CVE WatchSep 25, 2026

CVE-2026-81879

radare2 is a UNIX-like reverse engineering framework and command-line toolset. Prior to 6.2.0, radare2's ELF PN_XNUM handling was vulnerable

CVSS

5.5

Medium

EPSS

0.2%

KEV

—

Exploit Today

0-100

Published: Sep 22, 2026 · Last modified: Sep 25, 2026 · CWE-125

EPSS · 30d

0.2%EPSS · 30 days0.2%

2026-09-232026-10-19

Technical description

radare2 is a UNIX-like reverse engineering framework and command-line toolset. Prior to 6.2.0, radare2's ELF PN_XNUM handling was vulnerable because the ELF parser allocated the program-header array using the resolved PN_XNUM count but several consumers still iterated with the original e_phnum value of 65535. The vulnerability is triggered by processing a crafted ELF file with e_phnum = 0xffff and a much smaller resolved count in shdr[0].sh_info. Consumers iterated beyond the allocated program-header array. This can cause a heap out-of-bounds read and process termination, resulting in denial of service; memory disclosure and code execution have not been demonstrated. This issue is fixed in version 6.2.0.

Official references

Related CVEs

CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.

CVE-2026-96402—

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———A malicious USB MTP/PTP device can cause the USBX host to read past a heap buffer during ordinary object enumeration, leaking adjacent heap contents to the application or faulting on an unmapped page.1h CVE-2026-95111—

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———A memory-protected ThreadX module's queue request reaches the Module Manager's dispatch layer, which decides how much of the module's buffer the privileged queue copy may touch and hands that extent to the module port's range check. A queue's `tx_queue_message_size` is a count of `ULONG`s and the copy moves that many words, so the extent is `message_size * sizeof(ULONG)` bytes. The front-send dispatcher passed the word count itself. `tx_queue_send` and `tx_queue_receive`, either side of it in the same header, have always multiplied. A source buffer ending `message_size` bytes into memory the module may read was therefore accepted, and `_txe_queue_front_send` then read `message_size * sizeof(ULONG)` bytes from it in privileged mode — `3 * message_size` bytes past the end of what the module is allowed to read. The words are written into the queue's message area, so a module that can receive from that queue reads them back.1h CVE-2026-924546.1 MED

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———The GUIX software JPEG decoder reads four kinds of marker segment without checking that each is long enough to hold what it reads. A truncated segment is therefore read past the end of the caller's image buffer. Separately, a zero chroma sampling factor makes the block decode loop non-terminating. Both reproduce in the default configuration, in which `GX_SOFTWARE_DECODER_SUPPORT` is enabled.1h CVE-2026-92446—

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———`gx_binres_theme_load()` and `gx_binres_font_load()` take the resource as a bare `GX_UBYTE *` with no length, and `GX_BINRES_DATA_INFO` has no field to carry one. Every read is therefore performed at an offset the file itself chose, against a buffer whose extent the loader does not know. A resource that declares more data than it contains is read past its end, and an offset stored in the file is turned into a pointer without being bounded. This is a distinct defect from GHSA-hgcj-22cg-4hfv, which was an underflowed glyph count. It needs no underflow and no wrapped multiply: a perfectly well-formed, narrow glyph range reaches it.1h CVE-2026-91186—

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———The PNG chunk reader has no notion of chunk ordering. It records whether an IDAT has been seen and whether a tRNS has already supplied transparency, but nothing prevents an IHDR being read a second time. A PNG carries exactly one IHDR and it is the first chunk. A file that places a second one after IDAT rewrites the image width, height, bit depth and pixel depth *after* the decoded-data buffer has already been allocated and filled from the original values. The pass that reverses the PNG row filters then derives its own extent from the new dimensions and walks the old allocation, moving image bytes past the end of it. The buffer is allocated by GUIX rather than supplied by the caller, so the application has no way to size it defensively. The decoder is compiled in by default.1h CVE-2026-91059—

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———The GUIX JPEG software decoder enforces no ordering on JPEG markers. A file that places a second `SOF0` frame header after `SOS` re-runs the frame header parser after the output buffer has already been allocated and its geometry latched. The decoder returns `GX_SUCCESS` and publishes a `GX_PIXELMAP` whose reported dimensions and `data_size` exceed the allocation behind it. Any consumer that trusts the returned structure reads out of bounds, including GUIX's own display drivers, reached through the ordinary draw path. Reproduces in the shipped default configuration; `GX_SOFTWARE_DECODER_SUPPORT` is enabled by default.1h