CVE-2026-105096
A vulnerability was determined in Omega Solution CoinEx Crypto 2025. This affects an unknown function of the file /customer/ of the componen
CVSS
6.3
Medium
EPSS
0.3%
p19
KEV
—
Exploit Today
6
0-100
Published: Oct 4, 2026 · Last modified: Oct 4, 2026 · CWE-285 · CWE-639
Not enough EPSS history yet.
A vulnerability was determined in Omega Solution CoinEx Crypto 2025. This affects an unknown function of the file /customer/ of the component Customer Profile API. Executing a manipulation of the argument ID can lead to authorization bypass. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. The product web site does not exist anymore. Maybe the product got retired and/or replaced. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-1051716.3 MED—
——0A security vulnerability has been detected in kishor-23 food-waste-management-system 411989e3ecb82895e53dca7865f72145f03d7d93/b3a70b2c492dc9904de5be1ad9389bd79b87f82c. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file admin/admin.php of the component Role Attribute Handler. Such manipulation of the argument Name leads to authorization bypass. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. This product does not use versioning. This is why information about affected and unaffected releases are unavailable. Multiple endpoints are affected. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.10hCVE-2026-1050974.3 MED19.9%
——6A vulnerability was identified in Omega Solution CoinEx Crypto 2025. This impacts an unknown function of the file /customer-currency/ of the component Customer Information API. The manipulation of the argument ID leads to authorization bypass. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The product web site does not exist anymore. Maybe the product got retired and/or replaced. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.1dCVE-2026-964518.8 HIG21.0%
——6Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Ultimate Member Ultimate Member ultimate-member allows Privilege Escalation.This issue affects Ultimate Member: from n/a through 2.13.1.2dCVE-2026-1051214.9 MED15.1%
——5OpenAM before 16.1.3 contains an improper authorization vulnerability that allows delegated administrators to destroy sessions outside their realms because realm checks use the requester's realm. Authenticated accounts holding the iplanet-am-session-destroy-sessions attribute can supply a target session identifier or handle to forcibly log out users in any realm.2dCVE-2026-1051196.8 MED8.4%
——3OpenAM before 16.1.3 applies its OAuth2 Provider PKCE enforcement only to authorization requests whose response_type is exactly code, so codes issued through OpenID Connect hybrid flows (code token, code id_token, code token id_token) carry no bound challenge. An attacker who intercepts such a code can redeem it for a public client's tokens with any non-empty code_verifier.2dCVE-2026-71886—5.3%
——2In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier against every key of the third-party certificate, then verify the issuing component's binding chain and the signature itself; nothing checked that the issuing component carried the RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29 certification key flag (CERTIFY_OTHER) when the signature was created. A subkey bound only with SIGN_DATA - the online signing subkey of exactly the offline-primary arrangement those key flags exist to express - could therefore issue a positive User ID certification over an attacker-controlled identity, or a full-trust depth-one direct-key delegation of introducer trust, and the API returned it as a valid signature chain attributed to the third-party certificate. An application treating getCertificationBy(...).isValid() or getDelegationBy(...) as an identity or trusted-introducer decision would attribute the attacker's assertion to the offline primary key. The same held for a legacy RSA subkey bound only for encryption, whose algorithm is nonetheless able to sign. This does not forge the primary key's signature or recover any private key; it promotes an already-compromised restricted subkey to the primary key's identity-issuing authority, defeating the containment the key-flag separation provides. A third-party certification or delegation is now attributed to the issuing certificate only when the component key that made it is the primary key, or is a subkey holding CERTIFY_OTHER when the signature was created, so certification-capable subkeys continue to be accepted; primary keys are accepted whatever their key flags say, since a primary key is certification-capable by construction and certificates carrying no key flags subpacket at all are common. Third-party revocations are deliberately outside the rule, since declining to honour one would keep trust alive rather than withdraw it.2d