CVE WatchOct 29, 2026

CVE-2026-118761

Kubeflow Pipelines enables users to build and deploy portable, scalable machine learning workflows. Prior to 2.18.0, the API server decompre

CVSS

7.5

High

EPSS

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KEV

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Exploit Today

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0-100

Published: Oct 29, 2026 · Last modified: Oct 29, 2026 · CWE-409

EPSS · 30d

Not enough EPSS history yet.

Technical description

Kubeflow Pipelines enables users to build and deploy portable, scalable machine learning workflows. Prior to 2.18.0, the API server decompressed uploaded pipeline archives without adequately bounding expanded data while locating or reading the pipeline file. A small ZIP or gzip-compressed tar archive can consume disproportionately large memory and exhaust API-server resources. Multipart pipeline and pipeline-version upload processing performs decompression before namespace authorization, so a reachable caller does not need a successful pipeline-create authorization decision. URL-import handlers authorize before fetching and decompressing a remote archive. The amount of expansion required to interrupt service depends on deployment resource limits and concurrent activity, and no specific archive is guaranteed to crash every deployment. This issue is fixed in version 2.18.0.

Official references

Related CVEs

CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.

CVE-2026-118261—

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——0Echo is a Go web framework. From 4.0.0 until 4.16.1, Echo v4's opt-in Decompress middleware exposes a gzip-decoded request stream without limiting its expanded size. A small compressed request can expand into a very large body when a handler reads or binds it, consuming excessive memory or CPU and allowing repeated or concurrent requests to cause denial of service. The middleware is not enabled by default, and limiting only the compressed request size does not bound the decoded size. This issue is fixed in 4.16.1.7h CVE-2026-111073—

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——0The broker-side PushTelemetry API (KIP-714) validates only the compressed size of a client's metrics payload against telemetry.max.bytes (default 1 MB) before decompressing it. ClientTelemetryUtils.decompress() then decompresses the payload with no limit on the decompressed output size, growing a heap buffer until the compressed input is exhausted. A small, highly compressible payload (for example gzip-compressed zeros) can therefore expand to hundreds of megabytes of broker heap. Impact: An authenticated client can send a PushTelemetry request with a small compressed payload that decompresses to a very large size, consuming broker heap out of proportion to the request size. Repeated or concurrent requests can exhaust the broker heap and cause an OutOfMemoryError, degrading or crashing the broker; a client that targets multiple brokers can affect cluster availability. PushTelemetry is available to any authenticated client and is not gated by an ACL. Mitigation: Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.1, or 4.4.0. On affected versions there is no configuration that fully prevents the amplification, because telemetry.max.bytes bounds only the compressed size; lowering telemetry.max.bytes reduces the worst-case decompressed size proportionally and is a partial mitigation. Resolution: - From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.1, and 4.4.0: ClientTelemetryUtils.decompress() enforces a maximum decompressed size equal to telemetry.max.bytes (default 1 MB). Decompression reads in bounded chunks and aborts with a TelemetryTooLargeException once the decompressed total exceeds the limit, so an over-large or highly compressible payload is rejected instead of being fully expanded in heap. The decompressed size is therefore bounded by default.7h CVE-2026-1166627.5 HIG

31.4%

——9Tanium addressed a compression bomb vulnerability in Enforce.1d CVE-2026-1165795.9 MED

36.7%

——11Autobahn Python is a WebSocket and WAMP implementation for Python that supports Twisted and asyncio. From 26.7.1 until 26.10.1, PerMessageBrotli.decompress_message_data in compress_brotli.py calls the Brotli decompressor without an output limit and checks maxMessagePayloadSize only after a complete frame has been inflated. An unauthenticated WebSocket client can send a small, highly compressed frame that allocates hundreds of MiB before rejection, causing memory-exhaustion denial of service on servers that enable the opt-in permessage-brotli feature through the compress extra. Deflate and bzip2 already enforce the remaining output budget and are outside this residual vulnerability. This issue is fixed in version 26.10.1.2d CVE-2026-65627—

16.2%

——5Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in potatosalad jose (erlang-jose) allows a remote attacker to exhaust a node's memory with a small crafted JWE token. The jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2 function in src/jwe/jose_jwe_zip.erl decompresses the DEFLATE-compressed plaintext of a JWE that carries the optional zip: DEF header by calling zlib:inflate/2 on the entire attacker-controlled stream, with no bound on the output size or the inflation ratio. Raw DEFLATE reaches ratios around 1000:1 on highly repetitive input, so a few-kilobyte token inflates to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in a single call. Decompression runs automatically during decryption through jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2 (JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt/2 in Elixir), before the recipient can inspect or reject the payload. With the common asymmetric key-management algorithms (RSA-OAEP, ECDH-ES) an attacker needs only the recipient's public key to craft such a token, so no authentication or secret material is required. A single small token can exhaust the node's memory and crash the BEAM, denying service to all users. This issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.2d CVE-2026-938506.5 MED

32.3%

——10Mattermost versions 11.9.x <= 11.9.1, 11.8.x <= 11.8.5, 11.7.x <= 11.7.10, 11.10.x <= 11.10.1 fail to bind the volume of text extracted from an uploaded PDF which allows an authenticated user to exhaust server memory and cause a denial of service via a crafted PDF whose compressed content stream expands into a very large amount of text.. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-007693d