CVE-2026-18674
On a Kong Mesh global control plane, resources received over the zone-to-global KDS sync are attributed using the in-band, sender-controlled
CVSS
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EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
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Published: Aug 17, 2026 · Last modified: Aug 17, 2026 · CWE-345 · CWE-863
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On a Kong Mesh global control plane, resources received over the zone-to-global KDS sync are attributed using the in-band, sender-controlled ControlPlane.Identifier rather than the authenticated zone identity derived from the connection. Authenticated zones can have the global control plane store and re-distribute those resources as belonging to another zone. The result is a cross-zone isolation bypass: the holder of a single enrolled zone's credential can inject, attribute, and overwrite resources in another zone's namespace mesh-wide. The root cause lives in Kuma's open-source KDS sync code, which Kong Mesh's control plane is built on.
- developer.konghq.comhttps://developer.konghq.com/mesh/changelog/
- github.comhttps://github.com/kumahq/kuma/pull/17456
- github.comhttps://github.com/kumahq/kuma/pull/17458
- github.comhttps://github.com/kumahq/kuma/pull/17459
- github.comhttps://github.com/kumahq/kuma/pull/17460
- github.comhttps://github.com/kumahq/kuma/pull/17461
- github.comhttps://github.com/kumahq/kuma/pull/17462
- github.comhttps://github.com/kumahq/kuma/pull/17463
- github.comhttps://github.com/kumahq/kuma/security/advisories/GHSA-m58j-fjmc-h3g4