CVE-2026-9264
A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in SketchUp 2026's Dynamic Components feature allows remote code execution and local file exfiltr
CVSS
9.3
Critical
EPSS
0.2%
p14
KEV
—
Exploit Today
4
0-100
Published: May 22, 2026 · Last modified: Jul 23, 2026 · CWE-94
0.2%EPSS · 30 days0.2%
2026-07-282026-08-24
A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in SketchUp 2026's Dynamic Components feature allows remote code execution and local file exfiltration through maliciously crafted SKP files. The vulnerability stems from improper input sanitization in the component options window, enabling attackers to execute arbitrary system commands and read local files without user interaction by exploiting an embedded Internet Explorer 11 browser.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-524909.8 CRI—
——0An issue in libtiff 85f2ac8e0b01cb7db2bbecf4a3b891bdbef67938 allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code via the process_command_opts() function in tools/tiffcrop.c6hCVE-2026-408778.7 HIG—
——0Combodo iTop is a web-based IT service management tool. Prior to 3.2.3, iTop is vulnerable to PHP object injection in the user preference functionality, which can lead to remote code execution. This issue has been fixed in version 3.2.3.1dCVE-2026-39975——
——0Combodo iTop is a web-based IT service management tool. Prior to 3.2.3, unauthenticated users could delete the .readonly file on iTop instances, leading to code execution. This file, created during the setup process, prevents users from performing write actions. This issue has been fixed in version 3.2.3.1dCVE-2026-768368.8 HIG—
——0AzuraCast exposes the Liquidsoap custom configuration fields through an endpoint that does not require the permission guarding them. The backend_config property in backend/src/Entity/Station.php is annotated with GROUP_GENERAL, and PUT /api/station/{station_id}/profile/edit in backend/src/Controller/Api/Stations/ProfileEditController.php deserializes with that group while requiring only StationPermissions::Profile. AbstractArrayEntity::fromArray() then assigns every public property with no field-level permission check, so custom_config_top, custom_config, custom_config_pre_playlists, custom_config_pre_live, custom_config_pre_fade and custom_config_bottom are writable through it. ConfigWriter::writeCustomConfigurationSection() emits those values verbatim into the generated Liquidsoap .liq script, where the process.run() and process.exec() built-ins execute operating system commands when the backend restarts, which the built-in sync task triggers automatically once needs_restart is set. The dedicated endpoint for the same data, PUT /api/station/{id}/liquidsoap-config, requires StationPermissions::Broadcasting, so a station manager holding only the profile permission reaches configuration that the intended boundary reserves for broadcasting operators.1dCVE-2026-783677.0 HIG—
——0A vulnerability was found in RPM's rpmbuild tarball processing. When processing a crafted source archive, the getTarSpec() function in tools/rpmbuild.cc passes an attacker-controlled tar archive member name to rpmExpand() as part of a %{basename:...} macro expression. A specially crafted .spec member name can therefore inject RPM macros, including Lua expressions, resulting in arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running rpmbuild. This can be exploited when a victim or automated build system processes an attacker-controlled source tarball using rpmbuild tarball mode (such as -ts, -ta, or -tb).1dCVE-2026-768418.8 HIG—
——0Xinference loads models with Hugging Face remote code execution unconditionally enabled, and before version 2.12.0 exposes no setting to disable it. Six loader call sites pass trust_remote_code=True as a literal or as an unconditional default: RerankModel._get_tokenizer in xinference/model/rerank/core.py, SentenceTransformerRerankModel.load in xinference/model/rerank/sentence_transformers/core.py, SentenceTransformerEmbeddingModel.load in xinference/model/embedding/sentence_transformers/core.py, FlagEmbeddingModel.load in xinference/model/embedding/flag/core.py, and two sites in xinference/model/llm/transformers/core.py where PytorchModel._sanitize_model_config and PytorchModel._get_components default the value to True. Because a caller with model launch access can register a model whose type is unknown and supply an arbitrary model path, the server reaches _auto_detect_type and then AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained, which imports and executes Python declared by the model directory's own tokenizer_config.json auto_map, running attacker-supplied code with the privileges of the worker process. Version 2.12.0 gates every site behind allow_trust_remote_code and the XINFERENCE_TRUST_REMOTE_CODE setting, permitting remote code only for bundled built-in models.2d