CVE-2026-70636
Flowise through 3.1.4 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to access the OAuth2 credential
CVSS
7.5
High
EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
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0-100
Published: Aug 6, 2026 · Last modified: Aug 6, 2026 · CWE-862
Not enough EPSS history yet.
Flowise through 3.1.4 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to access the OAuth2 credential refresh endpoint by exploiting prefix-based whitelist matching in the authentication middleware defined in packages/server/src/utils/constants.ts. Attackers can send a POST request to the oauth2-credential refresh route with a trailing credential identifier to bypass all authentication and authorization checks, triggering unauthorized OAuth token rotation against credentials belonging to any workspace and potentially disrupting dependent OAuth integrations. This is a bypass of CVE-2026-41273.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-676217.6 HIG—
———Flowise through 3.1.4 contains a missing authorization vulnerability that allows authenticated workspace members to perform unauthorized document store operations by accessing unprotected mutation endpoints. Attackers holding only view-level permissions can send direct HTTP requests to the upsert and refresh document store routes to trigger document ingestion, refresh vector database contents, consume embedding API credits, and modify knowledge bases used by downstream chatflows.4hCVE-2026-646644.3 MED—
———Statamic is a Laravel and Git powered content management system (CMS). Prior to 5.74.1 and 6.24.0, an authenticated Control Panel user could use an endpoint intended for the user creation wizard to determine if a given email address belonged to an existing user, without having permission to view users, though the endpoint only exposed user existence and not any other user data. This issue is fixed in versions 5.74.1 and 6.24.0.4hCVE-2026-646626.5 MED—
———Statamic is a Laravel and Git powered content management system (CMS). Prior to 5.74.1 and 6.24.0, an authenticated Control Panel user could view content from entries they did not have permission to view, including entry content and custom field values, from any collection and including unpublished entries, through the navigation endpoint, though no data could be modified. This issue is fixed in versions 5.74.1 and 6.24.0.4hCVE-2026-480889.4 CRI—
———OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.4, the route `POST /api/tenants/{tenantId}/staff/{staffId}/crypto` accepts and stores attacker-controlled ML-KEM-768 public keys against any tenant on the platform without authentication. The handler logs an "Unauthorized crypto key storage attempt" warning when neither a session nor a registration cookie is present, then proceeds to insert the row regardless. The platform's E2E claim that "even administrators cannot view sensitive information" is broken: any unauthenticated network attacker can register themselves as an additional encryption recipient for any tenant's future patient appointments. A second variant of the bug suppresses the unauthorized-warning log entry. The Zod schema makes the `email` field optional. When the request body omits `email` and the request carries no registration cookie, the comparison `registrationEmail === email` becomes `undefined === undefined`, which evaluates to `true`. The handler treats the request as a legitimate registration flow, skips the warning entirely, and stores the row. Successful storage is still recorded as an `[info]` log line, but the security-relevant warning that operators are most likely to monitor or alert on is gone. The `staff_crypto` table has no unique constraint on `user_id`, so an arbitrary number of attacker rows can coexist for the same staff identifier and all return as `is_active=true`. The supplied `staffId` does not need to match any existing user or pending invite. Schema validation on `passkeyId`, `publicKey`, and `privateKeyShare` is also weak: the literal string `<placeholder-base64>` was accepted, indicating no length, format, or cryptographic-validity check beyond field presence. This weakness is independent of the auth bypass but compounds it: a poisoned directory can also be filled with malformed entries that break legitimate booking flows. The injected key is consumed by the public booking flow. After completing the unauthenticated `bootstrap-challenge` and `bootstrap-verify` ceremony as a "patient", the resulting `bookingAccessToken` is accepted by `GET /api/tenants/{id}/appointments/staff-public-keys`, which returns the attacker-controlled keys alongside any legitimate ones. A new appointment encrypts its tunnel key with ML-KEM to all listed recipients, so the attacker becomes a co-recipient of the encryption and can decapsulate the tunnel key with the matching secret. From there, all appointment payloads for that booking are decryptable. Version 1.0.4 patches the issue.4hCVE-2026-480859.8 CRI—
———OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.1, a fully provisioned OpenReception instance accepts unauthenticated POST requests to `/setup/create-admin-account` and creates additional GLOBAL_ADMIN accounts without verifying that an admin already exists. Any unauthenticated network attacker who can submit a same-origin form POST gains full platform-level administrative control. The newly created account is `is_active=true` with `confirmation_state=ACCESS_GRANTED` and does not require completing email confirmation; the GLOBAL_ADMIN row is created active and immediately usable. Login and tenant enumeration succeed without any further interaction. This is distinct from the deployment race condition already documented on the `Claiming an instance` page. That documented race covers the window between deployment and first claim. The bug reported here works after the operator has properly claimed and configured the instance: the layout-level guard that protects the setup page only redirects on GET, while the `default` form action handler creates the user without rechecking `adminExists()`. Three GLOBAL_ADMIN accounts were created in succession during testing, with no rate limiting observed. Audit-specific event logging beyond standard application logs was not assessed; the standard `[error]` line that surfaces only when a uniqueness conflict is hit is not the same as a security event for "additional admin created post-claim". The form post is rejected for browser drive-by CSRF by SvelteKit's built-in same-origin check, but any tool that supplies a matching `Origin` header (curl, Burp, automated scanners, server-side proxies) bypasses this trivially. No additional preconditions exist. Users should upgrade to version 1.0.1 to receive a patch.4hCVE-2026-480775.3 MED—
———OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.1.0, the GET handler at `/api/tenants/{id}/appointments/{appointmentId}` performs no authorization check before returning the appointment record. Any party who knows or obtains a valid appointment UUID receives the full row, including channel and agent IDs, time and timezone, status, and the AES-GCM ciphertext components (`encryptedPayload`, `iv`, `authTag`, `dataKey`). The same file's DELETE handler calls `checkPermission(locals, tenantId, true)` before allowing deletion. The intent is clear: appointment records are tenant-scoped and require authentication to access. The GET handler is missing the equivalent call. The middleware chain (`apiAuthHandle`, `authGuard`) does not compensate: API paths bypass `authGuard` entirely, and `apiAuthHandle` does not block requests to non-admin paths when no token is present. Version 1.1.0 patches the issue.4h