CVE-2026-117500
HTTP::Body versions before 1.24_01 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via regex backtracking on the filename of a multipart upload. For every fi
CVSS
—
No CVSS
EPSS
—
KEV
—
Exploit Today
—
0-100
Published: Oct 28, 2026 · Last modified: Oct 28, 2026 · CWE-1333
Not enough EPSS history yet.
HTTP::Body versions before 1.24_01 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via regex backtracking on the filename of a multipart upload. For every file part, the multipart parser finds the suffix of the uploaded filename by matching the default $basename_regexp, qr/[^.]+(\.[^\\\/]+)$/, against the whole basename. A basename made of many dots and ending in a backslash makes the regex backtrack in time quadratic in its length. A remote attacker can exhaust CPU with one request, as a basename of about 32 KB takes several seconds to match and every file part is matched separately.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-1186867.5 HIG—
———EspoCRM before 9.3.11 and 10.x before 10.0.8 contains a denial of service vulnerability in which the password-redaction regular expression applied during API error handling consumes excessive CPU on long request bodies. Unauthenticated remote attackers can concurrently send a small number of large API requests to exhaust server workers, making EspoCRM slow or unavailable to legitimate users.8hCVE-2026-1186466.5 MED—
———n8n before 1.123.85, 2.43.5, and 2.44.1 contains a regular expression denial of service vulnerability that allows authenticated members to block the event loop via crafted glob patterns. Attackers who can create and run workflows can submit a wildcard-heavy File(s) Selector pattern causing exponential backtracking, making the UI, API, webhooks, and health checks unresponsive until restart.8hCVE-2026-1182595.3 MED—
———opentelemetry-java is the Java implementation of the OpenTelemetry API for recording telemetry, and SDK for managing telemetry recorded by the API. Prior to 1.67.0, W3CTraceContextPropagator.extract() uses regex delimiter processing that can exhibit quadratic backtracking while parsing tracestate headers containing long runs of spaces or tabs without a following comma. An unauthenticated attacker whose headers reach extraction can repeatedly block request or event-loop threads and cause excessive CPU consumption, with practical impact bounded by ingress header-size limits, proxy configuration, and threading. This issue is fixed in version 1.67.0.8hCVE-2026-1167957.5 HIG—
———RE2JS is the JavaScript port of RE2, a regular expression engine that provides linear time matching. From 2.2.0 until 2.8.7, enabling LOOKBEHINDS and using repeated matching through matcher().find(), matchAll(), split(), or matcher().replaceAll() can cause quadratic total work. Machine.match restarts lookbehind scanning from offset zero for each requested start position, while Matcher-based APIs request capture slots that prevent the early exit used for captureless matching. Dense matches therefore repeatedly rescan the input, allowing attacker-influenced text to monopolize a single-threaded worker and deny service. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.7.9hCVE-2026-116285——
———HTTP::Body versions before 1.23_01 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via quadratic regex backtracking when parsing chunked request bodies.
In chunked mode, used when no content length is given, add() matches each chunk-size line with `/^([\da-fA-F]+).*\x0D\x0A/`. On a line of hex digits whose first LF has no CR before it, the digits and `.*` backtrack against each other, so a single add() takes time quadratic in the line's length. Nothing limits how long the line can be.
A remote attacker can exhaust CPU in applications that pass chunked request bodies to HTTP::Body.9hCVE-2026-116268——
———MIME::Field::ParamVal versions before 5.521 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via unclosed comments in header parameters.
The comment pattern used to parse Content-Type and Content-Disposition parameters scans from each "(" to the next ")". In a field with no ")", every "(" scans to the end of the header and fails, so parsing takes time quadratic in the header length. The field is parsed again on each attribute lookup, several times per MIME entity.
A 40 KB header takes about 7 seconds to parse once.9h