CVE-2026-14321
The divi-dash WordPress plugin before 1.0.7 does not validate the source of the client IP address it uses for rate limiting and banning, all
CVSS
8.2
High
EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
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0-100
Published: Sep 23, 2026 · Last modified: Sep 23, 2026 · CWE-400
Not enough EPSS history yet.
The divi-dash WordPress plugin before 1.0.7 does not validate the source of the client IP address it uses for rate limiting and banning, allowing unauthenticated attackers to spoof arbitrary IP addresses in order to bypass rate limiting, ban chosen addresses from the feature, and grow a stored option without bound, resulting in denial of service.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-777917.5 HIG—
———Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in Apache Tomcat during sending of WebSocket close message enabled a DoS attack.
This issue affects Apache Tomcat: from 11.0.0-M5 through 11.0.25, from 10.1.8 through 10.1.59, from 9.0.74 through 9.0.121.
The following versions were EOL at the time the CVE was created but are
known to be affected: from 8.5.88 through 8.5.100. Other unsupported versions may also be affected.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 11.0.26, 10.1.60 or 9.0.122, which fix the issue.3hCVE-2026-866088.2 HIG—
———The WP Recipe Maker WordPress plugin before 10.8.2 does not have any authorisation check in one of its REST routes, nor does it bound what that route stores, allowing unauthenticated users to write unlimited data into any user's metadata and to permanently prevent that account, including an administrator's, from loading.5hCVE-2026-917777.5 HIG—
———Forward-reference completion for @JsonIdentityInfo object IDs in FasterXML jackson-databind performs a linear scan of the pending-reference accumulator for every resolved ID. The affected paths are CollectionDeserializer.CollectionReferringAccumulator.resolveForwardReference() and the equivalent implementation in MapDeserializer. When a document first creates N unresolved object-ID references in an identity-enabled collection or map and then defines those same IDs in reverse order, completion performs on the order of N * (N + 1) / 2 identity comparisons, so a shallow document whose size grows linearly causes quadratic CPU work during deserialization. The reporter instrumented equals() calls on the ID class and measured exactly 2,003,000 comparisons at N = 2,000, against zero comparisons in the pending-reference lookup path for an equally sized control in which every reference was already resolved. The input requires no deep nesting and no syntactically unusual JSON. Exploitation requires an application that deserializes attacker-influenced JSON into an identity-enabled collection or map. The fix replaces the repeated linear lookup with a keyed pending-reference structure.13hCVE-2026-917767.5 HIG—
———TypeDeserializerBase._findDeserializer() in FasterXML jackson-databind caches the resolved deserializer under the raw, attacker-supplied type ID. When name-based polymorphism is configured with a fallback, for example @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.NAME, defaultImpl = ...), every distinct unrecognized type ID resolves to the same fallback deserializer but is retained as its own key in the _deserializers map. That map has no configurable bound and lives for the lifetime of the type deserializer, so an attacker who can repeatedly supply fresh unknown type IDs causes monotonic memory retention across requests. The reporter observed 10,000 retained entries from 10,000 distinct unknown IDs, against a single entry for a control that repeated one unknown ID the same number of times, isolating attacker-controlled key cardinality from request volume. Exploitation requires an application that enables name-based polymorphism with a defaultImpl or equivalent fallback, accepts attacker-influenced type IDs, and reuses a long-lived ObjectMapper across requests. The fix stops caching fallback resolutions for unrecognized IDs and bounds both the number of cached entries and the length of a cacheable type ID.13hCVE-2026-894257.5 HIG—
———UTF8DataInputJsonParser._reportInvalidToken() in FasterXML jackson-core builds the offending-token text for its error message by appending Java identifier characters to a StringBuilder in a loop that has no upper bound. Unlike the three sibling parser implementations, including UTF8StreamJsonParser, it never consults ErrorReportConfiguration.getMaxErrorTokenLength() (default 256). A malformed token supplied to a parser created through JsonFactory.createParser(DataInput) is therefore accumulated in full. No StreamReadConstraints setting mitigates this: maxDocumentLength cannot be applied to DataInput sources at all, and maxStringLength does not cover this path because the accumulation bypasses ReadConstrainedTextBuffer. The reporter measured a 20,000,109-character exception message from a 20-million-character malformed token on the DataInput path, against 367 characters for identical input on the InputStream path. Scaling the payload drives the StringBuilder, which also incurs byte-to-char expansion and internal array doubling, to many times the raw payload size and can trigger OutOfMemoryError for the whole JVM. UTF8DataInputJsonParser was introduced in 2.8.0 together with createParser(DataInput); releases before 2.8.0 do not contain the affected class.13hCVE-2026-575766.5 MED—
———plone.app.dexterity is a content-type system for the Plone content management system, and plone.app.contenttypes provides Plone’s Dexterity-based content types. Plone.app.dexterity versions through 3.2.2, 4.0.0 through 4.1.2, and 5.0.0, and plone.app.contenttypes versions through 3.0.11, 4.0.0 through 4.0.9, and 5.0.0 are vulnerable to denial of service because an authenticated user can create content with excessively long titles, descriptions, or uploaded-file names, causing Plone to become unresponsive and potentially making the resulting content difficult to edit or delete. The vulnerability is patched in plone.app.dexterity versions 3.2.3, 4.1.3, and 5.0.1, and in plone.app.contenttypes versions 3.0.12, 4.0.10, and 5.0.1.17h