Vulnerabilities exploitable today
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Single score combining CVSS, KEV membership and EPSS. Every CVE with its own record — timeline from publication to active exploitation.
In KEV catalog1,685
New KEV · 24H0
Exploit Today ≥ 701,629
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- High10,487
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CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2022-486547.1 HIG15.4%
——5In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: fix possible bogus match in nf_osf_find()
nf_osf_find() incorrectly returns true on mismatch, this leads to
copying uninitialized memory area in nft_osf which can be used to leak
stale kernel stack data to userspace.25dCVE-2024-383134.3 MED15.4%
——5In certain scenarios a malicious website could attempt to display a fake location URL bar which could mislead users as to the actual website address This vulnerability affects Firefox for iOS < 127.10dCVE-2025-59415—15.4%
——5——CVE-2021-474027.8 HIG15.4%
——5In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sched: flower: protect fl_walk() with rcu
Patch that refactored fl_walk() to use idr_for_each_entry_continue_ul()
also removed rcu protection of individual filters which causes following
use-after-free when filter is deleted concurrently. Fix fl_walk() to obtain
rcu read lock while iterating and taking the filter reference and temporary
release the lock while calling arg->fn() callback that can sleep.
KASAN trace:
[ 352.773640] ==================================================================
[ 352.775041] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower]
[ 352.776304] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881c8251480 by task tc/2987
[ 352.777862] CPU: 3 PID: 2987 Comm: tc Not tainted 5.15.0-rc2+ #2
[ 352.778980] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 352.781022] Call Trace:
[ 352.781573] dump_stack_lvl+0x46/0x5a
[ 352.782332] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140
[ 352.783400] ? fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower]
[ 352.784292] ? fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower]
[ 352.785138] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf
[ 352.785851] ? fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower]
[ 352.786587] kasan_check_range+0x145/0x1a0
[ 352.787337] fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower]
[ 352.788163] ? fl_put+0x10/0x10 [cls_flower]
[ 352.789007] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x220/0x220
[ 352.790102] tcf_chain_dump+0x231/0x450
[ 352.790878] ? tcf_chain_tp_delete_empty+0x170/0x170
[ 352.791833] ? __might_sleep+0x2e/0xc0
[ 352.792594] ? tfilter_notify+0x170/0x170
[ 352.793400] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x220/0x220
[ 352.794477] tc_dump_tfilter+0x385/0x4b0
[ 352.795262] ? tc_new_tfilter+0x1180/0x1180
[ 352.796103] ? __mod_node_page_state+0x1f/0xc0
[ 352.796974] ? __build_skb_around+0x10e/0x130
[ 352.797826] netlink_dump+0x2c0/0x560
[ 352.798563] ? netlink_getsockopt+0x430/0x430
[ 352.799433] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x220/0x220
[ 352.800542] __netlink_dump_start+0x356/0x440
[ 352.801397] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3ff/0x550
[ 352.802190] ? tc_new_tfilter+0x1180/0x1180
[ 352.802872] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x1f0/0x1f0
[ 352.803668] ? tc_new_tfilter+0x1180/0x1180
[ 352.804344] ? _copy_from_iter_nocache+0x800/0x800
[ 352.805202] ? kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
[ 352.805900] netlink_rcv_skb+0xc6/0x1f0
[ 352.806587] ? rht_deferred_worker+0x6b0/0x6b0
[ 352.807455] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x1f0/0x1f0
[ 352.808324] ? netlink_ack+0x4d0/0x4d0
[ 352.809086] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x62/0x3d0
[ 352.809951] netlink_unicast+0x353/0x480
[ 352.810744] ? netlink_attachskb+0x430/0x430
[ 352.811586] ? __alloc_skb+0xd7/0x200
[ 352.812349] netlink_sendmsg+0x396/0x680
[ 352.813132] ? netlink_unicast+0x480/0x480
[ 352.813952] ? __import_iovec+0x192/0x210
[ 352.814759] ? netlink_unicast+0x480/0x480
[ 352.815580] sock_sendmsg+0x6c/0x80
[ 352.816299] ____sys_sendmsg+0x3a5/0x3c0
[ 352.817096] ? kernel_sendmsg+0x30/0x30
[ 352.817873] ? __ia32_sys_recvmmsg+0x150/0x150
[ 352.818753] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x140
[ 352.819518] ? sendmsg_copy_msghdr+0x110/0x110
[ 352.820402] ? ___sys_recvmsg+0xf4/0x1a0
[ 352.821110] ? __copy_msghdr_from_user+0x260/0x260
[ 352.821934] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x81/0xd0
[ 352.822680] ? __handle_mm_fault+0xef3/0x1b20
[ 352.823549] ? rb_insert_color+0x2a/0x270
[ 352.824373] ? copy_page_range+0x16b0/0x16b0
[ 352.825209] ? perf_event_update_userpage+0x2d0/0x2d0
[ 352.826190] ? __fget_light+0xd9/0xf0
[ 352.826941] __sys_sendmsg+0xb3/0x130
[ 352.827613] ? __sys_sendmsg_sock+0x20/0x20
[ 352.828377] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2c5/0x8a0
[ 352.829184] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x52/0x60
[ 352.830001] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x32/0x160
[ 352.830845] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
[ 352.831445] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 352.832331] RIP: 0033:0x7f7bee973c17
[
---truncated---25dCVE-2026-138829.6 CRI15.4%
——5Race in USB in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)58dCVE-2026-762155.3 MED15.4%
——5phpMyFAQ before 4.1.7 fails to apply parent FAQ visibility checks before returning child resources including comments and attachments. Unauthenticated attackers can retrieve restricted comment text, commenter email addresses, and attachment filenames for FAQ records they cannot directly access by querying the comments and attachments API endpoints.7dCVE-2026-64287.6 HIG15.4%
——5SQL Injection in reports/catalogue_out.pl in Koha Community Koha through 22.11.37, 23.x, 24.x before 24.11.16, 25.05.x before 25.05.11, 25.11.x before 25.11.05, 26.05.x before 26.05.01, and 26.11.x before 26.11.00 allows an authenticated staff user with the Reports module flag to read arbitrary data from the Koha application database via the Filter URL parameter when the Criteria parameter matches /branchcode/.19dCVE-2026-704833.1 LOW15.4%
——5Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.6 until 0.11.0, DELETE /api/v1/chats/{id} cancelled a chat's in-flight tasks before checking whether the caller could delete that chat. Any authenticated user who knew another user's chat id could abort that user's running model response, title generation, or tag generation, even though the delete was refused and no chat data was deleted, modified, or disclosed. This issue is fixed in 0.11.0.23dCVE-2024-34398—15.4%
——5——CVE-2025-0420—15.4%
——5——CVE-2023-32994—15.4%
——5——CVE-2025-20084—15.4%
——5——CVE-2017-18226—15.4%
——5——CVE-2019-25387—15.4%
——5——CVE-2024-49880—15.4%
——5——CVE-2026-598493.1 LOW15.4%
——5A flaw was found in libssh. Logic errors in automatic certificate-based public key authentication can cause libssh clients to loop indefinitely when configured certificates are missing or repeatedly rejected by a server, leading to denial of service.10dCVE-2024-498767.8 HIG15.4%
——5In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: fix UAF around queue destruction
We currently do stuff like queuing the final destruction step on a
random system wq, which will outlive the driver instance. With bad
timing we can teardown the driver with one or more work workqueue still
being alive leading to various UAF splats. Add a fini step to ensure
user queues are properly torn down. At this point GuC should already be
nuked so queue itself should no longer be referenced from hw pov.
v2 (Matt B)
- Looks much safer to use a waitqueue and then just wait for the
xa_array to become empty before triggering the drain.
(cherry picked from commit 861108666cc0e999cffeab6aff17b662e68774e3)25dCVE-2023-527687.8 HIG15.4%
——5In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wilc1000: use vmm_table as array in wilc struct
Enabling KASAN and running some iperf tests raises some memory issues with
vmm_table:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in wilc_wlan_handle_txq+0x6ac/0xdb4
Write of size 4 at addr c3a61540 by task wlan0-tx/95
KASAN detects that we are writing data beyond range allocated to vmm_table.
There is indeed a mismatch between the size passed to allocator in
wilc_wlan_init, and the range of possible indexes used later: allocation
size is missing a multiplication by sizeof(u32)25dCVE-2022-32849—15.4%
——5——CVE-2023-52463—15.4%
——5——CVE-2026-33726—15.4%
——5——CVE-2023-52842—15.4%
——5——CVE-2024-467657.8 HIG15.4%
——5In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: protect XDP configuration with a mutex
The main threat to data consistency in ice_xdp() is a possible asynchronous
PF reset. It can be triggered by a user or by TX timeout handler.
XDP setup and PF reset code access the same resources in the following
sections:
* ice_vsi_close() in ice_prepare_for_reset() - already rtnl-locked
* ice_vsi_rebuild() for the PF VSI - not protected
* ice_vsi_open() - already rtnl-locked
With an unfortunate timing, such accesses can result in a crash such as the
one below:
[ +1.999878] ice 0000:b1:00.0: Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring 14
[ +2.002992] ice 0000:b1:00.0: Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring 18
[Mar15 18:17] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: NETDEV WATCHDOG: CPU: 38: transmit queue 14 timed out 80692736 ms
[ +0.000093] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: tx_timeout: VSI_num: 6, Q 14, NTC: 0x0, HW_HEAD: 0x0, NTU: 0x0, INT: 0x4000001
[ +0.000012] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: tx_timeout recovery level 1, txqueue 14
[ +0.394718] ice 0000:b1:00.0: PTP reset successful
[ +0.006184] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098
[ +0.000045] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ +0.000023] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ +0.000023] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ +0.000018] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ +0.000023] CPU: 38 PID: 7540 Comm: kworker/38:1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7 #1
[ +0.000031] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0014.082620210524 08/26/2021
[ +0.000036] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice]
[ +0.000183] RIP: 0010:ice_clean_tx_ring+0xa/0xd0 [ice]
[...]
[ +0.000013] Call Trace:
[ +0.000016] <TASK>
[ +0.000014] ? __die+0x1f/0x70
[ +0.000029] ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4f0
[ +0.000029] ? schedule+0x3b/0xd0
[ +0.000027] ? exc_page_fault+0x7b/0x180
[ +0.000022] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ +0.000031] ? ice_clean_tx_ring+0xa/0xd0 [ice]
[ +0.000194] ice_free_tx_ring+0xe/0x60 [ice]
[ +0.000186] ice_destroy_xdp_rings+0x157/0x310 [ice]
[ +0.000151] ice_vsi_decfg+0x53/0xe0 [ice]
[ +0.000180] ice_vsi_rebuild+0x239/0x540 [ice]
[ +0.000186] ice_vsi_rebuild_by_type+0x76/0x180 [ice]
[ +0.000145] ice_rebuild+0x18c/0x840 [ice]
[ +0.000145] ? delay_tsc+0x4a/0xc0
[ +0.000022] ? delay_tsc+0x92/0xc0
[ +0.000020] ice_do_reset+0x140/0x180 [ice]
[ +0.000886] ice_service_task+0x404/0x1030 [ice]
[ +0.000824] process_one_work+0x171/0x340
[ +0.000685] worker_thread+0x277/0x3a0
[ +0.000675] ? preempt_count_add+0x6a/0xa0
[ +0.000677] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x50
[ +0.000679] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000653] kthread+0xf0/0x120
[ +0.000635] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000616] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
[ +0.000612] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000604] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
[ +0.000604] </TASK>
The previous way of handling this through returning -EBUSY is not viable,
particularly when destroying AF_XDP socket, because the kernel proceeds
with removal anyway.
There is plenty of code between those calls and there is no need to create
a large critical section that covers all of them, same as there is no need
to protect ice_vsi_rebuild() with rtnl_lock().
Add xdp_state_lock mutex to protect ice_vsi_rebuild() and ice_xdp().
Leaving unprotected sections in between would result in two states that
have to be considered:
1. when the VSI is closed, but not yet rebuild
2. when VSI is already rebuild, but not yet open
The latter case is actually already handled through !netif_running() case,
we just need to adjust flag checking a little. The former one is not as
trivial, because between ice_vsi_close() and ice_vsi_rebuild(), a lot of
hardware interaction happens, this can make adding/deleting rings exit
with an error. Luckily, VSI rebuild is pending and can apply new
configuration for us in a managed fashion.
Therefore, add an additional VSI state flag ICE_VSI_REBUILD_PENDING to
indicate that ice_x
---truncated---25dCVE-2022-49186—15.4%
——5——CVE-2021-26321—15.4%
——5——CVE-2025-0879—15.4%
——5——CVE-2026-451807.5 HIG15.4%
——5Catalyst::Plugin::Statsd versions through 0.10.0 for Perl may leak session ids.
If the communication channel to the statsd daemon is not secured (for example, by sending UDP packets to a host on another network), then users' session ids may be leaked. This may allow an attacker to use session ids as authentication tokens.36dCVE-2024-49914—15.4%
——5——CVE-2026-22328—15.4%
——5——CVE-2021-47039—15.4%
——5——CVE-2023-40457—15.4%
——5——CVE-2022-48980—15.4%
——5——CVE-2024-35637—15.4%
——5——CVE-2024-28669—15.4%
——5——CVE-2024-6920—15.4%
——5——CVE-2026-471276.5 MED15.4%
——5Ghostfolio is an open source wealth management software. Prior to version 3.4.0, Ghostfolio's Stripe checkout success-URL handler at `GET /api/v1/subscription/stripe/callback?checkoutSessionId=<id>` retrieves the Stripe Checkout Session by ID and unconditionally grants a Premium subscription to the session's `client_reference_id` — without ever checking `session.payment_status` or `session.status`. There is no separate Stripe webhook endpoint with `stripe-signature` verification; this callback is the sole code path that creates Stripe-driven subscriptions. Any authenticated user can self-grant a 1-year Premium subscription without ever paying. Version 3.4.0 rejects sessions unless `session.payment_status === 'paid'` AND `session.status === 'complete'` (fails closed). Additionally, new unique `stripeCheckoutSessionId` column → a session can't be redeemed twice (race-safe via DB unique constraint).15dCVE-2022-48772—15.4%
——5——CVE-2025-3446—15.4%
——5——CVE-2025-24153—15.4%
——5——CVE-2025-30510—15.4%
——5——