CVE WatchAug 19, 2026

CVE-2026-65984

FUXA is a web-based Process Visualization (SCADA/HMI/Dashboard) software. In 1.3.2 and earlier, POST /api/refresh in server/api/auth/index.j

CVSS

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No CVSS

EPSS

0.5%

p39

KEV

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Exploit Today

0-100

Published: Aug 18, 2026 · Last modified: Aug 19, 2026 · CWE-613

EPSS · 30d

Not enough EPSS history yet.

Technical description

FUXA is a web-based Process Visualization (SCADA/HMI/Dashboard) software. In 1.3.2 and earlier, POST /api/refresh in server/api/auth/index.js falls back from current user data to decoded.groups, including when the user is deleted or groups is zero, and POST /api/heartbeat in server/api/index.js re-signs inbound JWT claims without validating the current database record. An attacker who possesses a previously issued privileged refresh cookie or access token can continue minting privileged JWTs after account deletion, disablement, role removal, or demotion. Continued refresh-cookie rotation can extend the stale session and preserve unauthorized access to user management, project manipulation, runtime configuration, scripts, and backdoor-account creation. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.3.

Official references

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