CVE-2026-45352
cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.43.4, negative chunk-size in chunked Transfer-E
CVSS
5.3
Medium
EPSS
0.3%
p26
KEV
—
Exploit Today
8
0-100
Published: May 29, 2026 · Last modified: Jul 22, 2026 · CWE-20 · CWE-770 · CWE-1285
0.3%EPSS · 30 days0.3%
2026-08-232026-09-20
cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.43.4, negative chunk-size in chunked Transfer-Encoding causes unbounded memory allocation and process crash. The ChunkedDecoder::read_payload function in cpp-httplib (httplib.h) parses the chunk-size field of HTTP chunked transfer encoding using std::strtoul(). Per the C standard (§7.22.1.4), strtoul silently accepts a leading minus sign, performing unsigned wrap-around: strtoul("-2", …, 16) returns ULONG_MAX − 1 (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE). The library's only guard (line 12833) rejects ULONG_MAX (the result of "-1"), but any other negative value such as "-2" passes validation. The resulting near-maximum value is stored in chunk_remaining and controls how many bytes the server's read loop consumes from the network. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.43.4.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-94383——
———The MISP blocklist workflow module accepted a user-supplied blocklist filename parameter without validating the file extension. The only sanitization applied was basename() to strip path components and a check for empty or dot values. A site administrator could specify a filename with an arbitrary extension that would be placed in the MISP export directory. If the underlying web server is configured to interpret and execute scripts from that directory, the resulting file could be invoked, leading to arbitrary code execution in the context of the web server process.
The vulnerability requires the attacker to hold site-administrator privileges within MISP, as the blocklist workflow module is restricted to that role. No additional user interaction is required beyond triggering the workflow action with a crafted filename parameter. The impact is full compromise of the MISP server's confidentiality, integrity, and availability, as arbitrary script execution grants the attacker the same privileges as the web server user.
Version affected: <2.5.472hCVE-2026-94379——
———The login() function in MISP's UsersController.php contained insufficient HTTP method validation for several security-critical code paths. The original code used an allowlist approach, checking only for specific HTTP methods (POST and PUT) before enforcing bruteforce protection, email one-time-password (OTP) verification, and login-failure logging. Because the checks were not exhaustive, an unauthenticated attacker could issue login requests using other HTTP methods and bypass all three security controls simultaneously. Specifically:
- the bruteforce blocklisting check and attempt counter were skipped, allowing unlimited credential-guessing attempts without being rate-limited or blocked
- the email OTP two-factor authentication step was skipped, defeating the second factor of authentication
- login-failure events were neither logged nor counted, removing the audit trail and the mechanism that would normally trigger a blocklist entry.
The security impact is the effective disabling of brute-force protection and multi-factor authentication for any attacker who can craft an HTTP request with a non-POST/PUT method to the login endpoint, potentially leading to credential compromise and unauthorized access to the MISP instance.
Version affected: <2.5.472hCVE-2026-65654——
———github.com/temporalio/ringpop-go enforces configured LabelOptions limits when an application changes the local node's labels, but affected versions do not apply those limits to label maps received in SWIM membership changes. A network peer that can reach a live Ringpop TChannel listener can repeatedly submit changes for distinct member addresses containing label keys, values, or counts that exceed the receiver's configured limits. Accepted labels are retained in the member list and disseminated to peers, allowing memory and gossip-bandwidth consumption to exceed configured bounds and potentially making the hosting process unavailable. The fix validates peer-supplied label maps before they are retained or disseminated. Availability only; no confidentiality or integrity impact was identified.3hCVE-2026-940936.3 MED—
———A security vulnerability has been detected in DLR-RM stable-baselines3 up to 2.9.0. This affects the function PPO.load/load_replay_buffer/VecNormalize.load of the file save_util.py. Such manipulation leads to deserialization. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. In v2.9.0 the PyTorch tensor load path is hardened (weights_only=True), but that hardening was later reverted on master via PR #1913 "Hotfix: revert loading with weights_only=True" [blocked] to fix PyTorch 1.13 compat - so even the one "safe" path is inconsistent across versions. #2281 was closed as a duplicate of #1831 since both are unsafe pickle deserialization - but #1831's fix (PR #41) only gated the Hugging Face Hub loader in the separate huggingface_sb3 package. This finding covers the core stable_baselines3 load APIs (PPO.load, load_replay_buffer, VecNormalize.load), which have no safe mode or gate and remained exploitable in v2.9.0 until the outstanding hardening (PR #2264) ships.1hCVE-2026-940925.5 MED—
———A vulnerability was detected in dmlc dgl up to 2.1.0. This impacts the function load_info/_read_torch_data of the file utils.py. Performing a manipulation of the argument path results in deserialization. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.1hCVE-2026-940915.5 MED—
———A weakness has been identified in piskvorky gensim up to 4.4.0. The impacted element is the function Load of the file gensim/utils.py of the component Model Loader. This manipulation of the argument fname causes deserialization. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. Maintainer closed #3663 same-day with no comment, PR, or fix; repo's last push (2025-11-01) predates the report, so the unsafe pickle.load in SaveLoad.load remains unguarded at develop HEAD.1h