CVE-2025-68668
n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. From version 1.0.0 to before 2.0.0, a sandbox bypass vulnerability exists in the Python
CVSS
9.9
Critical
EPSS
13.2%
p96
KEV
—
Exploit Today
29
0-100
Published: Dec 26, 2025 · Last modified: Oct 13, 2026 · CWE-693
11.9%EPSS · 30 days13.2%
2026-09-272026-10-25
n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. From version 1.0.0 to before 2.0.0, a sandbox bypass vulnerability exists in the Python Code Node that uses Pyodide. An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands on the host system running n8n, using the same privileges as the n8n process. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.0. Workarounds for this issue involve disabling the Code Node by setting the environment variable NODES_EXCLUDE: "[\"n8n-nodes-base.code\"]", disabling Python support in the Code node by setting the environment variable N8N_PYTHON_ENABLED=false, which was introduced in n8n version 1.104.0, and configuring n8n to use the task runner based Python sandbox via the N8N_RUNNERS_ENABLED and N8N_NATIVE_PYTHON_RUNNER environment variables.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-1161453.9 LOW—
——0ImageMagick before 6.9.13-58 and 7.x before 7.1.2-32 contains a security policy bypass caused by an incomplete fix for the policy bypass reported in GHSA-jjp4-3fwf-393j. An attacker able to supply input to ImageMagick can evade configured security policy restrictions, allowing operations the policy was intended to block.8hCVE-2026-1154805.3 MED24.2%
——7baserCMS is a website development framework. In versions 5.0.0 before 5.3.2 and 5.4.0 before 5.4.2, the public POST /baser/api/bc-mail/mail_messages/add/{mailContentId}.json endpoint accepts submissions without enforcing the form's auth_captcha setting. BcMail\Controller\Api\MailMessagesController::add() and MailMessagesService::create() omit the BcCaptchaService::check() verification of captcha_id and auth_captcha performed by MailController::submit() in the web UI. An unauthenticated attacker who can reach the API can therefore automate submissions without solving the enabled image challenge. The API disables FormProtection and has no rate limit; submissions can generate administrator-inbox spam, send attacker-influenced auto-replies to third parties when an email field is present, and accumulate mail_messages database records when save_info is enabled. The API already enforces the isAccepting() check added for CVE-2026-30878; the missing CAPTCHA check is a separate control failure. This issue has been patched in versions 5.3.2 and 5.4.2.3dCVE-2026-571448.8 HIG2.1%
——1PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.110 to before version 4.6.61, praisonai.sandbox.SandlockSandbox is documented and implemented as the kernel-enforced sandbox backend for untrusted code. Its SandboxConfig.native() path lets callers configure allowed filesystem paths and network=False. On systems where the optional sandlock module imports but reports that Landlock is unavailable, SandlockSandbox.execute() and run_command() do not fail closed. They silently fall back to SubprocessSandbox(self.config). That fallback keeps the same high-level native policy object but does not enforce the native filesystem or network boundary during code execution. A sandboxed payload can read files outside the configured allowed path and open network connections despite network=False. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.61.3dCVE-2026-568387.8 HIG3.8%
——1PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.87 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI recipe execution blocks default-denied dangerous tools unless the caller explicitly passes allow_dangerous_tools=True. The normal recipe.run() path enforces this with _check_tool_policy(). The streaming path, recipe.run_stream(), loads the same recipe, checks dependencies, and then calls _execute_recipe() without running the dangerous-tool policy check. As a result, a recipe that honestly declares execute_command in TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools is denied by recipe.run(), but reaches the execution engine through recipe.run_stream() with allow_dangerous_tools=False. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59.3dCVE-2026-1119654.3 MED17.8%
——5The Profile Builder WordPress plugin from 4.0.0 to 4.0.4 does not enforce its reCAPTCHA verification on all comment submission paths, allowing authenticated users to bypass the anti-spam protection an administrator configured for the WordPress comment form.3dCVE-2026-1146142.6 LOW7.2%
——2Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. From 0.13 until 1.8.0, authlib.common.security.is_secure_transport() uses a textual prefix comparison for loopback HTTP exemptions, so a URL whose userinfo begins with a loopback host can be accepted even when its parsed host is an external non-loopback system. An external party able to supply a URL to OIDC RP-Initiated Logout registration, authorization-server metadata validation, or another call site can bypass the TLS-required guard and cause cleartext redirection or acceptance of cleartext endpoints. The issue does not bypass redirect URI exact matching and does not by itself forge tokens or authenticate users. The vulnerable authlib.common.security.is_secure_transport() implementation in authlib/common/security.py misinterprets the userinfo component before OIDC RP-Initiated Logout dynamic client registration and other consumers enforce transport security. This issue is fixed in version 1.8.0.3d