CVE-2026-77310
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. Prior to versions 2.18.9
CVSS
5.3
Medium
EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
0
0-100
Published: Aug 24, 2026 · Last modified: Aug 24, 2026 · CWE-918
Not enough EPSS history yet.
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. Prior to versions 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1 on their respective release lines, the java.net.InetAddress branch of FromStringDeserializer.Std._deserialize() calls InetAddress.getByName() on attacker-controlled input, causing eager DNS resolution during deserialization and enabling DNS-based server-side request forgery and internal-host enumeration. This issue is fixed in versions 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-768388.5 HIG—
——0Hi.Events validates a webhook destination only when it is registered, never when it is used. NoInternalUrlRule in backend/app/Validators/Rules/NoInternalUrlRule.php resolves the hostname with gethostbyname() and rejects private and reserved ranges, which any public hostname passes. At dispatch, WebhookDispatchService takes the stored URL and calls it through spatie/laravel-webhook-server without repeating the check, and backend/config/webhook-server.php sets no Guzzle options, so redirect following remains enabled by default. A destination that answers with a redirect to a loopback, private or cloud metadata address therefore causes the server to issue that request, and changing the hostname's DNS record after registration reaches the same result because no resolution is repeated. The response is not discarded: WebhookResponseHandlerService stores the body on the webhook log and WebhookLogResource returns it from the webhook logs endpoint, so the requester reads what the internal service replied rather than inferring it. Both event and organizer webhooks share the rule and the dispatch path. Version 1.11.1-beta revalidates at dispatch, pins the validated address, checks every redirect hop, and decodes IPv6 transition addresses that previously bypassed the filter.1dCVE-2026-713667.7 HIG—
——0A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was found in multiple AWX notification backends. The webhook, Mattermost, Rocket.Chat, and Grafana notification backends use notification template URLs as direct HTTP request targets without validating the target address against private, loopback, or reserved IP ranges. An organization notification administrator can create notification templates pointing to internal or loopback addresses, causing the AWX control node to issue HTTP requests to services that are not externally accessible. Additionally, the webhook notification backend follows HTTP redirects and resends configured Basic Authentication credentials to redirect targets regardless of host change, allowing an attacker to exfiltrate notification credentials by redirecting to an attacker-controlled host. The Grafana backend sends its API key in the Authorization header to the configured target URL.10hCVE-2026-78385——
——0RansomLook contains insufficient resource validation in the analysis PDF generation functionality. Analysis documents are converted from Markdown to HTML and passed to WeasyPrint for PDF rendering. Prior to the fix, WeasyPrint used its default URL fetcher, allowing resource references contained in an analysis to be resolved without restrictions.
An authenticated attacker able to create or modify an analysis could embed crafted resource references using schemes such as file:// or http://. When the analysis was subsequently rendered as PDF, WeasyPrint would process these references with the privileges and network access of the RansomLook server.
A malicious file:// reference could cause the renderer to access arbitrary files readable by the RansomLook process, potentially exposing sensitive configuration, credentials, or other local data through rendered resources. Network URLs could cause the server to initiate requests to localhost, internal network services, or external systems, resulting in server-side request forgery (SSRF) and potentially bypassing network-level access restrictions.
The patch introduces a dedicated WeasyPrint URL fetcher that permits only data: resources, the RansomLook report logo, and files contained within the analysis asset directory. Network resources and filesystem paths outside these explicitly permitted locations are rejected.1dCVE-2026-782774.9 MED—
——0Subscriber Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in FluentCRM Pro <= 3.1.12 versions.1dCVE-2026-782696.4 MED—
——0Contributor Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Shared Files <= 1.7.69 versions.1dCVE-2026-105827.4 HIG—
——0Hugo's security.http.urls allowlist is the only control on outbound fetches made by resources.GetRemote, and it inspects the URL text alone. CheckAllowedHTTPURL in config/security/securityConfig.go applies the configured pattern list and then re-checks a canonicalised form of an integer, hex or octal IPv4 host, but it never resolves the hostname and never inspects the address the HTTP client actually connects to. The client constructed in resources/resource_factories/create/create.go installs no dial-time hook, so no check occurs at connection time either. A hostname that resolves to a loopback, private or cloud-metadata address therefore satisfies the policy, and the response body is embedded in the generated site. An attacker who can supply a URL through content, for example a front-matter field or a CMS field, can make the build fetch an internal endpoint and publish the response in the static output, so the build artifact itself carries the data out.1d