CVE WatchOct 2, 2026

CVE-2026-92820

The Ninja Forms - File Uploads plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file operations in all versions up to, and including, 3.3.34

CVSS

8.1

High

EPSS

0.5%

p44

KEV

—

Exploit Today

0-100

Published: Oct 2, 2026 · Last modified: Oct 2, 2026 · CWE-434

EPSS · 30d

0.5%EPSS · 30 days0.5%

2026-10-022026-10-25

Technical description

The Ninja Forms - File Uploads plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file operations in all versions up to, and including, 3.3.34 via the external (Amazon S3) upload flow. The plugin trusts an attacker-supplied file path from the form submission and stores it as the upload's file_path, which is then used without validation to attach a file to the form's notification email (arbitrary file read), to write fetched content (arbitrary file write, leading to remote code execution when the external store is configured), and in a scheduled deletion (arbitrary file deletion). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read, write, or delete arbitrary files on the server. Exploitation requires the site to use the plugin's External File Upload (Amazon S3) action; the read variant additionally requires a form Email action configured to attach the uploaded file.

Official references

Related CVEs

CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.

CVE-2026-1160446.3 MED

10.5%

——3A security vulnerability has been detected in prasathmani TinyFileManager up to 2.6. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file tinyfilemanager.php of the component Remote URL File Upload Module. The manipulation leads to unrestricted upload. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.12h CVE-2026-115481—

26.7%

——8baserCMS is a website development framework. Starting in version 5.0.0-beta1 and prior to versions 5.3.2 and 5.4.2, `PermissionGroupsService::build()` reads a plugin's `config/permission.php` to decide what each user group may reach. When that file is absent it writes a wildcard allow rule instead: `url` `/baser/<prefix>/<plugin>/*`, `method` `*`, `auth` true, for every non-admin group. BcCustomContent has no such file in any release. After an administrator installs it, the default `operators` group can store and execute arbitrary PHP under the document root. Versions 5.3.2 and 5.4.2 patch the issue.2d CVE-2026-1134725.4 MED

14.2%

——4The Depicter — Popup & Slider Builder WordPress plugin before 4.8.2 does not properly validate uploaded files in its editor media-upload endpoint, checking only the client-supplied MIME type and a case-sensitive block of the .php extension, which allows users with the Editor role and above to upload files with other active extensions into the public uploads directory, leading to stored script execution in the site origin and, depending on the server's handler mapping, to code execution.2d CVE-2026-591885.4 MED

4.1%

——1Part-DB is an open source inventory management system for electronic components. Prior to version 2.12.3, Part-DB-server sanitizes SVG files based solely on the user-controlled filename extension rather than actual file content type. An authenticated attacker can upload a malicious SVG with JavaScript payload using a non-SVG extension (e.g., .jpg), bypassing sanitization entirely. When any user views the attachment inline, the browser receives Content-Type: image/svg+xml and executes the embedded script in the Part-DB origin. This issue has been patched in version 2.12.3.2d CVE-2026-546309.6 CRI

14.1%

——4Part-DB is an open source inventory management system for electronic components. Prior to version 2.12.1, the part attachment upload handler stores uploaded files under the web-served media directory using the client-supplied file extension, and its extension blocklist does not include phar. AttachmentSubmitHandler::renameBlacklistedExtensions() rewrites dangerous extensions (php, phtml, sh, cgi, py, js, html, htaccess, ...) to .txt, but phar is absent from the list, so a .phar file keeps its extension. Public attachments (the default) are written into public/media/, which is the Apache document root. The shipped Apache configuration routes .phar to PHP-FPM, so the stored file is executed as PHP on request. The per-attachment-type extension filter is empty by default and is not consulted by the upload handler in a way that blocks this, and a non-admin user in the default users group can create an attachment type with no filter and attach files to parts. Any authenticated user in the default users group uploads a .phar attachment to a part and fetches it under /media/, executing arbitrary PHP as the www-data web user. Ability to exploit depends on the webserver config, docker image contained the vulnerability by default. This issue has been patched in version 2.12.1.2d CVE-2026-102785—

52.9%

——16Joomla Extension - yootheme.com - Unauthenticated remote code execution in YOOtheme Pro 5.0.0-5.0.52 - YOOtheme Pro’s publicly accessible image transformation handler incompletely binds normalized image operations and the output destination to its request signature. An unauthenticated remote attacker can reuse a signature disclosed in a legitimate public image URL, inject additional image operations, traverse out of the intended cache directory, and write an attacker-controlled PNG/PHP polyglot to an executable public media directory.3d