CVE-2026-49742
Backend users with file download permissions were able to download files from the fallback storage of the file abstraction layer (FAL) via t
CVSS
—
No CVSS
EPSS
0.3%
p24
KEV
—
Exploit Today
7
0-100
Published: Jun 9, 2026 · Last modified: Jul 23, 2026 · CWE-22 · CWE-200
0.3%EPSS · 30 days0.3%
2026-08-142026-09-10
Backend users with file download permissions were able to download files from the fallback storage of the file abstraction layer (FAL) via the Media Module. Since the fallback storage resolves paths relative to the server's document root, this could expose sensitive files such as log files. This issue affects TYPO3 CMS versions 11.0.0-11.5.50, 12.0.0-12.4.45, 13.0.0-13.4.30 and 14.0.0-14.3.2.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-8570610.0 CRI—
———GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 18.7 before 19.1.8, 19.2 before 19.2.6, and 19.3 before 19.3.2 that, under certain conditions, an unauthenticated user could have read arbitrary files from the GitLab server due to improper path confinement and missing authentication enforcement in the repository commits API.4hCVE-2026-90445——
———An interface that accepts file uploads from authenticated users extracts the contents of uploaded archives without validating that extracted file paths remain within the intended destination directory. This allows an authenticated attacker to craft an archive whose entries traverse outside the destination directory, causing the extraction process to write files to arbitrary locations with the privileges of that process. This could allow an attacker to inject fabricated records into the system's stored data or tamper with application configuration.10hCVE-2026-498467.5 HIG—
———libks provides foundational support for signalwire C products. Prior to version 2.0.11, `clean_uri()` in libks's HTTP request parser fails to reject URIs whose path has more segments than its internal canonicalization buffer can hold. The canonicalization step silently passes such URIs through with embedded ".." sequences intact, enabling path traversal in any consumer that later joins the URI with a filesystem path. Version 2.0.11 patches the issue.10hCVE-2026-50025——
———Mousehole is a background service to update a seedbox IP for MAM and web app to manage it. Prior to version 0.4.05, Mousehole's HTTP/WebSocket management boundary is reachable without application-layer authentication or browser/LAN provenance checks. The service stores a MyAnonamouse (MAM) session cookie in state and reuses the same cookie-bearing serialization for persisted state, public API responses, and WebSocket state updates. Any client that can reach the published Mousehole port can read cookie-bearing state, connect to WebSocket state updates, replace the stored cookie, or force MAM update side effects. The deployment examples publish port 5010 broadly with Docker's `5010:5010` syntax, which can make the issue reachable on mixed-trust LAN/VPN interfaces. Version 0.4.0 patches the issue.11hCVE-2026-494636.5 MED—
———NL Portal Backend Libraries provide backend components for Dutch government portals that interact with residents, customers, suppliers, and partner organizations. The `nl.nl-portal:documenten-api` package through version 3.0.0 and the `nl.nl-portal:besluiten` package from version 1.5.0 through 3.0.0 lack per-user authorization in GraphQL resolvers, allowing an authenticated user to access other users’ document contents, decisions, audit trails, and decision attachments. Version 3.0.1 contains a patch. As a workaround, block the affected document-content and decision-related GraphQL operations at the API gateway or block their GraphQL types entirely.12hCVE-2026-494625.3 MED—
———NL Portal Backend Libraries provide backend components for Dutch government portals that interact with residents, customers, suppliers, and partner organizations. In versions up to and including 3.0.0, deployments using the shipped default configuration exposed two GraphQL developer features without requiring authentication: the GraphiQL playground, an interactive UI for issuing GraphQL queries; and schema introspection, which lets a caller download the full description of every query, mutation, type, and argument the API supports. Anyone who could reach the `/graphiql` endpoint could open the playground in a browser, pull the full schema, and use that to map out the API and craft calls against it. By itself this does not leak user data, but it removes the guesswork from attacking the rest of the API and significantly lowers the bar for finding and exploiting other weaknesses. Version 3.0.1 patches the issue. As a workaround, override the two settings in deployed configuration.12h