Vulnerabilities exploitable today
402,516in current view
Single score combining CVSS, KEV membership and EPSS. Every CVE with its own record — timeline from publication to active exploitation.
In KEV catalog1,756
New KEV · 24H0
Exploit Today ≥ 701,669
Distribution · last window
- Critical3,936
- High16,940
- Medium15,775
- Low1,527
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CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2015-6114—97.3%
——29——CVE-2013-3116—97.3%
——29——CVE-2019-1221—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-6006—97.3%
——29——CVE-2011-2382—97.3%
——29——CVE-2019-1359—97.3%
——29——CVE-2019-1280—97.3%
——29——CVE-2010-0246—97.3%
——29——CVE-2022-0811—97.3%
——29——CVE-2016-0053—97.3%
——29——CVE-2011-1992—97.3%
——29——CVE-2006-6059—97.3%
——29——CVE-2014-0263—97.3%
——29——CVE-2026-20945—97.3%
——29——CVE-2000-0081—97.3%
——29——CVE-2009-2433—97.3%
——29——CVE-2011-3833—97.3%
——29——CVE-2015-0061—97.3%
——29——CVE-2016-7273—97.3%
——29——CVE-2008-0456—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-8576—97.3%
——29——CVE-2010-1980—97.3%
——29——CVE-2010-1260—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-1028—97.3%
——29——CVE-2024-0088—97.3%
——29——CVE-2024-1676—97.3%
——29——CVE-2021-212955.9 MED97.3%
——29Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.16dCVE-2024-21514—97.3%
——29——CVE-2000-0132—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-8013—97.3%
——29——CVE-2024-6298—97.3%
——29——CVE-2022-41654—97.3%
——29——CVE-2016-3356—97.3%
——29——CVE-2020-9425—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-6910—97.3%
——29——CVE-2011-0020—97.3%
——29——CVE-2003-0172—97.3%
——29——CVE-2006-0020—97.3%
——29——CVE-2016-0052—97.3%
——29——CVE-2006-0187—97.3%
——29——