CVE-2026-20014
A vulnerability in the IKEv2 feature of Cisco Secure Firewall ASA Software and Cisco Secure FTD Software could allow an authenticated, remot
CVSS
7.7
High
EPSS
0.3%
p21
KEV
—
Exploit Today
6
0-100
Published: Mar 4, 2026 · Last modified: Aug 11, 2026 · CWE-401
0.3%EPSS · 30 days0.3%
2026-08-092026-09-05
A vulnerability in the IKEv2 feature of Cisco Secure Firewall ASA Software and Cisco Secure FTD Software could allow an authenticated, remote attacker with valid VPN user credentials to cause a DoS condition on an affected device that may also impact the availability of services to devices elsewhere in the network. This vulnerability is due to the improper processing of IKEv2 packets. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted, authenticated IKEv2 packets to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to exhaust memory, causing the device to reload.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-183134.3 MED—
——0rpcapd can allocate up to 65536 bytes per each RPCAP_MSG_UPDATEFILTER_REQ or RPCAP_MSG_STARTCAP_REQ message received from the client, but it never frees the memory, so it leaks memory even under normal use. A malicious client can cause the server to leak memory substantially faster.2dCVE-2026-180764.3 MED17.4%
——5IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to cause a denial of service due to a memory leak.3dCVE-2026-13148—31.1%
——9Missing release of memory after effective lifetime vulnerability in Softing smartLink allows resource leak exposure.
This issue affects smartLink HW-PN: from 1.04 before 1.10.3dCVE-2026-202817.5 HIG25.8%
——8A vulnerability in Cisco Desk Phone 9800 Series, Cisco IP Phone 7800 and 8800 Series, and Cisco Video Phone 8875 that are running Cisco Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition on an affected device.
This vulnerability is due to improper memory management when an affected device processes HTTP packets. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a continuous stream of crafted HTTP packets to the device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the affected device to continuously consume memory, resulting in a DoS condition. A manual reboot of the device is required to recover from this condition.
Note: For this vulnerability to be exploitable, the phone must be registered to Cisco Unified Communications Manager (Unified CM) and have Web Access enabled. Web Access is disabled by default.5dCVE-2026-146976.5 MED7.1%
——2net_ipv6_send_ns() in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c allocates a transmit net_pkt for a Neighbor Solicitation. When it is called with a data packet pending on an unresolved neighbor and that neighbor's pending_queue is already non-empty (an NS is already outstanding), the function appends the data packet and returns early without ever sending the NS via net_send_data() or releasing it with net_pkt_unref(). The freshly allocated NS net_pkt and its attached TX buffers are held only by a local variable and are leaked permanently, never returning to CONFIG_NET_PKT_TX_COUNT / CONFIG_NET_BUF_TX_COUNT.
The leaking branch sits on the normal IPv6 transmit path: net_ipv6_prepare_for_send() (called from net_if.c) invokes net_ipv6_send_ns() for any outbound or forwarded IPv6 packet whose next hop is not yet in the neighbor cache. An on-link (adjacent) attacker can drive it deterministically by sending a burst of request packets (for example ICMPv6 echo requests or UDP datagrams) that all spoof a single non-existent on-link source address: the node generates a reply to each, the first reply queues an NS, and every subsequent reply during the roughly three-second INCOMPLETE resolution window takes the leaking branch and loses one TX packet. Router-configured nodes forwarding attacker traffic toward a non-existent on-link host leak identically.
Because the leaked packets are never reclaimed and CONFIG_NET_PKT_TX_COUNT defaults to only 4 (14 for Ethernet), a brief low-rate burst exhausts the TX pool. Once exhausted the node can no longer allocate any transmit packet and cannot send TCP/UDP, ARP/ND, or any reply at all, producing a complete and persistent network denial of service that does not self-heal until reboot. The fix releases the unsent NS packet with net_pkt_unref(pkt) before the early return.6dCVE-2026-146966.5 MED9.8%
——3When Ethernet bridging is enabled (CONFIG_NET_ETHERNET_BRIDGE), eth_bridge_input_process() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/bridge/bridge_input.c decides how each frame received on a bridge member interface is handled. For frames that must also be delivered to the local stack, the code called eth_bridge_handle_locally() and returned NET_OK. That helper does not consume the packet — it only calls bridge_iface_recv() (via virtual_recv()), which returns NET_CONTINUE without taking ownership of pkt.
The NET_OK verdict then propagates through ethernet_recv() up to processing_data() in subsys/net/ip/net_core.c, where NET_OK is interpreted as "the packet was consumed, do not free it." Because no consumer actually took ownership, the RX net_pkt is never returned to the pool and is leaked. The concretely reproducible leak occurs for frames whose EtherType has no registered L3 handler when CONFIG_NET_ETHERNET_FORWARD_UNRECOGNISED_ETHERTYPE is set (default y when CONFIG_NET_SOCKETS_PACKET is enabled): the fall-through L3 dispatch does not overwrite the NET_OK verdict, so ethernet_recv() returns NET_OK and the buffer is never released.
Any device on a bridged L2 segment can emit broadcast/multicast frames carrying an arbitrary EtherType with no authentication. Each such frame permanently consumes one buffer from the finite RX pool (CONFIG_NET_PKT_RX_COUNT), so a brief broadcast flood exhausts the pool and the device can no longer receive traffic until it is rebooted — a persistent denial of service. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact.
The fix makes eth_bridge_handle_locally() propagate the real net_verdict and return NET_CONTINUE for locally-kept frames, writing the bridge interface back through a new dst_iface out-parameter so the packet follows the normal receive path and is unreferenced exactly once.6d