CVE-2026-49114
In ONNX before 1.21.0, the 'save_external_data' function builds the external-data file path from the model's external_data location field an
CVSS
7.1
High
EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
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0-100
Published: Aug 21, 2026 · Last modified: Aug 21, 2026 · CWE-22 · CWE-59 · CWE-367
Not enough EPSS history yet.
In ONNX before 1.21.0, the 'save_external_data' function builds the external-data file path from the model's external_data location field and opens it for writing without 'O_NOFOLLOW/O_EXCL', after a non-atomic 'os.path.isfile()' check. A local attacker with write access to the directory where a victim serializes external data can deterministically pre-plant a symlink that is being followed, causing the victim's write to append to any file the victim can write, e.g. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, cron files, or application configs. Fixed in 1.21.0.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-778157.5 HIG—
———to_abs_path in scripts/iib/tool.py normalised the requested path with os.path.normpath, which collapses dot segments but does not resolve symbolic links. A symlink placed inside a scanned directory therefore satisfies the containment comparison performed by is_path_trusted in scripts/iib/api.py while pointing outside that directory, and FileResponse follows the link when serving the response, so a link created in an image directory and targeting a file such as /etc/passwd discloses that file. Whether the check applies depends on get_enable_access_control in scripts/iib/tool.py: it returns true when IIB_ACCESS_CONTROL is set to enable, false when set to disable, and otherwise true when the host Stable Diffusion WebUI was started with share, ngrok, listen or server_name, falling back to false. Confinement is therefore active in the network-exposed WebUI deployments that rely on it, while a standalone run with no such option serves every readable file regardless of this flaw. The fix resolves the path with os.path.realpath.5hCVE-2026-778147.5 HIG—
———is_path_trusted in scripts/iib/api.py compares the requested path against each allowed parent directory with path.startswith(parent_path), without appending a path separator. A directory whose name merely begins with an allowed path therefore satisfies the comparison, so where /data/images is allowed a request for /data/images_private/secret.txt is treated as trusted and served by FileResponse, disclosing files the confinement was meant to exclude. Whether the check applies depends on get_enable_access_control in scripts/iib/tool.py: it returns true when IIB_ACCESS_CONTROL is set to enable, false when set to disable, and otherwise true when the host Stable Diffusion WebUI was started with share, ngrok, listen or server_name, falling back to false. Confinement is therefore active in the network-exposed WebUI deployments that rely on it, while a standalone run with no such option serves every readable file regardless of this flaw. The fix compares against parent_path joined with os.sep.5hCVE-2026-631259.9 CRI—
———Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.3.0, an unprivileged, project-confined Incus user (a non-admin TLS/RBAC identity with `can_create_images` and `can_create_instances`) can execute arbitrary code as root on the host. A crafted image ships `backup.yaml` as a symlink to a host file. When the root daemon writes the instance's backup file, it follows the symlink. Version 7.3.0 patches the issue.5hCVE-2026-76611——
———Joomla Extension - yootheme.com - Unauthenticated arbitrary directory listing via the Gallery element in Zoo < 4.1.66.4hCVE-2026-75115——
———Joomla Extension - yootheme.com - Authenticated, privileged arbitrary file read in YOOtheme Pro 2.3.0-5.0.40 - The Filesystem source's path filter is vulnerable to glob-based pattern attacks, allowing authorized users to read arbitrary files.4hCVE-2026-777636.5 MED—
——0The filestore backend in pkg/object/file.go, used for file:// stores and as a common juicefs sync destination, derived every operation's target from path(key), which returned either filepath.Join(d.root, key) or filepath.Clean(d.root + key) with no check that the result stayed beneath the root. Put, Get, Head, Delete, Chmod, Chown, Symlink and Readlink all consumed that value directly. Object keys enumerated from a source object store during a sync are not constrained the way local filesystem names are, so a key containing traversal segments causes juicefs to write attacker-supplied content to a path outside the intended local destination, and no error is returned. An operator syncing from a bucket whose contents they do not fully control, such as a shared or public bucket or one an attacker can write to, is therefore exposed to a file write at an attacker-influenced location. The fix changes path() to return an error and rejects any key whose resolved path escapes the root.9h