CVE-2026-47361
In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v541-5.9.2, BubbleChatActivity is exported with no permission guard and accepts a SE
CVSS
6.4
Medium
EPSS
—
KEV
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Exploit Today
0
0-100
Published: Aug 7, 2026 · Last modified: Aug 8, 2026 · CWE-926
Not enough EPSS history yet.
In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v541-5.9.2, BubbleChatActivity is exported with no permission guard and accepts a SEND intent with a caller-supplied conversation_id. When the activity closes and no in-process session matches that ID, it unconditionally cancels notification ID 9201 (the Bits AI chat notification), with no check on the caller's identity or ownership of the conversation. This requires a malicious application co-installed on the victim's device. Impact: A co-installed application can silently dismiss the victim's Bits AI chat notification. No chat content is exposed; conversation data remains server-authentication gated and is never returned to the caller.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-473636.3 MED—
——0In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v541-5.9.2, the exported launcher activity AppActivity accepts an attacker-supplied session (including OAuth tokens) from Intent extras with no permission guard, and signs the app into that session without validating it against the backend.
This requires a malicious application co-installed on a device with the Datadog app installed, and an OAuth token the attacker is willing to load into the victim's app.
Impact: A co-installed application can switch the victim's Datadog app to a session the attacker controls. This is an account-confusion issue; it does not by itself expose the victim's existing session or data.13hCVE-2026-449655.5 MED—
——0In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, six App Widget configuration activities (IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, DashboardWidgetActivity) are exported with no permission guard. Each accepts a caller-supplied AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID and, when no deep-link destination is resolved, uses it to load the matching widget's stored session and automatically log in as that user. Because Android widget IDs are small sequential integers, a co-installed application can brute-force this value to find one that matches a widget configured on the victim's device.
This requires:
A malicious application co-installed on the victim's device.
At least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen.
An active Datadog session cached locally.
Impact: The matching configuration activity opens in the foreground under the victim's session and renders live infrastructure data. Exposure is limited to a visual side channel (e.g., screen recording or accessibility services); the calling application cannot programmatically read the rendered data.13hCVE-2026-186045.3 MED1.1%
——0A vulnerability was identified in textPlus Text Message and Call App up to 8.3.5 on Android. This impacts the function DialerActivity of the component com.gogii.textplus. Such manipulation leads to improper export of android application components. The attack needs to be performed locally. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure.5dCVE-2026-204706.2 MED2.9%
——1In Telephony, there is a possible information disclosure due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS11086431; Issue ID: MSV-8189.5dCVE-2026-578485.5 MED4.1%
——1Stoat for Android exports the chat.stoat.activities.ShareTargetActivity component (reachable to any process on the device via the android.intent.action.SEND intent) and accepts the file to share as a URI supplied through the android.intent.extra.STREAM extra. The activity does not validate or filter the incoming URI before using it as the outgoing attachment, so a caller can pass a file:// URI pointing at the application's own internal storage (for example /data/data/chat.revolt/databases/revolt.db, cached authentication token files, or preferences) and have the app treat that internal file as a user-selected attachment. An attacker who can invoke intents on the victim's device (via ADB access, a co-installed malicious application, or any other route that reaches Android's intent dispatch) can launch ShareTargetActivity with such a URI and cause the victim, on a single channel-selection interaction, to send the internal file to any Stoat channel or user of the attacker's choosing. The composer displays the attachment as \"attachment\" with no filename indication, so the victim has no visible signal that the file being sent is their own internal application data. Consequences include disclosure of the local Stoat database (message history, contact list, cached content), disclosure of authentication tokens permitting full account takeover, and disclosure of any other file readable by the app process.16dCVE-2026-12960—2.0%
——1An Improper Export of Android Application Components vulnerability in ASUS Router App allows a third-party application on the same device to send a crafted Intent that causes ASUS Router App to open an specified URL.
Refer to the '
Security Update for ASUS Router Android App ' section on the ASUS Security Advisory for more information.33d