CVE-2026-66074
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, match_value/3 passes the user-sup
CVSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
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0-100
Published: Sep 23, 2026 · Last modified: Sep 23, 2026 · CWE-1333
Not enough EPSS history yet.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, match_value/3 passes the user-supplied ?name= regular expression to re:run with no match_limit option, and executes it once per resource in the result set. OTP's default 10M match_limit caps each call at roughly 100-200ms, but the regex runs once per resource in the result set. With a large set, for example 5000 queues at 150ms each, a single request consumes 12 or more minutes of CPU. Parallel requests saturate the schedulers. The use_regex=true option is a supported feature on list endpoints, so this path is reachable through normal API use. Preconditions include Any user with the management tag can exploit this.. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-67240——
———RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1, pattern_to_regex maps % -> .*? and _ -> ., then compiles ^...$ with only [unicode]; re:run is called with only [{capture, none}] - no explicit match_limit. A pattern like %_%_..._%X becomes ^.*?..*?.....*?.X$ with overlapping lazy quantifiers. The whole-expression cap is ?MAX_EXPRESSION_LENGTH=4096 chars / ?MAX_TOKENS=200; a LIKE string literal is one token, so ~2000 %_ pairs fit. SQL filters are accepted unconditionally at rabbit_amqp_session.erl:3264 (no feature flag). Evaluated per-message at rabbit_stream_queue.erl:1439. OTP's default 10M match_limit caps each match at ~100-200 ms (not seconds), and the re NIF yields to the scheduler. An authenticated AMQP 1.0 consumer with read+write on a stream queue can cause ~100-200 ms of CPU per delivered message via a crafted LIKE filter, multiplied across thousands of messages and parallel sessions - a substantial backtracking-driven CPU amplification. Preconditions include AMQP 1.0 with stream queues in use Attacker can attach a receiver with a filter (read permission) and publish messages with long property values (write permission). This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1.8hCVE-2026-774237.5 HIG—
——0JLine is a Java library for handling console input. From 3.0.0 until 3.30.15 and 4.3.1, the JLine built-in less viewer passes user-controlled search and display-filter patterns from getPattern(boolean doDisplayPattern) in builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/Less.java directly to Java's backtracking regular expression engine and repeatedly applies them to file content. A nested-quantifier expression evaluated against non-matching lines can consume excessive CPU and indefinitely block the session thread, and repeated sessions in Telnet or SSH deployments can exhaust a bounded worker pool. This issue is fixed in versions 3.30.15 and 4.3.1.10hCVE-2026-774227.5 HIG—
——0JLine is a Java library for handling console input. From 3.0.0 until 3.30.15 and 4.3.1, the JLine built-in grep command in builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/PosixCommands.java accepts a user-controlled regular expression in grep(...) and, unless line-regexp mode is used, automatically adds a dot-star prefix and suffix before compiling it with Java's backtracking regular expression engine. The wrapping expands the backtracking search space, so a short nested-quantifier expression evaluated against non-matching input can consume excessive CPU and indefinitely block a command worker, including in remotely exposed shell sessions. This issue is fixed in versions 3.30.15 and 4.3.1.10hCVE-2026-774216.5 MED—
——0JLine is a Java library for handling console input. From 3.0.0 until 3.30.15 and 4.3.1, the JLine built-in nano editor's regex search mode passes a user-controlled search term from doSearch(String text) in builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/Nano.java to Java's backtracking regular expression engine without a timeout or backtracking bound. A nested-quantifier expression evaluated against non-matching buffer content can consume excessive CPU and indefinitely block the editor session thread, and remote multi-user deployments can lose a worker thread for each affected session. This issue is fixed in versions 3.30.15 and 4.3.1.9hCVE-2026-774205.5 MED—
——0JLine is a Java library for handling console input. From 3.0.0 until 3.30.15 and 4.3.1, DefaultHistory.matchPatterns(String patterns, String line) in reader/src/main/java/org/jline/reader/impl/history/DefaultHistory.java converts the HISTORY_IGNORE configuration value into a Java regular expression while escaping only part of its syntax, allowing other regex metacharacters to reach the backtracking engine. An attacker who can control application or user configuration can supply a nested-quantifier expression that is reevaluated whenever a command is added to history, consuming excessive CPU and indefinitely blocking the reader thread. This issue is fixed in versions 3.30.15 and 4.3.1.10hCVE-2026-894077.5 HIG48.8%
——15NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber() in FasterXML jackson-core pre-validates "stringified numbers" with two regular expressions: PATTERN_FLOAT ([+-]?[0-9]*[\.]?[0-9]+([eE][+-]?[0-9]+)?), present since 2.17.0, and PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT, added in 2.17.2. PATTERN_FLOAT places adjacent quantifiers over the same character class -- an optional [0-9]* run, an optional dot, then a required [0-9]+ run -- so input that ultimately fails to match forces Java's backtracking engine to retry every possible split point of the digit run.
Matching cost therefore grows with the square of the input length.
An attacker who can supply JSON that an application deserializes into a numeric target type reaches this method through jackson-databind's default String-to-number coercion (StdDeserializer and NumberDeserializers for BigDecimal, BigInteger, Double and Float).
Because StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength defaults to 20,000,000 characters, no constraint bounds the input before it reaches the regex.
Testing by the reporter confirmed O(n^2) growth across five consecutive input-size doublings, with a single 160,000-character string consuming roughly 74 seconds in one call; a small number of concurrent requests of ordinary body size can therefore exhaust a server's request-handling thread pool.
The affected method does not exist before 2.17.0, so 2.16.x and earlier releases are not affected.
The fix replaces both regular expressions with a hand-rolled single-pass scan.1d