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CVE WatchOct 25, 2026

CVE-2026-46406

Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. From 2.1.59 until 2.1.128, the Claude Code /copy command wrote responses to a hardcoded, predictable

CVSS

6.1

Medium

EPSS

0.2%

p4

KEV

—

Exploit Today

1

0-100

Published: Jun 29, 2026 · Last modified: Oct 25, 2026 · CWE-59 · CWE-200 · CWE-377

EPSS · 30d
0.2%EPSS · 30 days0.2%
2026-10-022026-10-30
Technical description

Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. From 2.1.59 until 2.1.128, the Claude Code /copy command wrote responses to a hardcoded, predictable path (/tmp/claude/response.md) without UID isolation, randomness, or symlink protection. The file was created world-readable (0644) in a world-traversable directory (0755), allowing any local user to read a privileged user's Claude response, which could contain secrets or credentials. Additionally, because the path was static and predictable, a local attacker could pre-create the directory and plant a symlink at the expected file path, causing the privileged process to follow the symlink and overwrite an attacker-chosen file with the response text. Exploiting this required a local unprivileged user on the same system and a privileged user to run the /copy command. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.1.128.

Official references
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