CVE WatchJul 14, 2026

CVE-2026-58169

Vibe-Trading before 0.1.10 contains a DNS rebinding authentication bypass vulnerability that allows remote attackers to bypass bearer-token

CVSS

7.5

High

EPSS

0.3%

p21

KEV

—

Exploit Today

0-100

Published: Jun 30, 2026 · Last modified: Jul 14, 2026 · CWE-346

EPSS · 30d

0.3%EPSS · 30 days0.3%

2026-07-012026-07-21

Technical description

Vibe-Trading before 0.1.10 contains a DNS rebinding authentication bypass vulnerability that allows remote attackers to bypass bearer-token authentication by exploiting the server's trust of TCP peer addresses for loopback clients combined with missing Host header validation while binding to 0.0.0.0 with credentialed CORS. Attackers can craft a malicious DNS rebinding page to issue authenticated requests to the local API server, reach the shell execution endpoint with a bash-enabled preset, and achieve remote code execution as the API process user while also overwriting LLM and data-source settings to exfiltrate credentials.

Official references

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