CVE WatchAug 20, 2026

CVE-2026-61704

Link Preview JS extracts web links information. Prior to 4.0.4, the resolveDNSHost mitigation in index.ts validates one resolved IP address

CVSS

7.5

High

EPSS

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KEV

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Exploit Today

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0-100

Published: Aug 20, 2026 · Last modified: Aug 20, 2026 · CWE-918

EPSS · 30d

Not enough EPSS history yet.

Technical description

Link Preview JS extracts web links information. Prior to 4.0.4, the resolveDNSHost mitigation in index.ts validates one resolved IP address but fetches the original hostname, allowing an attacker-controlled DNS server to return a public address during validation and a loopback or internal address during the final connection. This DNS rebinding condition bypasses the SSRF protection and can cause the server-side preview fetch to reach internal HTTP resources. Redirect handling is affected by the same validation-to-fetch mismatch. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.4.

Official references

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