CVE-2026-71283
Fledge's backup-restore upload handler, upload_backup() (python/fledge/services/core/api/backup_restore.py), calls tarfile.extractall(temp_p
CVSS
4.9
Medium
EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
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0-100
Published: Aug 5, 2026 · Last modified: Aug 5, 2026 · CWE-22
Not enough EPSS history yet.
Fledge's backup-restore upload handler, upload_backup() (python/fledge/services/core/api/backup_restore.py), calls tarfile.extractall(temp_path) on an admin-uploaded tar archive with no filter argument and no per-member path validation. A crafted tar archive containing member names with `../` path components extracts files outside the intended temporary directory, allowing arbitrary file writes anywhere on the filesystem reachable by the Fledge process. Requires the admin role (@has_permission("admin")).
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-76466.5 MED—
———IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.3 allows users to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem, including other users' uploaded documents, the JWT signing secret, the SQLite database, and process environment variables, by sending a crafted MCP `resources/read` request with a URL-encoded path traversal sequence in the filename.4hCVE-2026-91959.3 CRI—
———A cross-site scripting vulnerability in the Query Console of Progress MarkLogic Server before 11.3.6 and 12.0.3 allows a remote attacker who lures an authenticated administrator to a crafted URL to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the administrator's browser session, capture credentials, and perform privileged actions on the administrator's behalf.5hCVE-2026-159798.1 HIG—
———The Content Egg – Affiliate Product Importer & Price Comparison plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion via Path Traversal in versions up to and including 11.3.0. This is due to insufficient validation of the 'img_file' field within the cegg_data post metadata: the value passes only through wp_strip_all_tags() (which does not strip path traversal sequences), is stored directly in post meta, and is later concatenated without normalization into a filesystem path in getFullImgPath() before being passed to PHP's unlink(). This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with author-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible.5hCVE-2026-712798.0 HIG—
———Zigbee2MQTT's ExternalJSExtension.getFilePath() (lib/extension/externalJS.ts) joins a `name` parameter received via an MQTT message (topic zigbee2mqtt/bridge/request/extension/save) into the extensions base path using path.join(basePath, name) with no sanitization. Because path.join() resolves `../` sequences, a name such as `../../tmp/evil.js` escapes the intended extensions directory. The extension handler only validates that the name ends in .js/.mjs/.cjs, writes the file, and then dynamically imports it via Node.js import(), achieving remote code execution. Requires the `enable_external_js` config option (off by default, but commonly enabled in legacy installs) and MQTT broker access, which is frequently unauthenticated in real deployments. The identical unsanitized getFilePath() is also used by the extension-removal handler, enabling arbitrary file deletion.5hCVE-2026-712697.2 HIG—
———Node-RED's local-filesystem library storage module (getLibraryEntry() and saveLibraryEntry() in packages/node_modules/@node-red/runtime/lib/storage/localfilesystem/library.js), reachable via GET/POST /library/:lib/:type/*path, joins the user-supplied path parameter directly into the filesystem path via fspath.join(libDir, type, path) with no traversal sanitization, containment check, or path normalization/prefix verification. An authenticated user (including read-only-scoped tokens for the read path) can supply a path containing `../` sequences to read arbitrary files outside the library directory; a user with write access can write arbitrary files, enabling remote code execution via SSH authorized_keys or cron injection. This is a distinct, separately unpatched traversal from the previously fixed CVE-2021-21298 (Projects API).5hCVE-2026-712689.9 CRI—
———OpenPLC Runtime v3's compile_program() function (webserver/openplc.py) parses `(*FILE:path content*)` directives from uploaded Structured Text (.st) program files and writes the referenced content to `os.path.join('./core', file_path)` with no validation that file_path stays within the ./core directory. A crafted .st file containing a directive such as `(*FILE:../../../etc/cron.d/x * * * * root <command>*)` writes attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary filesystem path, enabling remote code execution (e.g. via cron or SSH authorized_keys). A path-validation function, validate_file_path(), exists elsewhere in the codebase (webserver/credentials.py) but is never invoked from compile_program(), leaving the sink unprotected. OpenPLC additionally ships with hardcoded default credentials (openplc:openplc), lowering the practical bar for exploitation.5h