CVE WatchOct 30, 2026

CVE-2026-119328

Immich is a high-performance self-hosted photo and video management solution. Prior to 3.3.0, the unauthenticated machine-learning /predict

CVSS

6.5

Medium

EPSS

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KEV

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Exploit Today

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0-100

Published: Oct 30, 2026 · Last modified: Oct 30, 2026 · CWE-22 · CWE-73

EPSS · 30d

Not enough EPSS history yet.

Technical description

Immich is a high-performance self-hosted photo and video management solution. Prior to 3.3.0, the unauthenticated machine-learning /predict endpoint in machine-learning/immich_ml/main.py accepted an options object and passed its values into model construction in machine-learning/immich_ml/models/base.py without restricting security-sensitive parameters. An attacker with network access to the service could set cache_dir to an arbitrary writable path, causing model downloads to write there and causing clear_cache() to pass that path to shutil.rmtree() after selected model-loading failures. Depending on filesystem permissions and the selected path, this could modify files in mounted data locations or recursively delete an attacker-selected directory. The model-name allowlist prevents this issue from becoming arbitrary-model deserialization or code execution. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.0.

Official references

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CVE-2026-617256.1 MED

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———SABnzbd is an open source automated Usenet download tool. Prior to 5.1.0Beta3, orphan-job management in `sabnzbd/api.py` accepts the user-controlled `value` parameter without path confinement before `os.path.join()` with `download_dir`. An absolute path discards that base directory. An attacker with a valid API key can invoke `mode=status` with `name=delete_orphan` to reach `_api_delete_orphan` and `remove_all()` in `sabnzbd/filesystem.py`, which uses `shutil.rmtree()` for recursive deletion. The advisory also identifies `_api_add_orphan` and `_api_delete_all_orphan` as affected by the path-validation issue, while its concrete arbitrary-deletion trace is through `_api_delete_orphan`. The API key is stored in plaintext in `sabnzbd.ini`. The attacker can delete files or directories writable by the SABnzbd process, including configuration, queue data, and downloads, but system files outside the regular user's ownership are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.0Beta3.6h CVE-2026-1193436.8 MED

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———Stirling-PDF is a locally hosted web application that facilitates various operations on PDF files. Prior to 3.0.0, POST /api/v1/ai/tools/create-pdf-from-html-agent accepts attacker-controlled htmlContent and passes it to WeasyPrint without CustomHtmlSanitizer, unlike the sanitized /api/v1/convert/html/pdf control path. HTTP and HTTPS resource references can make server-side requests to internal or cloud-metadata destinations, while file references can embed local content readable by the Stirling-PDF process into the generated PDF. The endpoint is reachable without credentials when security.enableLogin is false, and the flaw is distinct from earlier Stirling-PDF WeasyPrint vulnerabilities in older conversion paths. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.0.6h CVE-2026-1193425.3 MED

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———Stirling-PDF is a locally hosted web application that facilitates various operations on PDF files. From 2.13.1 until 2.13.2, the POST /api/v1/convert/svg/pdf endpoint renders attacker-supplied SVG through Apache Batik, and a scheme-less root-relative image reference bypasses SvgSanitizer.isExternalUrl() before Batik resolves it against the file:///input.svg document base as a same-origin local file. The convert() and addSvgAsPage() paths in app/core/src/main/java/stirling/software/SPDF/utils/SvgToPdf.java can then render image-decodable server files into the returned PDF when sanitization is enabled, including without authentication on login-disabled deployments or with non-admin access when login is enabled. The issue discloses PNG, JPG, GIF, or SVG content and provides an existence oracle only for image-decodable paths; plain text, binary files, directories, XInclude text, external entities, explicit file URLs, and tested HTTP references are not disclosed through this mechanism. This issue is fixed in version 2.13.2.6h CVE-2026-1162498.4 HIG

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———In server mode pgAdmin 4 resolves a server's password file, SSL certificate, key, CRL and SSH tunnel identity file relative to the user's storage directory, but get_complete_file_path() only stripped leading slashes before joining the two. A path such as "../<another user>/.pgpass", set through the server dialog, the REST API or a servers.json import, therefore named another user's file, and connecting used that user's saved passwords, client certificate or SSH key. The sslkeylogfile connection parameter was passed to libpq unchanged, so a path outside storage let libpq create or append a file as the account running pgAdmin. make_conninfo() also quoted connection parameter values but not their names, so a crafted parameter name could smuggle additional keyword=value pairs past these checks. The fix requires the resolved path, with symbolic links followed, to stay inside the user's storage directory or the named shared storage directory, confines sslkeylogfile the same way, and accepts only exact libpq keywords as connection parameter names. A refused path or keyword is reported instead of letting libpq fall back to a default. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.7h CVE-2026-1162406.5 MED

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———In server mode pgAdmin 4 validates a path into the user's storage directory with check_access_permission(), which builds the absolute path with get_abs_path(). Several callers then acted on a path they built differently, so the path checked and the path used could name different files: - Opening a file in the Query Tool, the Google client secret and, on Windows, Import/Export Data, Backup, Restore and saving a file joined the path to the storage directory after stripping leading slashes and backslashes. On POSIX a path checked as a name inside storage could become an absolute path once stripped, so any file the pgAdmin account can read could be opened; on Windows a path naming a drive discarded the storage directory, so these could read, or write, outside it. - Listing a folder decoded the path a second time after the check, so a folder named like an encoded "..", which a user can create, listed any directory on the host. - Download, delete, rename and the file-exists check appended the path to the storage directory without a separator, so in a deployment where one user's storage directory name is a prefix of another's, another user's files could be read, deleted or moved; download also checked the path appended to itself. - Creating a folder could create one in another user's directory. The fix makes check_access_permission() return the path it checked and every caller act on that path, decodes folder paths once, and opens, deletes and renames files relative to directories opened from the storage directory without following symbolic links. Desktop mode is not affected. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.7h