockerfile that references an image on a lookalike host, such as FROM x.azurecr.io.attacker.com/img or COPY --from=<image>, causes the helper to obtain a token from the build's Azure identity (service principal environment variables, federated workload identity token, or managed identity) and POST it to https://<host>/oauth2/exchange. The attacker can use the token against Azure Resource Manager with the identity's role assignments until it expires, and can exchange it for credentials to any ACR registry the identity can access. No RUN instruction or push is required. This issue is fixed in 1.25.20.6hCVE-2026-1162526.5 MED17.5%
——5pgAdmin 4's materialized view refresh passed the target database's name to psql's --dbname argument unchanged. libpq treats a --dbname value containing "=" (or a postgresql:// URI) as a full connection string, whose keywords override the host, port and other settings pgAdmin had supplied. A database whose name is such a string, which any role with CREATEDB can create, therefore redirected the psql process pgAdmin starts for the refresh to a host and port of the creator's choosing, and the connecting user's saved server password was presented to that endpoint. It also let the pgAdmin host be made to open connections to arbitrary addresses.
The same weakness was fixed for Backup, Restore, Maintenance and Import/Export Data in earlier releases (CVE-2026-86862); the materialized view refresh was the remaining caller. The fix routes the name through the same database_conninfo() helper, so libpq treats it strictly as a database name.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.6hCVE-2026-1162478.2 HIG2.4%
——1When a server in pgAdmin 4 had no password file, client certificate or client key configured, or the configured one could not be found, pgAdmin left the parameter out of the connection and libpq fell back to the defaults of the operating-system account running pgAdmin: ~/.pgpass, ~/.postgresql/postgresql.crt and postgresql.key, or PGPASSFILE, PGSSLCERT and PGSSLKEY. In server mode any user could therefore connect to a server with the service account's saved passwords or client certificate, and supplying only a copy of its public certificate was enough for libpq to pair it with the service account's private key. A pg_service.conf entry, or a maintenance database name read as a connection string by pg_dumpall, could bring the same files back for the utilities.
The fix gives each of these parameters a value in server mode, the user's own file or otherwise a path that can never be opened, in the connection string, in the environment of the utilities and in the --dbname connection string that ranks above a service entry. Desktop mode is unchanged.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.6hCVE-2026-1162458.2 HIG4.8%
——1libpq looks a connection service up in the service file of the operating-system account running pgAdmin 4, and an entry there can hold a password or name a password file or client certificate. In server mode any user could set a server's Service, or a "service" connection parameter, to one of those entries and connect with its credentials. A PGPASSWORD or PGSERVICE variable set for that account was likewise used by libpq for every connection without a value of its own and passed on to the utilities, and pg_dumpall read a maintenance database name such as "service=..." as a connection string.
The fix adds the SERVER_MODE_ALLOWED_SERVICES setting, empty by default: in server mode only a listed service can be used, the servicefile parameter is refused, and PGPASSWORD and PGSERVICE are removed from pgAdmin's environment at startup. The allowlist is checked again on the final connection string, and the pg_dumpall database name is wrapped as a connection string.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.6hCVE-2026-1162448.2 HIG20.2%
——6When a pgAdmin 4 connection was not meant to use a Kerberos user's delegated credentials, pgAdmin removed KRB5CCNAME from its environment, so the Kerberos library fell back to the default credential cache, or a client keytab, of the operating-system account running pgAdmin. libpq then answered any server that asked for GSSAPI authentication with that account's ticket, whatever user name the pgAdmin user gave, so in server mode any user could connect as the service account's Kerberos principal; gssencmode=disable did not prevent it. On Windows, SSPI used the service account's logon in the same way. psql was also started with pgAdmin's environment, which could hold another user's credential cache while that user was connecting.
The fix points KRB5CCNAME and KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME at a file that cannot exist except while a Kerberos-authenticated user connects with Kerberos, and gives every other connection, psql and the utilities require_auth=!gss,!sspi and gssencmode=disable, checked on the final connection string. require_auth needs libpq 16 or later.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.6hCVE-2026-1162428.2 HIG14.1%
——4pgAdmin 4 opens SSH tunnels with the sshtunnel library but gave it neither host_pkey_directories nor ssh_config_file, so it always loaded the unencrypted private keys in ~/.ssh of the operating-system account running pgAdmin, read that account's ~/.ssh/config (IdentityFile, User, HostName, ProxyCommand) for the tunnel host, and could use its ssh-agent. In server mode any user could therefore configure a tunnel to a host that accepts the service account's key, with no credentials of their own or with an identity file that did not exist in their storage, and reach it as that account.
The fix makes tunnels in server mode use only the identity file or password the user configured: the service account's keys, configuration and agent are no longer used, and an identity file that cannot be found in the user's storage is reported instead of falling back to ~/.ssh. Desktop mode is unchanged.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.6h