CVE-2026-126799
Gotenberg 8.31.0 before 8.38.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in IsPublicIP() that allows unauthenticated attackers to
CVSS
7.5
High
EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
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0-100
Published: Nov 11, 2026 · Last modified: Nov 11, 2026 · CWE-918
Not enough EPSS history yet.
Gotenberg 8.31.0 before 8.38.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in IsPublicIP() that allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass private-IP deny-list protections using IPv6 zone identifiers. Attackers can append a zone such as %25eth0 to the unspecified address or blocked IPv6 prefixes in downloadFrom, webhook, or Chromium/LibreOffice URLs to reach internal services and read responses in the returned PDF.
- github.comhttps://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/blob/v8.37.0/pkg/gotenberg/outbound.go#L112-L142
- github.comhttps://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/commit/8e850b1c932452627fba397f2005dd6fd57b9617
- github.comhttps://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/releases/tag/v8.38.0
- github.comhttps://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-fqg9-x2xw-5crx
- www.vulncheck.comhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gotenberg-8.31.0-before-8.38.0-ssrf-via-ipv6-zone-identifiers-in-ispublicip
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-675457.4 HIG—
———Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.73, the HTTP workflow node in Heym makes outbound HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validation of the target host or IP address. If a workflow author has already configured an HTTP node that targets internal addresses such as cloud metadata endpoints or private network hosts, and exposed the workflow with anonymous execution, an unauthenticated attacker can trigger the preconfigured SSRF sink. The same project has comprehensive SSRF protection in its MCP integration, which is absent from the HTTP node. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.73.3hCVE-2026-675427.1 HIG—
———Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools is reachable by any authenticated user (lowest role; no admin/workflow association) and fetches an attacker-supplied URL through the sse and streamable_http transports with no scheme / private-IP / allowlist / redirect guard. The transport error is reflected in the HTTP 422 response, giving a semi-blind SSRF oracle, and the attacker also controls the outbound request headers. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70.3hCVE-2026-68507——
———ideon is a self-hosted visual workspace. Prior to version 0.9.5, ideon's link-preview endpoint requires no authentication at all and forwards any URL a caller supplies straight into a server-side fetch. The app does have a general-purpose SSRF guard (safeFetch/validateSafeUrl in src/app/lib/ssrf.ts), but this route sits behind no login check whatsoever, making it a fully open, anonymous URL-fetch relay - and the guard's IP blocklist itself has a gap that lets it reach the server's own loopback interface via the 0.0.0.0 "any address" bypass, a well-documented SSRF-filter evasion technique on Linux. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.5.4hCVE-2026-65968——
———ideon is a self-hosted visual workspace. Prior to version 0.9.4, validateUrlForSSRF() / safeFetch() in lib/oauth/ssrf-protection.ts (and the parallel validateMcpUrl() in lib/security/validators.ts) perform SSRF host-blocking by string/regex matching on new URL(url).hostname. Their IPv6 branch only recognises the textual forms ::1, fe80:/fc00:/fd00: prefixes, and the dotted-decimal IPv4-mapped form ::ffff:127.x. It does not recognise the WHATWG-canonical IPv4-mapped-IPv6 host that Node emits for a mapped address, which is hex-compressed and bracket-wrapped: [::ffff:7f00:1] for 127.0.0.1, [::ffff:a9fe:a9fe] for 169.254.169.254. An authenticated user who registers a STREAMABLE_HTTP / SSE MCP server with URL http://[::ffff:7f00:1]:PORT/ (loopback) or http://[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe]/ (cloud metadata) passes both guards, and the server-side OAuth-discovery action then fetches that host, yielding server-side request forgery to loopback and to the cloud metadata service. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.4.4hCVE-2026-1259268.5 HIG—
———Server-side request forgery (SSRF) in the server registration and update API in Amazon mcp-gateway-registry before 1.35.0 might allow an authenticated remote user to send requests from the gateway to internal network services and cloud instance metadata endpoints and read the responses via a crafted request.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version 1.35.0.4hCVE-2026-103980——
———ideon is a self-hosted visual workspace. Prior to version 0.9.6, the SSRF protection in safeFetch is bypassed by IPv6 transition addresses that embed private IPv4 addresses. The isPrivateIP function in src/app/lib/ssrf.ts checks only a narrow set of IPv6 ranges (loopback ::1, ULA fc/fd, link-local fe80) but does not recognize IPv4-mapped (::ffff:), NAT64 well-known (64:ff9b::/96, RFC 6052), NAT64 local-use (64:ff9b:1::/48, RFC 8215), 6to4 (2002::/16, RFC 3056), or Teredo (2001::/32, RFC 4380) encodings. An authenticated user can supply these addresses in link URLs to reach cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), localhost services, and RFC 1918 internal networks through the link preview metadata fetcher. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.6.4h