CVE WatchAug 6, 2026

CVE-2026-64652

GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub's official command line tool. Prior to version 2.97.0, gh auth status masked only the characters after the last un

CVSS

3.3

Low

EPSS

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KEV

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Exploit Today

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0-100

Published: Aug 6, 2026 · Last modified: Aug 6, 2026 · CWE-201

EPSS · 30d

Not enough EPSS history yet.

Technical description

GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub's official command line tool. Prior to version 2.97.0, gh auth status masked only the characters after the last underscore in certain fine-grained personal access tokens and GitHub App tokens. As a result, part of an affected token could appear in terminal or CI output that is captured or shared. Authenticated users are affected if they ran gh auth status (without the --show-token flag) with a token type whose format contains an underscore after the prefix. This includes fine-grained personal access tokens (github_pat_*) and GitHub App installation and user access tokens (ghs_*, ghu_*; for example, ghs_<APPID>_<JWT>), as well as the Actions GITHUB_TOKEN. Classic tokens such as gho_* and ghp_* have an underscore-free body and are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.

Official references

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8.1%

——2Google::Auth versions before 0.09 for Perl allow server side request forgery and credential exfiltration via unvalidated URLs taken from the credentials JSON. The URLs the library requests are read from the credentials JSON, and their hosts were not checked against the universe domain before the request. For an external_account configuration, retrieve_subject_token fetched credential_source.url with headers from the same JSON, and fetch_access_token posted the subject token to token_url, then sent the STS access token it received to service_account_impersonation_url in an Authorization: Bearer header. The authorized_user, impersonated_service_account and service_account configurations posted the client secret and refresh token, the source access token, and a signed JWT assertion to their own JSON-supplied token_uri or impersonation URL. Any caller that builds credentials from a configuration it does not fully control issues those requests from the application's network position, reaching hosts the configuration names, including internal services and link-local metadata endpoints, and hands them the credentials each request carries. The service_account assertion is bound to aud, so it is not replayable against Google. Version 0.06 added a _validate_url host check to the external_account class, keyed on a universe_domain read from the same credentials JSON. Version 0.07 gated a JSON-supplied universe domain behind GOOGLE_EXTERNAL_ACCOUNT_ALLOW_CUSTOM_UNIVERSES=1, deriving the pin flag from arguments that an earlier BUILDARGS pass had already merged on the make_creds path. Version 0.08 passed the pin decision through as an explicit constructor argument and moved _validate_url to Google::Auth::Credentials, adding the call to UserRefreshCredentials and ImpersonatedServiceAccountCredentials, and 0.09 added it to ServiceAccountCredentials.1d