CVE-2026-68968
Apache Airflow's Backfill API authorized a request against a Dag id supplied by the caller whenever the `backfill_id` path segment failed to
CVSS
—
No CVSS
EPSS
—
KEV
—
Exploit Today
—
0-100
Published: Aug 12, 2026 · Last modified: Aug 12, 2026 · CWE-436
Not enough EPSS history yet.
Apache Airflow's Backfill API authorized a request against a Dag id supplied by the caller whenever the `backfill_id` path segment failed to parse. The authorization dependency parsed it with `int()` while the route handler parsed it as pydantic's `NonNegativeInt`, which accepts values `int()` rejects (`1.0` coerces to `1`); FastAPI resolves dependencies before endpoint validation, so the two acted on different Dags. An authenticated user holding edit permission on any single Dag could therefore read, pause and cancel backfills belonging to any other Dag, including moving another Dag's queued runs to `failed`. No non-default configuration is required and backfill ids are sequential, so finding a target is trivial. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which parses the backfill id with the same type the routes declare.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-182463.0 LOW—
———IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to bypass security restrictions due to an interpretation conflict in the multipart parser.4hCVE-2026-184277.5 HIG37.6%
——11@fastify/static before version 10.1.3 contains an incomplete fix for a previous route guard bypass. The static file handler rejected only parent directory segments, but it did not canonicalize dot segments, duplicate slashes, encoded dots, or backslashes before route matching and before delegating to the send layer. As a result, an unauthenticated attacker could request a file protected by a route based guard using a non canonical path form that misses the guarded route yet resolves back onto the protected file, disclosing its contents. Applications that protect a subtree of the static root with a route based guard are affected, while applications relying on the allowedPath option are not. This is fixed in @fastify/static 10.1.3, which canonicalizes the pathname, including rejecting backslashes, on the path used for routing and serving.6dCVE-2026-692467.2 HIG11.8%
——4Guzzle is an extensible PHP HTTP client. Prior to 7.15.2 and 8.0.1, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the Host header separately. The cURL handlers set CURLOPT_URL to the URI exactly as written and push that Host into CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER; StreamHandler does the same through fopen(). libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy CONNECT, while the supplied Host suppresses the aligned one libcurl would have generated. For a URI host written as 127.0.0.%31, filter_var() rejects the host as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to 127.0.0.1 and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives Host: 127.0.0.%31. An attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever the host exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: no_proxy selects proxy routing from the literal host, and RedirectMiddleware decides from it whether to strip Authorization and Cookie. Exploitation requires the application to build a request URI from untrusted input and to make a host decision before handing it to Guzzle. This issue is fixed in versions 7.15.2 and 8.0.1.8dCVE-2026-184467.5 HIG12.8%
——4fast-uri before 4.1.2, 3.1.5, and 2.4.4 requires a literal double forward slash to recognize a URI authority, so a reference that uses a backslash based introducer in place of it (backslash backslash, forward slash backslash, or backslash forward slash) is parsed with no authority and folds into the path. Node's native WHATWG URL parser instead treats a backslash as interchangeable with a forward slash for special schemes, so the two parsers extract different hosts from the same input. Applications that use fast-uri to enforce host based policy such as allowlists, SSRF filtering, or redirect validation before passing the same URL into Node's URL or fetch consumers can be steered to an unintended host. Upgrade to fast-uri 4.1.2, 3.1.5, or 2.4.4.12dCVE-2026-146435.9 MED14.0%
——4undici's cache interceptor mishandles optional whitespace placed around the equals sign of a qualified no-cache or private Cache-Control directive. In undici from 7.0.0 up to before 7.29.0 and from 8.0.0 up to before 8.9.0, the parser either drops the directive or stores a field name with literal quote characters, so the cache decision fails to recognize the qualification and the response is stored. In shared-cache mode, this lets a response containing one user's authenticated data be served from cache to a later caller, including an unauthenticated one, when both requests resolve to the same cache key. It affects applications that enable the cache interceptor in shared mode, forward Authorization headers upstream, and receive cacheable responses with qualified directives padded with whitespace around the equals sign. This is the whitespace-around-equals variant that the fix for CVE-2026-9678 did not normalize, and it is fixed in undici 7.29.0 and 8.9.0.8dCVE-2026-672018.6 HIG32.0%
——10V through 0.5.2, fixed in commit 85859f0, contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) bypass vulnerability that allows attackers to circumvent host-based allowlists by exploiting a parser differential between net.urllib and net.http. Attackers can craft a URL containing a backslash in the authority section such that net.urllib.parse() extracts the trusted host for allowlist validation while net.http.get() normalizes the backslash and connects to the internal host, enabling access to internal network services that the allowlist was intended to block.13d