CVE WatchNov 1, 2026

CVE-2026-117685

The OCI registry's cross-repository blob mount checked the target package against the token's `public-only` restriction, but checked the sou

CVSS

—

No CVSS

EPSS

—

KEV

—

Exploit Today

0-100

Published: Nov 1, 2026 · Last modified: Nov 1, 2026 · CWE-863

EPSS · 30d

Not enough EPSS history yet.

Technical description

The OCI registry's cross-repository blob mount checked the target package against the token's `public-only` restriction, but checked the source blob only against the full account permissions of the token owner. A `public-only` token with `write:package` scope, whose owner can read a private package and write to a public package namespace, could mount a blob of the private package into the public package. The private blob, such as a container layer, could then be downloaded by anyone through the public package.

Official references

Related CVEs

CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.

CVE-2026-119625—

—

——0The `/{username}` web route accepted personal access tokens over HTTP Basic authentication without checking their scope. A token confined to an unrelated scope, such as `read:issue`, could read its owner's private activity through the user RSS/Atom feed and the profile activity tab, and other members' activity in a private organization through the organization feed; a public-only token could list the owner's private repositories and organizations and render private profile READMEs. For a site administrator's token this applied to every account. Tokens are now accepted on this route only for feeds, which require `read:user` or `read:organization`.5h CVE-2026-119441—

—

——0`DELETE /api/v1/orgs/{org}/repos` deletes all repositories of an organization, but it did not enforce the public-only restriction of access tokens: the route only checked that the organization itself was public. A public-only token of an owner of a public organization could therefore permanently delete the organization's private repositories, which such a token must not reach. Routes that require organization ownership now reject public-only tokens.5h CVE-2026-118394—

—

——0The OAuth2 userinfo endpoint (`/login/oauth/userinfo`) decided whether to limit the `groups` claim to public organizations by re-parsing the `Authorization` header as an OAuth2 access token instead of using the scope of the credential that authenticated the request. When a public-only OAuth2 token was sent as a query parameter or form field, or a public-only personal access token was used, that scope came back empty and the claim listed the token owner's private organizations, teams and concealed memberships. The disclosure is limited to the owner's organization and team names and memberships; no repository content is exposed. The endpoint now uses the scope of the authenticating token.5h CVE-2026-118386—

—

——0Workflows triggered by a pull request review were read from the commit named in the review's `commit_id`, while the fork restrictions were decided by the reviewed pull request, and the commit was not checked to belong to that pull request. A user with read access to a repository could place a commit of their own in it, through a fork pull request or an AGit push, and submit a review naming that commit on a pull request whose head branch is in the same repository. On instances with a runner serving the repository, the attacker's workflow then ran without approval, received the Actions secrets of the repository and its owner, and got a `GITEA_TOKEN` with write access to the repository. Review-triggered workflows now run on the pull request head.5h CVE-2026-116289—

—

——0Gitea did not reject personal access tokens restricted to public resources (`public-only`) on the organization Actions runner registration-token endpoint, and the runner registered with the resulting token was not limited to public repositories. Holding only such a token with `write:organization` that belongs to an owner of a public organization, an attacker could register an organization-level runner and receive jobs of the organization's private repositories that have Actions enabled, including the workflow content, Actions secrets and variables, and a task token with access to the private repository. The issue widens what the restricted token can reach; it gives nothing beyond what the owner's full account can already do.5h CVE-2026-1185986.5 MED

40.6%

——12A logic error in Epiphany's site permission handling can cause camera and microphone access to be granted when the user only approves a different permission. In src/ephy-window.c, set_permission() stores the user's Allow/Deny choice after a WebKit permission dialog. Types CLIPBOARD and WEBSITE_DATA_ACCESS are not stored by ephy_permission_is_stored_by_permissions_manager(), so control fell into an else-if that was written as: } else if (EPHY_PERMISSION_TYPE_ACCESS_WEBCAM_AND_MICROPHONE) { Because that expression is a non-zero enum constant, the branch always ran for those types and wrote EPHY_PERMISSION_PERMIT for both ACCESS_WEBCAM and ACCESS_MICROPHONE for the site origin. The user only saw a Clipboard or Website Data Access dialog. A malicious site that obtains approval for clipboard or third-party storage access can afterwards use getUserMedia without a further camera/microphone prompt, exposing audiovisual confidentiality. Requirements: the victim must visit a malicious page and click Allow on a clipboard or website-data-access prompt. Affected: Epiphany >= 45.0 (bug present at least through 51.x). Fixed: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/merge_requests/2249 (commit 480c3648). Upstream: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/work_items/2976 Reporter acknowledgment: Fernando Munoz1d