CVE-2026-17621
IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.2 could allow a remote attacker to traverse directories on the system. An attacker could send a speciall
CVSS
5.4
Medium
EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
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0-100
Published: Sep 4, 2026 · Last modified: Sep 4, 2026 · CWE-22
Not enough EPSS history yet.
IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.2 could allow a remote attacker to traverse directories on the system. An attacker could send a specially crafted URL request containing "dot dot " sequences ( /.. /) to view arbitrary files on the system.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-819399.1 CRI—
———A Zip Slip vulnerability in the SonicWall Network Security Manager (NSM) On-Prem file upload and archive processing functionality allows an attacker to extract files outside the intended destination directory using a specially crafted archive.16hCVE-2026-53757——
———Emlog is an open source website building system. In versions 2.6.29 and prior, the emUnZip() function extracts all ZIP entries via ZipArchive::extractTo() without validating entry paths for ../ traversal sequences. Only the first entry's subdirectory structure is checked. An attacker can overwrite arbitrary files on the server filesystem, including config.php for immediate RCE. At time of publication, there are no publicly known patches.18hCVE-2026-50553——
———Note Mark is an open-source note-taking application. Prior to version 0.19.5, Note Mark validates book and note slug values with the OpenAPI/huma tag pattern:"[a-z0-9-]+". huma compiles this with regexp.MustCompile(s.Pattern) and tests it with patternRe.MatchString(str), an UNANCHORED match. Because the pattern is not anchored (^...$), any string that merely CONTAINS one [a-z0-9-] substring passes validation. A slug such as ../../../../../../tmp/escape is accepted and stored verbatim. The data-export CLI commands (note-mark migrate export and note-mark migrate export-v1) join these unsanitized slugs straight into the output path with path.Join / filepath.Join, then os.MkdirAll the directory and os.Create the note file. path.Join resolves the ../ segments, so the note content file is written OUTSIDE the configured export directory. The export process commonly runs as root (default in Docker / bare-metal admin usage), so this is a root-privilege arbitrary directory create + file write. This issue has been patched in version 0.19.5.18hCVE-2026-176226.5 MED—
———IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.2 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory.19hCVE-2026-144706.5 MED—
———IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.2 could allow an authenticated attacker to traverse directories on the system. An attacker could send a specially crafted URL request containing "dot dot" sequences (/../) to view arbitrary files on the system.19hCVE-2026-193067.7 HIG—
———IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.11.2 allows an authenticated attacker to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem — including server secret material (secret_key, JWT signing keys, the application database, /proc/self/environ, and other tenants' upload directories) — by supplying absolute paths or traversal sequences in the files parameter of an authenticated build request. The file contents were embedded as text attachments in the language model prompt and transmitted to the configured model endpoint, resulting in confidential data exfiltration. This bypassed the LANGFLOW_RESTRICT_LOCAL_FILE_ACCESS=true containment boundary, which was enforced for other file-reading components but not for the Chat Input to Message attachment pipeline.18h