CVE-2026-57079

Net::BitTorrent versions before 2.1.0 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata. Net::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny's child() does not collapse "..". A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing ".." segments therefore resolves outside the download directory. Because the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host.

• github.comhttps://github.com/sanko/Net-BitTorrent.pm/security/advisories/GHSA-5wc6-r65f-62rr
• metacpan.orghttps://metacpan.org/release/SANKO/Net-BitTorrent-v2.1.0/changes