Vulnerabilities exploitable today
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In KEV catalog1,695
New KEV · 24H0
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CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2025-3749—22.0%
——7——CVE-2024-7577—22.0%
——7——CVE-2022-49568—22.0%
——7——CVE-2014-5723—22.0%
——7——CVE-2025-383659.1 CRI22.0%
——7In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix a race between renames and directory logging
We have a race between a rename and directory inode logging that if it
happens and we crash/power fail before the rename completes, the next time
the filesystem is mounted, the log replay code will end up deleting the
file that was being renamed.
This is best explained following a step by step analysis of an interleaving
of steps that lead into this situation.
Consider the initial conditions:
1) We are at transaction N;
2) We have directories A and B created in a past transaction (< N);
3) We have inode X corresponding to a file that has 2 hardlinks, one in
directory A and the other in directory B, so we'll name them as
"A/foo_link1" and "B/foo_link2". Both hard links were persisted in a
past transaction (< N);
4) We have inode Y corresponding to a file that as a single hard link and
is located in directory A, we'll name it as "A/bar". This file was also
persisted in a past transaction (< N).
The steps leading to a file loss are the following and for all of them we
are under transaction N:
1) Link "A/foo_link1" is removed, so inode's X last_unlink_trans field
is updated to N, through btrfs_unlink() -> btrfs_record_unlink_dir();
2) Task A starts a rename for inode Y, with the goal of renaming from
"A/bar" to "A/baz", so we enter btrfs_rename();
3) Task A inserts the new BTRFS_INODE_REF_KEY for inode Y by calling
btrfs_insert_inode_ref();
4) Because the rename happens in the same directory, we don't set the
last_unlink_trans field of directoty A's inode to the current
transaction id, that is, we don't cal btrfs_record_unlink_dir();
5) Task A then removes the entries from directory A (BTRFS_DIR_ITEM_KEY
and BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY items) when calling __btrfs_unlink_inode()
(actually the dir index item is added as a delayed item, but the
effect is the same);
6) Now before task A adds the new entry "A/baz" to directory A by
calling btrfs_add_link(), another task, task B is logging inode X;
7) Task B starts a fsync of inode X and after logging inode X, at
btrfs_log_inode_parent() it calls btrfs_log_all_parents(), since
inode X has a last_unlink_trans value of N, set at in step 1;
8) At btrfs_log_all_parents() we search for all parent directories of
inode X using the commit root, so we find directories A and B and log
them. Bu when logging direct A, we don't have a dir index item for
inode Y anymore, neither the old name "A/bar" nor for the new name
"A/baz" since the rename has deleted the old name but has not yet
inserted the new name - task A hasn't called yet btrfs_add_link() to
do that.
Note that logging directory A doesn't fallback to a transaction
commit because its last_unlink_trans has a lower value than the
current transaction's id (see step 4);
9) Task B finishes logging directories A and B and gets back to
btrfs_sync_file() where it calls btrfs_sync_log() to persist the log
tree;
10) Task B successfully persisted the log tree, btrfs_sync_log() completed
with success, and a power failure happened.
We have a log tree without any directory entry for inode Y, so the
log replay code deletes the entry for inode Y, name "A/bar", from the
subvolume tree since it doesn't exist in the log tree and the log
tree is authorative for its index (we logged a BTRFS_DIR_LOG_INDEX_KEY
item that covers the index range for the dentry that corresponds to
"A/bar").
Since there's no other hard link for inode Y and the log replay code
deletes the name "A/bar", the file is lost.
The issue wouldn't happen if task B synced the log only after task A
called btrfs_log_new_name(), which would update the log with the new name
for inode Y ("A/bar").
Fix this by pinning the log root during renames before removing the old
directory entry, and unpinning af
---truncated---41dCVE-2025-2254—22.0%
——7——CVE-2026-30917—22.0%
——7——CVE-2014-5689—22.0%
——7——CVE-2014-6678—22.0%
——7——CVE-2026-663815.3 MED22.0%
——7A repository reader with cache-deploy permission may access content outside a configured upstream path under specific conditions.6dCVE-2014-5873—22.0%
——7——CVE-2026-22492—22.0%
——7——CVE-2014-5797—22.0%
——7——CVE-2024-28140—22.0%
——7——CVE-2026-789686.5 MED22.0%
——7Missing authorization in Core in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially spoof address bar via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)13dCVE-2025-14428—22.0%
——7——CVE-2014-6653—22.0%
——7——CVE-2024-56279—22.0%
——7——CVE-2014-5822—22.0%
——7——CVE-2024-47174—22.0%
——7——CVE-2014-5686—22.0%
——7——CVE-2014-5865—22.0%
——7——CVE-2026-73508.3 HIG22.0%
——7Use after free in WebMIDI in Google Chrome prior to 147.0.7727.138 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)47dCVE-2024-37271—22.0%
——7——CVE-2026-73577.5 HIG22.0%
——7Use after free in GPU in Google Chrome prior to 147.0.7727.138 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)47dCVE-2014-5761—22.0%
——7——CVE-2014-5658—22.0%
——7——CVE-2024-3215—22.0%
——7——CVE-2014-5798—22.0%
——7——CVE-2021-30816—22.0%
——7——CVE-2022-35648—22.0%
——7——CVE-2014-5690—22.0%
——7——CVE-2026-822427.7 HIG22.0%
——7Budibase versions before 3.41.3 contain a missing authorization vulnerability in the POST /api/resources/duplicate endpoint that allows authenticated builders to inject tables, automations, queries, and screens into any other application without holding any role in the destination workspace. Attackers can inject resources by specifying an arbitrary destination workspace ID in the request body, then trigger injected automations with outgoing webhooks to exfiltrate data from victim applications.11dCVE-2014-5816—22.0%
——7——CVE-2014-5687—22.0%
——7——CVE-2014-5971—22.0%
——7——CVE-2024-35749—22.0%
——7——CVE-2014-5569—22.0%
——7——CVE-2025-3870—22.0%
——7——CVE-2014-5741—22.0%
——7——