CVE-2026-115547
An input validation issue in the Okta Access Gateway (OAG) Admin Console allows the processing of specially formatted configuration values.
CVSS
9.1
Critical
EPSS
0.4%
p38
KEV
—
Exploit Today
11
0-100
Published: Oct 23, 2026 · Last modified: Oct 23, 2026 · CWE-20 · CWE-94
Not enough EPSS history yet.
An input validation issue in the Okta Access Gateway (OAG) Admin Console allows the processing of specially formatted configuration values. An authenticated administrator can leverage this to execute system commands within the context of the OAG service account.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-554445.3 MED—
———The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. Prior to version 26.05, the legacy RSS servlet (RssResolver, GET /rss/) accepts the q and filterQuery parameters and concatenates them into Solr queries without validation. The servlet predates the REST API layer and lacks the input validation present in GET /api/v1/records/rss. q forms the main query body (wrapped only in literal parentheses); filterQuery is passed directly as a Solr fq. An unauthenticated attacker can inject Solr boolean operators to break out of the wrapping and render the trailing access-condition filter-query suffix optional, so that access-restricted records are included in the generated RSS feed. The q and filterQuery parameters are the same underlying vulnerability in the same servlet; q (the main query body) has the broader scope. This issue has been patched in version 26.05.5hCVE-2026-554425.3 MED—
———The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. From version 23.03 to before version 26.05, SolrTools.cleanUpQuery() strips Solr local-parameter syntax ({!...}) from user-supplied query strings before they reach Solr. Its regex can be bypassed by wrapping the local parameter in a second pair of curly braces ({{!...}}): the outer braces are stripped, the inner {!...} survives intact, and a valid Solr local parameter is forwarded. The flaw is in the shared sanitizer, so it affects any endpoint that routes user input through cleanUpQuery. The double-brace bypass applies from v23.10 (the greedy \{(.+)\} regex); a related bare-!join rewrap path is present. This issue has been patched in version 26.05.5hCVE-2026-539429.9 CRI—
———Conda Organization Infrastructure is a centralized location for infrastructure codes. Prior to commit 9c0f238, a GitHub Actions Pwn Request vulnerability appears to remain present in conda/conda. The affected workflow is .github/workflows/update.yml. It is triggered by issue_comment events containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate. For the render path, the workflow obtains the pull request head repository and branch from the PR API, checks out that PR-controlled repository/ref using secrets.SYNC_TOKEN, and then runs conda/actions/template-files@7f6830b1428a9bd47f0b068892c77eae95207037. The external template-files action reads its default configuration and templates from the checked-out working directory. In the confirmed finding, that action uses an unsandboxed Jinja2 environment to render attacker-controlled template content. This creates a Pwn Request chain in which an untrusted PR/comment path can reach template rendering in a privileged token context. This issue has been patched via commit 9c0f238.6hCVE-2026-1154795.3 MED—
———baserCMS is a website development framework. In versions 5.2.5 before 5.3.2 and 5.4.0 before 5.4.2, an unauthenticated visitor can supply a comma-separated address list in a public mail form's email field and cause a single auto-reply to be addressed to multiple third parties. MailMessageMailer::sendFormToUser() passes the visitor-controlled userMail value to parseAndNormalizeMailAddresses(), which splits it with explode(',') and supplies every resulting address to setTo(). Newly created forms with an email-type field are affected when the separate, optional VALID_EMAIL server-side validation is not enabled; browser type=email validation does not prevent crafted requests. The bundled contact form enables VALID_EMAIL and is not affected. The auto-reply uses the site's sender identity and includes partially attacker-controlled content, allowing abuse of the site to deliver unsolicited mail. This issue has been patched in versions 5.3.2 and 5.4.2.5hCVE-2026-57210——
———Heimdall is a cloud native Identity Aware Proxy and Access Control Decision service. Prior to version 0.17.17, when the trusted_proxies option is configured, heimdall extracts client IP addresses from the Forwarded (for= parameter) and X-Forwarded-For headers and exposes them as Request.ClientIPAddresses to the rule pipeline. However, extracted values are not validated to be syntactically valid IP addresses. Arbitrary strings, malformed IP literals, and RFC 7239 unknown values and obfuscated identifiers are accepted without further checks. In addition, the Forwarded header parser splits on , and ; without accounting for RFC 7239 quoted strings, which can cause a single quoted value to be parsed as multiple entries, with fragments — including trailing quote characters — treated as independent addresses. This issue has been patched in version 0.17.17.8hCVE-2026-57209——
———Heimdall is a cloud native Identity Aware Proxy and Access Control Decision service. Prior to version 0.17.17, when Heimdall operates in proxy mode, it constructs the Forwarded HTTP header after executing the matched rule pipeline by inserting the incoming request's Host header value directly into the header string without sanitizing commas or semicolons. This allows an attacker to inject additional parameters into the Forwarded header, potentially spoofing IP addresses for upstream services. This issue has been patched in version 0.17.17.8h