CVE-2026-63757
SurrealDB versions before 3.1.0 contain a session hijacking vulnerability where the HTTP /rpc sessions method returns attached session UUIDs
CVSS
8.8
High
EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
0
0-100
Published: Jul 20, 2026 · Last modified: Jul 20, 2026 · CWE-306
Not enough EPSS history yet.
SurrealDB versions before 3.1.0 contain a session hijacking vulnerability where the HTTP /rpc sessions method returns attached session UUIDs without authentication and accepts arbitrary session fields with no ownership verification. Unauthenticated attackers can enumerate session UUIDs and impersonate authenticated sessions to read, write, delete data and escalate privileges.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-57495——
——0AgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers. In @agenticmail/claudecode prior to version 0.2.39, @agenticmail/codex prior to version 0.1.33, @agenticmail/core prior to version 0.9.43, and @agenticmail/openclaw prior to version 0.5.71, two inbound-mail handlers act on a privileged effect without verifying that the sender is the operator, while a sibling handler in the same repo does. The higher-impact one: any external email routed to the bridge inbox causes the dispatcher to resume the operator's Claude Code session with `permissionMode: 'bypassPermissions'`, embedding the attacker-controlled `from`/`subject`/`preview` verbatim into the prompt the resumed agent reads — an indirect prompt injection into a fully-privileged agent (Bash/Write/Edit/WebFetch + the agenticmail MCP toolbelt) running as the operator's OAuth identity. The sibling operator-query email-reply hook gates the same untrusted-From provenance with `isOperatorReplySender(replyFrom, config.operatorEmail)` (fail-closed); the bridge-wake path — a strictly higher-privilege effect — has no equivalent. @agenticmail/claudecode 0.2.39, @agenticmail/codex 0.1.33, @agenticmail/core 0.9.43, and @agenticmail/openclaw 0.5.71 contain a fix.15hCVE-2026-556268.0 HIG—
——0xrdp is an open source RDP server. In versions 0.10.6 and prior, when an authenticated user session is initialized using the Xvnc backend over UNIX domain sockets, the Xvnc process is launched with insufficient authentication mechanisms. A local authenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability to bypass intended session isolation, allowing them to unauthorizedly view or control the active desktop sessions of other users on the same system. Users using other backends, such as xorgxrdp or Xvnc over TCP sockets, are not affected. This issue has been fixed in version 0.10.6.1.18hCVE-2026-465557.7 HIG—
——0WhatsApp MCP Server is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for WhatsApp, enabling Claude to read and send WhatsApp messages. Prior to version 0.2.1, the `whatsapp-bridge` HTTP API listens on `127.0.0.1:8080` without authentication and without Host header validation, and the `/api/send` endpoint accepts an absolute `media_path` parameter without confining it to a safe directory. Combined, these issues allow any local process running as the same user as the bridge to send WhatsApp messages from the paired account without authorization; the same caller to read arbitrary files readable by the user (e.g. SSH private keys, browser session data, source code, dotfiles) and exfiltrate them as WhatsApp document attachments; and/or a remote attacker to trigger the same operations via DNS rebinding from a webpage the user visits, since no Host header validation is performed. In MCP environments, "local caller" extends beyond processes the user explicitly launched — sibling MCP servers, IDE extensions, and tool-triggered flows running in the user's session can act as the effective caller. This issue is fixed in whatsapp-mcp v0.2.1 and corresponding Docker images / release artifacts. Users should upgrade immediately. The fix introduces bearer token authentication on the bridge HTTP API (configured via environment variable, required on all requests, validated with constant-time comparison); host header allow-list validation to prevent DNS rebinding; and confinement of `media_path` to a configured directory, with rejection of absolute paths outside the root and path traversal sequences. This is a breaking change for clients of the bridge API. For users who cannot immediately upgrade: Stop the bridge, or block loopback access to port 8080, when the bridge is not actively in use; avoid running the bridge alongside untrusted MCP servers, browser extensions, or other untrusted local processes; avoid browsing untrusted sites while the bridge is running (DNS rebinding mitigation); and/or run the bridge under a dedicated user account or in a sandbox/container with no access to sensitive files.19hCVE-2026-634298.6 HIG—
——0HeyForm is an open-source form builder. Prior to version 3.0.0-rc.9, `POST /api/upload` has no authentication guard, no global guard, no form-context validation, no `openToken` requirement, and no session cookie check. Any anonymous internet user can upload files (PDF, DOC/DOCX, XLS/XLSX, CSV, TXT, MP4, images, etc., up to 10 MB) and receive a permanent public URL on the HeyForm domain. The endpoint is used by both authenticated form creators and unauthenticated form submitters; because no form-context binding exists, every request to it is anonymously accepted. Version 3.0.0-rc.9 contains a patch for the issue.19hCVE-2026-162429.4 CRI29.1%
——9A flaw was found in the Konnectivity proxy-server configuration for hosted control planes. The agent-facing listener was started without --cluster-ca-cert (and without token-based agent authentication), so client certificates were not validated. A remote attacker who can reach the Konnectivity cluster endpoint could connect as an unauthenticated agent, join the routing pool, and potentially proxy, inspect, modify, or drop control-plane-to-node traffic.20hCVE-2026-162107.3 HIG32.1%
——10A vulnerability was found in newpanjing simpleui 2026.01.13. This affects the function self.get_action of the file simpleui/admin.py of the component AjaxAdmin AJAX Endpoint. Performing a manipulation results in missing authentication. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.1d