CVE-2026-69267
Insufficient granularity of access control in Windows Connected User Experiences and Telemetry allows an authorized attacker to disclose inf
CVSS
6.5
Medium
EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
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0-100
Published: Sep 8, 2026 · Last modified: Sep 8, 2026 · CWE-1220
Not enough EPSS history yet.
Insufficient granularity of access control in Windows Connected User Experiences and Telemetry allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-774808.8 HIG—
———Insufficient granularity of access control in SQL Server allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.3hCVE-2026-668148.8 HIG—
———Insufficient granularity of access control in SQL Server allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.4hCVE-2026-78230——
———AshAi exposes Ash read actions to language-model tool calls. The read tool accepts an aggregate result type (min, max, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value.
Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A tool caller could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate; min/max in particular return an actual field value. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The tool's existing check only required the field to be public, which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization.
The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible.
This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.3.4hCVE-2026-78216——
———AshLua exposes Ash read actions to Lua scripts run through an eval action. A read call accepts an operation (list, min, max, first, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value.
Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A script could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate instead of as a field. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The prior hardening only enforced the exposed-field allow-list (field visibility), which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization.
The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible.
This issue affects ash_lua: from 0.1.0 before 0.2.2.4hCVE-2026-15431—0.5%
——0A potential security vulnerability has been identified in the HP Support
Assistant for versions prior to 9.53.2.0. The vulnerability
could potentially allow a local attacker to escalate
privileges due to insufficient access controls.7hCVE-2026-781227.4 HIG24.9%
——7docker-socket-proxy fails to properly gate read endpoints in the /containers Docker API namespace when the CONTAINERS environment variable is set. Attackers can use GET requests to /containers/{id}/archive, /containers/{id}/export, /containers/{id}/logs, and /containers/{id}/top to read arbitrary files and download entire container filesystems as tar archives.13d