CVE-2026-78617
WatchGuard Dimension's web login endpoint does not enforce effective rate-limiting or account lockout by default allowing a remote attacker
CVSS
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EPSS
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KEV
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Published: Aug 28, 2026 · Last modified: Aug 28, 2026 · CWE-203 · CWE-307
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WatchGuard Dimension's web login endpoint does not enforce effective rate-limiting or account lockout by default allowing a remote attacker to perform automated password guessing against user accounts. If the account lockout setting is enabled, brute-force attempts are blocked after a defined number of failed attempts, but this setting is not enabled by default.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-769407.5 HIG—
——0The affected Ebyte device does not restrict repeated authentication
attempts through rate limiting or account lockout mechanisms. This could
allow an attacker to perform automated authentication attacks against
deployments that rely on password based authentication.19hCVE-2026-117545.3 MED—
——0Observable discrepancy vulnerability in Seres Software syWEB allows Account Footprinting.
This issue affects syWEB: through 27082026.
NOTE: The vendor was contacted and it was learned that the product is not supported.23hCVE-2026-552274.3 MED7.9%
——2Weblate is a web-based localization tool. In versions prior to 2026.7, several endpoints look up objects in a globally scoped manner rather than restricting the lookup to projects the user can access, so they return HTTP 403 (Forbidden) instead of 404 (Not Found) when a user requests an object they are not authorized to see. This difference lets unauthorized users infer whether a given object exists in a private Weblate project. The issue has been fixed in version 2026.7.1dCVE-2026-786559.1 CRI40.4%
——12Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl allow the second-factor attempt limit to be reset by replaying an earlier session cookie because the challenge route counts failures in the session.
The POST handler on challenge_path keeps the failure count as tries inside the totp_pending record in the session, raising it on each rejected code and deleting the pending record once it reaches attempts, five by default. Punk::Session carries the session in a signed cookie unless the application declares a store, and keeps no server-side record, so an earlier value of the same session stays valid until the expiry stamped inside it. A client that saves the cookie before its failed attempts and presents it again gets the pending record back with its counter, and the limit never fires. The replayed record is accepted while its own expiry, pending_ttl seconds from the challenge and 300 by default, has not passed.
Sessions declared with a store are not affected: the pending record and its counter then live server-side.
The attempt limit does not bound guessing of the second factor, which is left to the per-address rate limit the plugin registers on the same path, 30 requests per 60 seconds.2dCVE-2026-792875.3 MED17.2%
——5Observable discrepancy in Forms in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)1dCVE-2026-792425.3 MED17.2%
——5Observable discrepancy in HTML in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)2d