Vulnerabilities exploitable today
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CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2021-42029—14.4%
——4——CVE-2023-525237.8 HIG14.4%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Reject sk_msg egress redirects to non-TCP sockets
With a SOCKMAP/SOCKHASH map and an sk_msg program user can steer messages
sent from one TCP socket (s1) to actually egress from another TCP
socket (s2):
tcp_bpf_sendmsg(s1) // = sk_prot->sendmsg
tcp_bpf_send_verdict(s1) // __SK_REDIRECT case
tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(s2)
tcp_bpf_push_locked(s2)
tcp_bpf_push(s2)
tcp_rate_check_app_limited(s2) // expects tcp_sock
tcp_sendmsg_locked(s2) // ditto
There is a hard-coded assumption in the call-chain, that the egress
socket (s2) is a TCP socket.
However in commit 122e6c79efe1 ("sock_map: Update sock type checks for
UDP") we have enabled redirects to non-TCP sockets. This was done for the
sake of BPF sk_skb programs. There was no indention to support sk_msg
send-to-egress use case.
As a result, attempts to send-to-egress through a non-TCP socket lead to a
crash due to invalid downcast from sock to tcp_sock:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000002f
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x60/0x70
? __die+0x1f/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x80/0x160
? do_user_addr_fault+0x2d7/0x800
? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50
? exc_page_fault+0x70/0x1c0
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
? tcp_tso_segs+0x14/0xa0
tcp_write_xmit+0x67/0xce0
__tcp_push_pending_frames+0x32/0xf0
tcp_push+0x107/0x140
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x99f/0xbb0
tcp_bpf_push+0x19d/0x3a0
tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir+0x55/0xd0
tcp_bpf_send_verdict+0x407/0x550
tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0x1a1/0x390
inet_sendmsg+0x6a/0x70
sock_sendmsg+0x9d/0xc0
? sockfd_lookup_light+0x12/0x80
__sys_sendto+0x10e/0x160
? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x20/0x60
? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x82/0x110
__x64_sys_sendto+0x1f/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Reject selecting a non-TCP sockets as redirect target from a BPF sk_msg
program to prevent the crash. When attempted, user will receive an EACCES
error from send/sendto/sendmsg() syscall.23dCVE-2023-526767.8 HIG14.4%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Guard stack limits against 32bit overflow
This patch promotes the arithmetic around checking stack bounds to be
done in the 64-bit domain, instead of the current 32bit. The arithmetic
implies adding together a 64-bit register with a int offset. The
register was checked to be below 1<<29 when it was variable, but not
when it was fixed. The offset either comes from an instruction (in which
case it is 16 bit), from another register (in which case the caller
checked it to be below 1<<29 [1]), or from the size of an argument to a
kfunc (in which case it can be a u32 [2]). Between the register being
inconsistently checked to be below 1<<29, and the offset being up to an
u32, it appears that we were open to overflowing the `int`s which were
currently used for arithmetic.
[1] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/815fb87b753055df2d9e50f6cd80eb10235fe3e9/kernel/bpf/verifier.c#L7494-L7498
[2] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/815fb87b753055df2d9e50f6cd80eb10235fe3e9/kernel/bpf/verifier.c#L1190423dCVE-2025-398488.8 HIG14.4%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ax25: properly unshare skbs in ax25_kiss_rcv()
Bernard Pidoux reported a regression apparently caused by commit
c353e8983e0d ("net: introduce per netns packet chains").
skb->dev becomes NULL and we crash in __netif_receive_skb_core().
Before above commit, different kind of bugs or corruptions could happen
without a major crash.
But the root cause is that ax25_kiss_rcv() can queue/mangle input skb
without checking if this skb is shared or not.
Many thanks to Bernard Pidoux for his help, diagnosis and tests.
We had a similar issue years ago fixed with commit 7aaed57c5c28
("phonet: properly unshare skbs in phonet_rcv()").28dCVE-2025-656765.4 MED14.4%
——4Stored Cross site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Classroomio LMS 0.1.13 allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted SVG cover images.53dCVE-2025-12895—14.4%
——4——CVE-2025-14173—14.4%
——4——CVE-2024-267927.8 HIG14.4%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix double free of anonymous device after snapshot creation failure
When creating a snapshot we may do a double free of an anonymous device
in case there's an error committing the transaction. The second free may
result in freeing an anonymous device number that was allocated by some
other subsystem in the kernel or another btrfs filesystem.
The steps that lead to this:
1) At ioctl.c:create_snapshot() we allocate an anonymous device number
and assign it to pending_snapshot->anon_dev;
2) Then we call btrfs_commit_transaction() and end up at
transaction.c:create_pending_snapshot();
3) There we call btrfs_get_new_fs_root() and pass it the anonymous device
number stored in pending_snapshot->anon_dev;
4) btrfs_get_new_fs_root() frees that anonymous device number because
btrfs_lookup_fs_root() returned a root - someone else did a lookup
of the new root already, which could some task doing backref walking;
5) After that some error happens in the transaction commit path, and at
ioctl.c:create_snapshot() we jump to the 'fail' label, and after
that we free again the same anonymous device number, which in the
meanwhile may have been reallocated somewhere else, because
pending_snapshot->anon_dev still has the same value as in step 1.
Recently syzbot ran into this and reported the following trace:
------------[ cut here ]------------
ida_free called for id=51 which is not allocated.
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 31038 at lib/idr.c:525 ida_free+0x370/0x420 lib/idr.c:525
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 31038 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00410-gc02197fc9076 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
RIP: 0010:ida_free+0x370/0x420 lib/idr.c:525
Code: 10 42 80 3c 28 (...)
RSP: 0018:ffffc90015a67300 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: be5130472f5dd000 RBX: 0000000000000033 RCX: 0000000000040000
RDX: ffffc90009a7a000 RSI: 000000000003ffff RDI: 0000000000040000
RBP: ffffc90015a673f0 R08: ffffffff81577992 R09: 1ffff92002b4cdb4
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52002b4cdb5 R12: 0000000000000246
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffffff8e256b80 R15: 0000000000000246
FS: 00007fca3f4b46c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f167a17b978 CR3: 000000001ed26000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
btrfs_get_root_ref+0xa48/0xaf0 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1346
create_pending_snapshot+0xff2/0x2bc0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1837
create_pending_snapshots+0x195/0x1d0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1931
btrfs_commit_transaction+0xf1c/0x3740 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2404
create_snapshot+0x507/0x880 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:848
btrfs_mksubvol+0x5d0/0x750 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:998
btrfs_mksnapshot+0xb5/0xf0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1044
__btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x387/0x4b0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1306
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x1ca/0x400 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1393
btrfs_ioctl+0xa74/0xd40
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:871 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfe/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:857
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
RIP: 0033:0x7fca3e67dda9
Code: 28 00 00 00 (...)
RSP: 002b:00007fca3f4b40c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fca3e7abf80 RCX: 00007fca3e67dda9
RDX: 00000000200005c0 RSI: 0000000050009417 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fca3e6ca47a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fca3e7abf80 R15: 00007fff6bf95658
</TASK>
Where we get an explicit message where we attempt to free an anonymous
device number that is not currently allocated. It happens in a different
code path from the example below, at btrfs_get_root_ref(), so this change
may not fix the case triggered by sy
---truncated---23dCVE-2024-56256—14.4%
——4——CVE-2024-24272—14.4%
——4——CVE-2023-33873—14.4%
——4——CVE-2023-20268—14.4%
——4——CVE-2026-43930—14.4%
——4——CVE-2020-1994—14.4%
——4——CVE-2024-13709—14.4%
——4——CVE-2026-133186.4 MED14.4%
——4A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw was found in KubeVirt's virt-api port-forward handler. When processing a port-forward request to a VirtualMachineInstance (VMI), virt-api reads the target IP from vmi.Status.Interfaces[0].IP and passes it directly to net.Dial() without validation. For VMIs using non-masquerade network bindings (bridge or secondary-only), this IP is reported by the QEMU guest agent running inside the VM and is fully controllable by the VM owner. An attacker with kubevirt.io:edit permissions can create a VM with a modified guest agent that reports an arbitrary IP address, then request port-forward to establish a bidirectional TCP tunnel from virt-api's cluster-internal network position to any routable destination, bypassing NetworkPolicy isolation.52dCVE-2025-2531—14.4%
——4——CVE-2025-9724—14.4%
——4——CVE-2025-40834—14.4%
——4——CVE-2025-43584—14.4%
——4——CVE-2025-41110—14.4%
——4——CVE-2022-50720—14.4%
——4——CVE-2026-1899—14.4%
——4——CVE-2020-4387—14.4%
——4——CVE-2026-82937.5 HIG14.4%
——4The Really Simple Security WordPress plugin before 9.5.10.1 does not enforce the second-factor challenge in two of its two-factor authentication REST endpoints, allowing an attacker who knows a user's password to obtain a WordPress authentication session for that user without completing the email OTP challenge.36dCVE-2022-50714—14.4%
——4——CVE-2021-475357.8 HIG14.4%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/a6xx: Allocate enough space for GMU registers
In commit 142639a52a01 ("drm/msm/a6xx: fix crashstate capture for
A650") we changed a6xx_get_gmu_registers() to read 3 sets of
registers. Unfortunately, we didn't change the memory allocation for
the array. That leads to a KASAN warning (this was on the chromeos-5.4
kernel, which has the problematic commit backported to it):
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _a6xx_get_gmu_registers+0x144/0x430
Write of size 8 at addr ffffff80c89432b0 by task A618-worker/209
CPU: 5 PID: 209 Comm: A618-worker Tainted: G W 5.4.156-lockdep #22
Hardware name: Google Lazor Limozeen without Touchscreen (rev5 - rev8) (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x248
show_stack+0x20/0x2c
dump_stack+0x128/0x1ec
print_address_description+0x88/0x4a0
__kasan_report+0xfc/0x120
kasan_report+0x10/0x18
__asan_report_store8_noabort+0x1c/0x24
_a6xx_get_gmu_registers+0x144/0x430
a6xx_gpu_state_get+0x330/0x25d4
msm_gpu_crashstate_capture+0xa0/0x84c
recover_worker+0x328/0x838
kthread_worker_fn+0x32c/0x574
kthread+0x2dc/0x39c
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Allocated by task 209:
__kasan_kmalloc+0xfc/0x1c4
kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x14
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x1f0/0x2a0
a6xx_gpu_state_get+0x164/0x25d4
msm_gpu_crashstate_capture+0xa0/0x84c
recover_worker+0x328/0x838
kthread_worker_fn+0x32c/0x574
kthread+0x2dc/0x39c
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x1823dCVE-2026-13966.4 MED14.4%
——4The Magic Conversation For Gravity Forms plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'magic-conversation' shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 3.0.97 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.33dCVE-2026-485088.8 HIG14.4%
——4Lemur manages TLS certificate creation. Prior to 1.9.1, StrictRolePermission and AuthorityCreatorPermission in lemur/auth/permissions.py call flask_principal.Permission.__init__() with zero Need objects when ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION and LEMUR_STRICT_ROLE_ENFORCEMENT are unset because both flags default to False. Flask-Principal Permission.allows() returns True when self.needs is empty, so the .can() authorization gate permits every authenticated identity, including the read-only role. A read-only user can access POST /api/1/authorities, POST /api/1/certificates/upload, POST /api/1/pending_certificates//upload, POST /api/1/notifications, PUT or DELETE /api/1/notifications/, and POST /api/1/domains to create root Certificate Authorities, upload arbitrary certificates, create or edit notifications that reach an SSRF sink, and create domain entries. Explicitly setting either flag to False continues to opt into the permissive behavior. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.1.9dCVE-2023-40953—14.4%
——4——CVE-2025-40013—14.4%
——4——CVE-2024-46917—14.4%
——4——CVE-2026-72568—14.4%
——4Rejected reason: Red Hat CNA-LR concluded that this CVE is not valid.10dCVE-2025-62327—14.4%
——4——CVE-2025-15512—14.4%
——4——CVE-2025-14880—14.4%
——4——CVE-2024-26842—14.4%
——4——CVE-2025-7630—14.4%
——4——CVE-2026-140794.3 MED14.4%
——4Insufficient policy enforcement in Network in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)57dCVE-2025-14948—14.4%
——4——