CVE-2026-41155
An attacker could cooperatively pass data from one secure GPU process to another secure GPU process through shared secure memory allocations
CVSS
5.5
Medium
EPSS
0.1%
p1
KEV
—
Exploit Today
0
0-100
Published: Jun 12, 2026 · Last modified: Oct 25, 2026 · CWE-653
0.1%EPSS · 30 days0.1%
2026-10-042026-10-31
An attacker could cooperatively pass data from one secure GPU process to another secure GPU process through shared secure memory allocations in the kernel module. Additionally, an attacker could disrupt the operation of another secure GPU process leading to image corruption / GPU hardware recovery. Sharing secure memory allocations among various GPU secure processes allows an attacker to corrupt shared resource affecting other users.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-1203069.9 CRI—
———Beta9 turns each shell command in a tenant image definition into a Dockerfile RUN line and executes it with Buildah on the build worker. The worker image sets BUILDAH_ISOLATION=chroot, and no buildah invocation passes --isolation, so the step only changes its filesystem root. It keeps the worker pod's PID, network, IPC, and user namespaces, runs as uid 0, and holds CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. PID 1 in that procfs is the worker entrypoint, so /proc/1/root is the worker container's filesystem and is writable. That filesystem contains the runc, buildah, and runsc binaries the worker uses to start tenant containers, the worker's Kubernetes service account token, and the host directories mounted into the pod. Worker pods are privileged. Clip v2 layered builds are the default, so a tenant with a workspace token reaches this by submitting one image build. The read-only proof confirmed the shared namespaces, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, and that the worker's runc binary is visible at /proc/1/root. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: Buildah RUN steps, including the WORKDIR mkdir, use OCI isolation with private PID, IPC, and network namespaces, and tenant ARG values are passed only into the build container.15hCVE-2026-1194088.8 HIG50.1%
——15n8n before 2.42.6, 2.43.x before 2.43.3, and 3.x before 3.0.1 contains a remote code execution vulnerability via deprecated Function, Function Item, and LangChain Code nodes running outside task runner isolation. Authenticated users who can create, modify, or import workflows naming these hidden node types can execute JavaScript in the n8n main process.3dCVE-2026-115517—37.3%
——11Unrestricted network access between execution contexts in KNIME Business Hub before version 1.19.0 allows an authenticated remote user to access open network ports on executors in different execution contexts. This only poses a security issue if the IP address of the attacked executor is know and there are open network ports that provided access without further authentication. By default no network ports are open. However, depending on the running workflows, ports may be opened and provide an attack surface. As a workaround, network policies can be created manually.9dCVE-2026-1140878.1 HIG43.7%
——13Trigger.dev before 4.5.6 self-hosted Docker Compose deployments using the default secrets from hosting/docker/.env.example allow authentication bypass because the hardcoded MAGIC_LINK_SECRET lets anyone forge valid magic link tokens. Unauthenticated attackers can log in as any email address, then reach Postgres, Redis, and ClickHouse with default credentials from runner containers on infrastructure networks, compromising all tenant data.12dCVE-2026-1094438.8 HIG58.5%
——18JoySafeter through 1.0.0 contains a remote code execution vulnerability that allows authenticated users to run operating system commands via an unsandboxed execute tool in Copilot standard mode. Attackers can self-register, select standard mode in the WebSocket chat.start extension, and have the agent invoke subprocess.run with shell=True on the host to access other tenants' data and server secrets.12dCVE-2026-1094415.8 MED38.4%
——12LangAlpha through 2026.09.07 contains an improper isolation vulnerability that places all tenants' sandbox containers on Docker's shared default bridge network with inter-container communication enabled. Authenticated users with code execution in their own sandbox can connect directly to other tenants' containers, bypassing require_workspace_owner checks to read files such as vault secrets from exposed servers.12d