CVE-2026-77507
Weblate is a web-based continuous localization platform used to manage software translations. In versions prior to 2026.8, Weblate's object-
CVSS
5.3
Medium
EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
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0-100
Published: Aug 26, 2026 · Last modified: Aug 27, 2026 · CWE-200 · CWE-862 · CWE-863
Not enough EPSS history yet.
Weblate is a web-based continuous localization platform used to manage software translations. In versions prior to 2026.8, Weblate's object-scoped RSS feeds do not apply the permission checks used elsewhere, allowing unauthorized users to read change-history metadata from private projects and restricted components. On installations that permit anonymous access, this metadata can be retrieved without any authentication. The exposed information can include project and component identities, contributor usernames and full names, action types, timestamps, and translation or unit links, though translated-string content is not included in the feed. Installations using private projects or restricted components are affected. This issue is fixed in version 2026.8.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-622494.3 MED—
———Weblate is a web-based continuous localization platform used to manage software translations. In versions prior to 2026.7, an authenticated user with access to a project can retrieve the change history of restricted components in that project through nested API change endpoints, even without permission to view those components directly. The nested endpoints do not apply the component-level access checks enforced on the direct component views, so the requester can enumerate changes for components that should be hidden from them. The exposed data can include the restricted component's identity, translation and unit links, and change payload fields such as source or translated string content in the target, old, and details values. This issue is fixed in version 2026.7.1hCVE-2026-66003——
———Frappe is a full-stack web application framework written in Python and JavaScript. Prior to version 15.115.0, an access control bypass in the REST API allows a user to read data from Linked DocTypes that they are not authorized to access. When a document references another document through a Link field, the framework does not consistently enforce the linked DocType's own permissions when the record is retrieved through the REST API, so a low-privileged authenticated user can obtain fields from linked records outside their permitted scope. This issue is fixed in version 15.115.0.1hCVE-2026-463716.5 MED—
———Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions up to and including 4.84.1, the Apple MDM commands listing endpoint (GET /api/v1/fleet/mdm/apple/commands) allowed an authenticated user with the lowest-privilege Observer role to extract sensitive values from joined database tables, including host enrollment secrets and Apple Push Notification Service tokens, through a sort-order oracle. The endpoint accepted a user-supplied order_key parameter that was not validated against a column allowlist, and because the underlying query joins the hosts and nano_enrollments tables, an attacker could set the sort column to a sensitive field and combine it with the cursor-based after parameter to binary-search the value one character at a time, with the presence or absence of results revealing each character even though the value never appeared in the response. With extracted node_key or orbit_node_key values an attacker could impersonate enrolled hosts to Fleet's osquery and Orbit endpoints, submit fabricated host data, and retrieve pending scripts and commands. This issue is fixed in version 4.84.2.1hCVE-2026-463706.5 MED—
———Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions up to and including 4.84.1, the labels host-listing endpoint (GET /api/v1/fleet/labels/{id}/hosts) allowed an authenticated user with the lowest-privilege Observer role to extract host enrollment secrets through a sort-order oracle. The endpoint accepted a user-supplied order_key parameter that was not validated against a column allowlist, so an attacker with Global or Team Observer access could set the sort column to a sensitive field such as h.node_key and combine it with the cursor-based after parameter to binary-search the value one character at a time; the targeted value never appeared in the response, but the presence or absence of results revealed each character. Because node_key and orbit_node_key are the long-lived shared secrets that osquery and Orbit agents use to authenticate to the Fleet server, an attacker who reconstructed them could impersonate enrolled hosts, submit fabricated query results and inventory, retrieve pending scripts and MDM commands, and poison compliance and policy results across the deployment. This issue is fixed in version 4.84.2.22hCVE-2026-487866.5 MED—
———Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions prior to 4.87.0, the target search endpoint (POST /api/latest/fleet/targets) returned unmasked team enroll secrets and full team configuration, including credential-bearing agent options, to low-privilege observer-class users. Other team-facing endpoints mask these fields for observers, but the target search endpoint did not apply the same sanitization, so an authenticated user with the Observer, Observer+, or Technician role, whether global or team-scoped, could retrieve the secrets and agent options by performing a target search against an observer-runnable query. With a leaked team enroll secret an attacker could enroll unauthorized hosts into the affected team, and if the team's agent options contained credentials such as AWS secret access keys or proxy passwords, those values were disclosed as well. This issue is fixed in version 4.87.0.22hCVE-2026-412624.3 MED—
———Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions prior to 4.85.0, the global policy read endpoint (GET /api/latest/fleet/policies/{policy_id}) fails to verify team ownership of the requested policy, allowing an authenticated user with observer-level access on any single team to read the full details of policies belonging to any other team and bypass Fleet's team isolation model. The handler authorizes the request against an empty policy object whose TeamID is nil, which an authorization rule permits for any user holding a role on any team, and then fetches the policy by ID with no team filter and returns it without any post-fetch scope check. Because policy IDs are sequential integers, an attacker can enumerate them to read other teams' policy SQL queries, host pass and fail counts, and associated software-installer and script metadata, exposing security-monitoring strategies and compliance posture across team boundaries. This issue is fixed in version 4.85.0.22h