CVE-2026-83535
A flaw was found in openstack-network-exporter. When an operator configures user authentication but omits or misconfigures Transport Layer S
CVSS
7.4
High
EPSS
0.3%
p19
KEV
—
Exploit Today
6
0-100
Published: Oct 12, 2026 · Last modified: Oct 15, 2026 · CWE-208
0.3%EPSS · 30 days0.3%
2026-10-132026-10-19
A flaw was found in openstack-network-exporter. When an operator configures user authentication but omits or misconfigures Transport Layer Security (TLS), the basic authentication mechanism is silently bypassed. This fail-open design allows an adjacent network attacker to access sensitive Open vSwitch (OVS) and Open Virtual Network (OVN) dataplane metrics without credentials. Consequently, an attacker can enumerate bridge names, port counters, OVN controller state, and host topology, leading to information disclosure.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-24715—8.0%
——2An observable timing discrepancy vulnerability has been reported to affect QuRouter. If exploited, the vulnerability could allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive data.
We have already fixed the vulnerability in the following version:
QuRouter 2.7.2.113 and later5dCVE-2026-492656.8 MED30.0%
——9OAuthLib is an implementation of the OAuth request-signing logic for Python 3.6+. From 3.0.0 until 4.0.0, OAuthLib's PKCE checks in oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/authorization_code.py compare attacker-supplied code_verifier values with stored challenges using ordinary string equality in code_challenge_method_plain and code_challenge_method_s256. Because the comparison can return after a length difference or the first mismatching character, repeated token endpoint measurements can reveal common-prefix timing information that could potentially allow recovery of the code_verifier, unauthorized access-token acquisition, and account takeover. Practical exploitation requires an intercepted, single-use authorization code and enough measurements to overcome real-world network noise; the local timing benchmark does not establish practical remote account takeover, so the weakness remains a defense-in-depth concern. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.0.4dCVE-2026-1093795.3 MED26.9%
——8Cockpit CMS 2.14.1 contains an observable timing discrepancy vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate accounts due to an incomplete timing fix in /auth/check. Attackers can post login attempts and measure response times, since existing accounts incur two bcrypt operations versus one, revealing valid usernames and email addresses.4dCVE-2026-1072693.7 LOW14.4%
——4Gophish through 0.12.1 contains a timing discrepancy vulnerability in AdminServer.Login that allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate valid usernames by measuring login response times. Attackers can submit candidate usernames to POST /login and detect bcrypt comparison delays for existing accounts, narrowing targets for password guessing or credential stuffing.11dCVE-2026-18040—1.1%
——0In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, HQC leaked secret-derived data through two side channels: its GF(2^8) arithmetic used lookup tables indexed by field elements, making the cache line touched a function of the operand, and its fixed-weight support sampler left its duplicate scan as soon as a collision was found and stored accepted positions at a secret index. Both run on secret inputs during encapsulation and decapsulation, and the sampler re-expands the secret key from its seed on every decapsulation, so an attacker able to observe cache behaviour or decapsulation timing can recover information about the HQC private key. The field arithmetic is now table-free and the sampler branch-free within a batch of candidates, with output and randomness consumption unchanged.14dCVE-2026-18036—19.4%
——6In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, NTRU reduced secret values with the % operator in three helpers whose reference implementations are deliberately division-free, so each reduction was carried out by an integer division whose latency depends on the secret operand. Polynomial.modQ divided by a variable divisor, which a compiler cannot strength-reduce to a multiply the way it can a constant one, so it emitted a division on every call including on the decapsulation path where the dividend derives from the private key; Polynomial.mod3 and NTRUSampling.mod3 divided the secret key polynomials f and g during key generation, the message polynomials r and m during encapsulation, and coefficients recovered during decapsulation. An attacker able to measure that timing can recover information about the NTRU private key. modQ now masks, which is exact because q is always a power of two, and mod3 uses the reference implementation's division-free fold and select; the results are unchanged.18d