CVE WatchOct 26, 2026

CVE-2026-40070

BSV Ruby SDK is the Ruby SDK for the BSV blockchain. From 0.3.1 to before 0.8.2, BSV::Wallet::WalletClient#acquire_certificate persists cert

CVSS

8.1

High

EPSS

0.1%

KEV

—

Exploit Today

0-100

Published: Apr 9, 2026 · Last modified: Oct 26, 2026 · CWE-347

EPSS · 30d

0.1%EPSS · 30 days0.2%

2026-09-282026-10-26

Technical description

BSV Ruby SDK is the Ruby SDK for the BSV blockchain. From 0.3.1 to before 0.8.2, BSV::Wallet::WalletClient#acquire_certificate persists certificate records to storage without verifying the certifier's signature over the certificate contents. In acquisition_protocol: 'direct', the caller supplies all certificate fields (including signature:) and the record is written to storage verbatim. In acquisition_protocol: 'issuance', the client POSTs to a certifier URL and writes whatever signature the response body contains, also without verification. An attacker who can reach either API (or who controls a certifier endpoint targeted by the issuance path) can forge identity certificates that subsequently appear authentic to list_certificates and prove_certificate.

Official references

Related CVEs

CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.

CVE-2026-65632—

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