CVE WatchJul 27, 2026

CVE-2026-53669

React Router is a router for React. Versions 6.0.0 through 7.17.0 are vulnerable to Open Redirtect through use of backslashes in <Link> and

CVSS

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No CVSS

EPSS

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KEV

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Exploit Today

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0-100

Published: Jul 27, 2026 · Last modified: Jul 27, 2026 · CWE-601

EPSS · 30d

Not enough EPSS history yet.

Technical description

React Router is a router for React. Versions 6.0.0 through 7.17.0 are vulnerable to Open Redirtect through use of backslashes in <Link> and useNavigate. This issue is a follow up to CVE-2025-68470 and has been fixed in version 7.18.0.

Official references

Related CVEs

CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.

CVE-2026-536686.9 MED

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———React Router is a router for React. In versions 6.30.2 through 6.30.4 and 7.9.6 through 7.12.0, applications that allow open redirects are vulnerable to XSS. An attacker could craft a malicious link that redirects users to an unexpected external site or that exploits an XSS vector.This issue has been fixed in version 7.13.0.8h CVE-2026-59730—

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———Astro is a web framework for content-driven websites. In versions 8.1.0 through 11.0.1, when trailingSlash: 'always' is configured, the @astrojs/node standalone server's static file handler appends a trailing slash to request paths and issues a 301 redirect. Paths beginning with /\ (slash-backslash) were not recognized as internal paths, so the handler would echo the raw path back in the Location header. Because browsers treat \ as / per the WHATWG URL specification, the resulting redirect could resolve to an external host. Preconditions for exploitation: trailingSlash: 'always' must be set (non-default; the default is 'ignore'), the request path must not have a file extension in its final segment, and an attacker must deliver the crafted link to a user. This issue has been fixed in version 11.0.2.9h CVE-2026-64645—

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———Next.js is a React framework for building full-stack web applications. In versions 12.0.0 through 15.5.20 and 16.0.0 through 16.2.10, a rewrites() or redirects() rule that builds its external destination hostname from request-controlled input can be pointed at an arbitrary hostname, regardless of the rule's hostname suffix. For a rewrite, Next.js proxies the request to that arbitrary host and serves the response from the application's origin, leading to Server-Side Request forgery. A redirects() rule configured this way is vulnerable to an Open Redirect. This issue has been fixed in versions 15.5.21 and 16.2.11.12h CVE-2026-142364.7 MED

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——0The Contact Form 7 WordPress plugin before 2.5 does not validate the host of a user-supplied return URL before using it as the success and cancel redirect targets of a Stripe checkout, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to redirect a victim, via a crafted link, to an arbitrary external site after the checkout flow.10h CVE-2026-480124.3 MED

5.8%

——2Shopware is an open commerce platform. Versions 6.7.3.0 through 6.7.10.0 have an open redirect in Shopware's public SSO entry point at `GET /api/oauth/sso/auth`. When the endpoint is reached without the expected SSO session state, the application falls back to the request's `Referer` header and uses that value as the redirect destination. In the validated behavior, the server does not restrict that fallback target to same-origin URLs, does not require a relative path, and does not reject dangerous schemes such as `javascript:`. As a result, an unauthenticated request can turn this endpoint into a reusable redirect primitive whose destination is fully controlled by attacker-supplied request metadata. The security problem is not limited to a harmless navigation mismatch. The endpoint sits under `/api/oauth/`, which gives the redirect a trustworthy application-controlled origin and makes it suitable for phishing chains, branded redirect abuse, and cases where client software automatically follows redirects issued by a trusted host. The attached evidence also shows that the response is not only an HTTP `302` with a user-controlled `Location` header. The HTML body contains a matching meta refresh tag and redirect link built from the same attacker-controlled value. In the validated proof, the endpoint redirects to `https://attacker.example/poc` when that URL is supplied through `Referer`, and it also reflects `javascript:alert(1)` into `Location` and the HTML redirect body without any scheme filtering. This report therefore stays conservative and claims an open redirect with arbitrary redirect targets, while noting that the lack of scheme restrictions makes the behavior materially worse than a same-scheme external redirect. Version 6.7.10.1 fixes the issue.4d CVE-2026-8152—

15.7%

——5Unblu Spark contains an open redirect vulnerability that can be escalated to a DOM-based cross-site scripting (XSS) attack. When Unblu Spark is deployed with com.unblu.identifier.siteEmbeddedSetup=true, it runs in the same origin as the host application. Any JavaScript injected through this vulnerability therefore executes with full access to the host application's cookies, DOM, and same-origin APIs — an attacker can reach all resources of the host application, not just Unblu's. This expanded blast radius is the reason on-premises deployments using this configuration are rated CRITICAL.5d