Vulnerabilities exploitable today
354,689in current view
Single score combining CVSS, KEV membership and EPSS. Every CVE with its own record — timeline from publication to active exploitation.
In KEV catalog1,656
New KEV · 24H0
Exploit Today ≥ 701,601
Distribution · last window
- Critical2,617
- High9,374
- Medium7,592
- Low711
Window
Severity
Flags
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2022-26509—5.3%
——2——CVE-2025-0610—5.4%
——2——CVE-2023-33087—5.4%
——2——CVE-2025-39724—5.4%
——2——CVE-2023-30906—5.4%
——2——CVE-2025-526113.1 LOW5.4%
——2HCL iControl v4.0.0 was affected by Unhandled Exception - Stack Trace Disclosure vulnerability. The error occurs due to an undefined property being accessed in the application's JavaScript code. Specifically, the code attempts to read the property dashboard key from an object that is undefined. This issue likely stems from one of the following: A missing or improperly initialized object.10dCVE-2025-39749—5.4%
——2——CVE-2025-20954—5.4%
——2——CVE-2025-38384—5.4%
——2——CVE-2025-32901—5.4%
——2——CVE-2025-10214—5.4%
——2——CVE-2022-42860—5.4%
——2——CVE-2025-38626—5.4%
——2——CVE-2022-50046—5.4%
——2——CVE-2026-285273.5 LOW5.4%
——2BlueKitchen BTstack versions prior to 1.8.1 contain an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the AVRCP Controller GET_PLAYER_APPLICATION_SETTING_ATTRIBUTE_TEXT and GET_PLAYER_APPLICATION_SETTING_VALUE_TEXT handlers that allows nearby attackers to read beyond packet boundaries. Attackers can establish a paired Bluetooth Classic connection and send specially crafted VENDOR_DEPENDENT responses to trigger out-of-bounds reads, causing information disclosure and potential crashes on affected devices.18dCVE-2026-162112.6 LOW5.4%
——2A vulnerability was determined in allegro up to bcf65b994ef29fb3fc2e10b660e6288723d5209e. This impacts the function AssetLastHostname.increment_hostname of the file src/ralph/assets/models/assets.py of the component Hostname Allocation Handler. Executing a manipulation of the argument counter can lead to race condition. Attacks of this nature are highly complex. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.12dCVE-2025-38269—5.4%
——2——CVE-2025-2181—5.3%
——2——CVE-2022-50107—5.3%
——2——CVE-2025-41231—5.3%
——2——CVE-2025-0050—5.3%
——2——CVE-2026-63821—5.3%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw88: usb: fix memory leaks on USB write failures
When rtw_usb_write_port() fails to submit a USB Request Block (URB)
(e.g., due to device disconnect or ENOMEM), the completion callback is
never executed.
Currently, the driver ignores the return value of rtw_usb_write_port()
in rtw_usb_write_data() and rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb(). Because these
functions rely on the completion callback to free the socket buffers
(skbs) and the transaction control block (txcb), a submission failure
results in:
1. A memory leak of the allocated skb in rtw_usb_write_data().
2. A memory leak of the txcb structure and all aggregated skbs in
rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb().
Fix this by checking the return value of rtw_usb_write_port(). If it
fails, explicitly free the skb in rtw_usb_write_data(), and properly
purge the tx_ack_queue and free the txcb in rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb().
The issue was discovered in practice during device disconnect/reconnect
scenarios and memory pressure conditions. Tested by verifying normal TX
operation continues after the fix without regressions.5dCVE-2020-0292—5.3%
——2——CVE-2021-30308—5.3%
——2——CVE-2025-64312—5.3%
——2——CVE-2018-25301—5.3%
——2——CVE-2026-2746—5.3%
——2——CVE-2025-22237—5.3%
——2——CVE-2023-33240—5.3%
——2——CVE-2020-37253—5.3%
——2——CVE-2025-12050—5.3%
——2——CVE-2023-30732—5.3%
——2——CVE-2026-150767.5 HIG5.3%
——2In versions up to and including 4.5.29 (4.x branch) and 5.1.4 (5.x branch), the WebClientSession component of Eclipse Vert.x Web Client does not validate that the Domain attribute of a Set-Cookie response header matches the originating server's domain, in violation of RFC 6265 section 5.3.
An attacker who controls any server that the victim application contacts can inject a cookie scoped to an arbitrary third-party domain; because the session store performs no cross-domain ownership check, it stores and later transmits that cookie to the targeted domain.
When the victim application subsequently sends a request to the targeted domain using the same WebClientSession, it presents the attacker-injected cookie, causing the receiving service to process the request under the attacker's account. Sensitive data included in the victim application's requests, such as payment amounts, card details, or other API payloads, may then be accessible to the attacker through their own account on that service.18dCVE-2025-21105—5.3%
——2——CVE-2025-38351—5.3%
——2——CVE-2022-50088—5.3%
——2——CVE-2025-71137—5.3%
——2——CVE-2020-0410—5.3%
——2——CVE-2025-381667.8 HIG5.3%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: fix ktls panic with sockmap
[ 2172.936997] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 2172.936999] kernel BUG at lib/iov_iter.c:629!
......
[ 2172.944996] PKRU: 55555554
[ 2172.945155] Call Trace:
[ 2172.945299] <TASK>
[ 2172.945428] ? die+0x36/0x90
[ 2172.945601] ? do_trap+0xdd/0x100
[ 2172.945795] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.946031] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.946267] ? do_error_trap+0x7d/0x110
[ 2172.946499] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.946736] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70
[ 2172.946961] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.947197] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 2172.947446] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.947683] ? iov_iter_revert+0x5c/0x180
[ 2172.947913] tls_sw_sendmsg_locked.isra.0+0x794/0x840
[ 2172.948206] tls_sw_sendmsg+0x52/0x80
[ 2172.948420] ? inet_sendmsg+0x1f/0x70
[ 2172.948634] __sys_sendto+0x1cd/0x200
[ 2172.948848] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[ 2172.949072] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x140/0x270
[ 2172.949330] ? __lock_release.isra.0+0x5e/0x170
[ 2172.949595] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[ 2172.949817] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x140/0x270
[ 2172.950211] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xda/0x190
[ 2172.950632] ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0xc2/0xd0
[ 2172.951036] __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
[ 2172.951382] do_syscall_64+0x90/0x170
......
After calling bpf_exec_tx_verdict(), the size of msg_pl->sg may increase,
e.g., when the BPF program executes bpf_msg_push_data().
If the BPF program sets cork_bytes and sg.size is smaller than cork_bytes,
it will return -ENOSPC and attempt to roll back to the non-zero copy
logic. However, during rollback, msg->msg_iter is reset, but since
msg_pl->sg.size has been increased, subsequent executions will exceed the
actual size of msg_iter.
'''
iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter, msg_pl->sg.size - orig_size);
'''
The changes in this commit are based on the following considerations:
1. When cork_bytes is set, rolling back to non-zero copy logic is
pointless and can directly go to zero-copy logic.
2. We can not calculate the correct number of bytes to revert msg_iter.
Assume the original data is "abcdefgh" (8 bytes), and after 3 pushes
by the BPF program, it becomes 11-byte data: "abc?de?fgh?".
Then, we set cork_bytes to 6, which means the first 6 bytes have been
processed, and the remaining 5 bytes "?fgh?" will be cached until the
length meets the cork_bytes requirement.
However, some data in "?fgh?" is not within 'sg->msg_iter'
(but in msg_pl instead), especially the data "?" we pushed.
So it doesn't seem as simple as just reverting through an offset of
msg_iter.
3. For non-TLS sockets in tcp_bpf_sendmsg, when a "cork" situation occurs,
the user-space send() doesn't return an error, and the returned length is
the same as the input length parameter, even if some data is cached.
Additionally, I saw that the current non-zero-copy logic for handling
corking is written as:
'''
line 1177
else if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
if (ret == -ENOSPC)
ret = 0;
goto send_end;
'''
So it's ok to just return 'copied' without error when a "cork" situation
occurs.2dCVE-2025-14573—5.3%
——2——