CVE Watch360,624 in full archive

Vulnerabilities exploitable today

360,624in current view

Single score combining CVSS, KEV membership and EPSS. Every CVE with its own record — timeline from publication to active exploitation.

In KEV catalog1,665

New KEV · 24H0

Exploit Today ≥ 701,608

Distribution · last window

Critical
2,501
High
11,081
Medium
7,068
Low
637

Filters

Window

Severity

Flags

Vulnerabilities360,041–360,080 · 360,624

CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.

CVE-2026-72412—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/mm: Fix handling of _PAGE_UNUSED pte bit The _PAGE_UNUSED softbit should not really be lying around. Its sole purpose is to signal to try_to_unmap_one() and try_to_migrate_one() that the page can be discarded instead of being moved / swapped. KVM has no way to know why a page is being unmapped, so it sets the bit on userspace ptes corresponding to unused guest pages every time they get unmapped. KVM has no reasonable way to clear the bit once the page is in use again. While set_ptes() checks and clears the bit, other paths that set new ptes did not. This led to used pages being thrown out as if they were unused, causing guest corruption. Fix the issue by clearing the _PAGE_UNUSED bit for present ptes in set_pte(), i.e. whenever a present pte is getting set. The check in set_ptes() is then redundant and can be removed. Also fix gmap_helper_try_set_pte_unused() to only set the bit if the pte is present; the _PAGE_UNUSED bit is only defined for present ptes and thus should not be set for non-present ptes.14h CVE-2026-72056—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ena: clean up XDP TX queues when regular TX setup fails create_queues_with_size_backoff() creates XDP TX queues before setting up the regular TX path. If the subsequent allocation or creation of regular TX queues fails, the error handling paths omit the teardown of the XDP TX queues, leading to a resource leak. Fix this by explicitly destroying the XDP TX queue subset at the two missing failure points. The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in v7.1-rc7. An x86_64 allyesconfig build showed no new warnings. As we do not have an ENA device to test with, no runtime testing was able to be performed.14h CVE-2026-72410—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: octeontx2-af: Validate NIX maximum LFs correctly NIX maximum number of LFs can be set via devlink command but that can be done before assigning any LFs to a PF/VF. The condition used to check whether any LFs are assigned is incorrect. This patch fixes that condition.14h CVE-2026-72409—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mvneta: re-enable percpu interrupt on resume On Marvell MPIC platforms (Armada 370/XP/38x), mvneta uses a percpu IRQ disable/enable scheme for NAPI: the ISR (mvneta_percpu_isr) calls disable_percpu_irq() to mask the MPIC per-CPU interrupt and schedules NAPI poll, which calls enable_percpu_irq() on completion to unmask. If suspend occurs while NAPI poll is pending (between disable_percpu_irq in the ISR and enable_percpu_irq in poll completion), the interrupt is never re-enabled: 1. mvneta_percpu_isr: disable_percpu_irq() + napi_schedule() => MPIC masked, percpu_enabled cpumask bit cleared 2. NAPI poll does not complete before suspend proceeds (on PREEMPT_RT this is highly likely since softirqs run in ksoftirqd which gets frozen; on non-RT it can happen when softirq processing is deferred to ksoftirqd) 3. mvneta_stop_dev => napi_disable(): cancels the pending poll without executing the completion path 4. suspend_device_irqs => IRQCHIP_MASK_ON_SUSPEND: masks MPIC (already masked, but records IRQS_SUSPENDED) 5. Resume: mpic_resume checks irq_percpu_is_enabled() => false (bit was cleared in step 1) => skips unmask 6. mvneta_start_dev only restores device-level INTR_NEW_MASK, does not touch the MPIC per-CPU mask Result: MPIC per-CPU interrupt stays masked permanently. The NIC generates interrupts (INTR_NEW_CAUSE != 0) but the CPU never receives them, causing complete loss of network connectivity. Fix by calling on_each_cpu(mvneta_percpu_enable) in the resume path to unconditionally unmask the MPIC per-CPU interrupt regardless of pre-suspend state.14h CVE-2026-72408—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: geneve: gate GRO hint in geneve_gro_complete() on gs->gro_hint geneve_gro_receive() reads the GRO hint through geneve_sk_gro_hint_off(), which honours it only when the socket enabled IFLA_GENEVE_GRO_HINT (gs->gro_hint). geneve_gro_complete() instead calls the low-level geneve_opt_gro_hint_off() and acts on the hint unconditionally. On a tunnel without the hint, receive aggregates the frames as plain ETH_P_TEB while complete still honours an attacker-supplied hint option: it inflates gh_len by gro_hint->nested_hdr_len (u8) and redirects the dispatch type, so the inner gro_complete handler runs at nhoff + gh_len, an offset receive never pulled nor validated, reading out of bounds of the skb head: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ipv6_gro_complete (net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:196) Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800fe91980 by task exploit/153 ipv6_gro_complete (net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:196) geneve_gro_complete (drivers/net/geneve.c:965) udp_gro_complete (net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:940) inet_gro_complete (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1621) __gro_flush (net/core/gro.c:306) Gate the complete path on gs->gro_hint too via geneve_sk_gro_hint_off(), so both paths agree. Tunnels that enable the hint are unaffected.14h CVE-2026-72055—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ip6_vti: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink vti6_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net. Gate vti6_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top, before any attribute is parsed.14h CVE-2026-72277—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: nv: Inject SEA if guest VNCR isn't normal memory When constructing an L1 VNCR mapping, KVM unconditionally uses cacheable memory attributes, even if the underlying PFN isn't memory. This gets particularly hairy if the endpoint doesn't support cacheable memory attributes, potentially throwing an SError on writeback... While KVM does permit cacheable memory attributes on certain PFNMAP VMAs, kvm_translate_vncr() isn't currently grabbing the VMA. So do the simpler thing for now and just reject everything that isn't memory.14h CVE-2026-72054—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ip_vti: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink vti_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net. Gate vti_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top, before any attribute is parsed.14h CVE-2026-72278—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: nv: Re-translate VNCR before injecting abort KVM faults in the VNCR page with FOLL_WRITE whenever the guest aborts for a write, similar to how a regular stage-2 mapping is handled. It is entirely possible that the guest reads from the VNCR before writing to it, in which case the PFN could only be read-only. Invalidate the VNCR TLB and re-fetch the translation upon taking a VNCR abort, allowing the host mapping to be faulted in for write the second time around. Interestingly enough, this also satisfies the ordering requirements of FEAT_ETS2/3 between descriptor updates and MMU faults.14h CVE-2026-72407—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: geneve: validate inner network offset in geneve_gro_complete() Even with both paths gated on gs->gro_hint, geneve_gro_complete() re-derives the inner dispatch type and length from the packet and the current gs->gro_hint, independently of geneve_gro_receive(). The two can disagree if gs->gro_hint flips under a concurrent geneve_quiesce()/ geneve_unquiesce() (sk_user_data is NULL across a synchronize_net()), or if the re-read option bytes differ from the ones receive parsed. geneve_gro_receive() already records the inner network header position in NAPI_GRO_CB()->inner_network_offset. Have geneve_gro_complete() compute the offset it is about to dispatch at, adding ETH_HLEN in the ETH_P_TEB case where eth_gro_complete() steps over the inner MAC header, and bail out if it lands past inner_network_offset. Use a lower bound rather than exact equality: between gh_len and the inner L3 header, geneve_gro_receive() may also have pulled an inner VLAN tag (vlan_gro_receive() advances the recorded offset past it), which only moves inner_network_offset further out. A valid frame therefore always satisfies inner_nh <= inner_network_offset, while a gh_len inflated by a hint gro_receive() did not honour dispatches past the validated inner header, i.e. the out-of-bounds completion. Only the latter is rejected.14h CVE-2026-72406—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: sungem: fix probe error cleanup gem_init_one() calls gem_remove_one() when register_netdev() fails. gem_remove_one() unregisters and frees resources owned by the net_device, including the DMA block, MMIO mapping, PCI regions, and the net_device itself. gem_init_one() then falls through to its own cleanup labels and frees the same resources again. Keep the register_netdev() error path in gem_init_one(): clear drvdata so PM/remove paths do not see a half-registered device, remove the NAPI instance added during probe, and let the existing cleanup labels release the resources once. The issue was found by a local static-analysis checker for probe error paths. The reported path was manually inspected before sending this fix. Compile-tested with CONFIG_SUNGEM=y. Runtime testing was not performed because no sungem hardware is available.14h CVE-2026-72405—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: udp_tunnel: prevent double queueing in udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync Yue Sun reported a use-after-free and debugobjects warning in udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync_work() during concurrent device operations. The workqueue core clears the internal pending bit before invoking the worker. At that point, a concurrent thread can queue the work again. When the already running worker eventually clears the work_pending flag to 0, it mistakenly clears the flag for the newly queued instance. udp_tunnel_nic_unregister() then observes work_pending as 0 and frees the structure while the second work item is still active in the queue, leading to UAF. Fix this by returning early in udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync() if work_pending is already set, preventing redundant work queueing.14h CVE-2026-72053—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ipip: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink ipip_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net. Gate ipip_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top, before any attribute is parsed.14h CVE-2026-72280—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: nv: Drop bogus WARN for write to ZCR_EL2 It is entirely possible for a guest to write to the ZCR_EL2 sysreg alias while in a nested context, as it is expected if FEAT_NV2 is advertised to the L1 hypervisor. Get rid of the bogus WARN which, since the hyp vectors were installed at this point, has the effect of a hyp_panic...14h CVE-2026-72052—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ip6_gre: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink ip6gre_changelink() and ip6erspan_changelink() operate on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net. Gate both ops on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at their top, before any attribute is parsed.14h CVE-2026-72051—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ip6_tunnel: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink ip6_tnl_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net. Gate ip6_tnl_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top, before any attribute is parsed.14h CVE-2026-72281—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: account pKVM reclaim against the VM mm Protected guest faults charge long term pins to the VM's mm. Teardown can run later from file release, where current->mm may be unrelated. Drop the charge from kvm->mm instead.14h CVE-2026-72050—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: octeontx2-af: Free BPID bitmap on setup failure nix_setup_bpids() allocates bp->bpids with rvu_alloc_bitmap(), which uses a plain kcalloc(). If any of the following devm_kcalloc() allocations for the BPID mapping arrays fails, the function returns without freeing the bitmap. Free the BPID bitmap before returning from those error paths.14h CVE-2026-72049—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ieee802154: admin-gate legacy LLSEC dump operations In net/ieee802154/netlink.c, the legacy IEEE802154_NL family ops table builds the LLSEC dump entries (LLSEC_LIST_KEY, LLSEC_LIST_DEV, LLSEC_LIST_DEVKEY, LLSEC_LIST_SECLEVEL) with IEEE802154_DUMP() which sets no .flags, so generic netlink runs them ungated. The modern nl802154 family admin-gates the equivalent reads via NL802154_CMD_GET_SEC_KEY and friends with .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM. Any local uid that can open AF_NETLINK / NETLINK_GENERIC can resolve the "802.15.4 MAC" family and dump LLSEC_LIST_KEY on any wpan netdev that has an LLSEC key installed; the dump handler writes the raw 16-byte AES-128 key bytes (IEEE802154_ATTR_LLSEC_KEY_BYTES, copied verbatim from struct ieee802154_llsec_key.key) into the reply. Recovering the AES key compromises 802.15.4 LLSEC link confidentiality and authenticity, since LLSEC uses CCM* and the same key authenticates and encrypts frames. Impact: any local uid with no capabilities can read the raw 16-byte AES-128 LLSEC key from the kernel keytable on any wpan netdev that has an administrator-installed LLSEC key, by issuing an LLSEC_LIST_KEY dump on the legacy IEEE802154_NL generic-netlink family. Introduce IEEE802154_DUMP_PRIV() mirroring IEEE802154_DUMP() but setting .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, and use it for the four LLSEC dump entries. LIST_PHY and LIST_IFACE retain IEEE802154_DUMP() because the modern nl802154 family exposes their equivalents to unprivileged readers by design (NL802154_CMD_GET_WPAN_PHY and NL802154_CMD_GET_INTERFACE carry "can be retrieved by unprivileged users" annotations).14h CVE-2026-72048—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ieee802154: ca8210: fix cas_ctl leak on spi_async failure ca8210_spi_transfer() allocates cas_ctl with kzalloc_obj(GFP_ATOMIC) and relies entirely on the SPI completion callback ca8210_spi_transfer_complete() to free it. The spi_async() API only invokes the completion callback on successful submission. On failure it returns a negative error code without ever queuing the callback, which leaves cas_ctl and its embedded spi_message and spi_transfer orphaned. Every kfree(cas_ctl) in the driver is inside the completion callback, so there is no other reclamation path. ca8210_spi_transfer() is called from ca8210_spi_exchange(), the interrupt handler ca8210_interrupt_handler(), and from the retry path inside the completion callback itself. The exchange and interrupt handler paths loop on -EBUSY, so under sustained SPI bus contention every retry iteration leaks a fresh cas_ctl (~600 bytes per occurrence). Fix it by freeing cas_ctl on the spi_async() error path. While here, correct the misleading error string: the function calls spi_async(), not spi_sync().14h CVE-2026-72282—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: Move kvm_io_bus_get_dev() locking responsibilities to callers kvm_io_bus_get_dev() returns a device that is only matched by the address, and nothing else. This can cause a lifetime issue if the matched device is not the expected type, as by the time the caller can introspect the object, it might be gone (the srcu lock having been dropped). Given that there is only a single user of this helper, the simplest option is to move the locking responsibility to the caller, which can keep the srcu lock held for as long as it wants. Note that this aligns with other kvm_io_bus*() helpers, which already require the srcu lock to be held by the callers.14h CVE-2026-72283—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Nullify irqfd->producer if updating IRTE for bypass fails Nullify irqfd->producer if updating the IRTE for bypass fails, as leaving a dangling pointer will result in a use-after-free if the irqfd is reachable through KVM's routing, but the producer is freed separately. E.g. for VFIO PCI, the producer is embedded in struct "vfio_pci_irq_ctx" and freed when the vector is disabled, which can happen independent of routing updates. [sean: drop PPC change, massage changelog]14h CVE-2026-72403—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: FCP: Fix NULL pointer dereference in interface lookup A malformed USB device can provide a vendor-specific interface without any endpoint descriptors. fcp_find_fc_interface() currently selects the first vendor-specific interface and reads endpoint 0 from it, without checking whether the interface actually has any endpoints. When bNumEndpoints is zero, no endpoint array is allocated for the parsed alternate setting, so get_endpoint(..., 0) yields an invalid endpoint descriptor pointer. Dereferencing it through usb_endpoint_num() then triggers a NULL pointer dereference. Skip vendor-specific interfaces that do not have any endpoints.14h CVE-2026-72047—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ieee802154: ca8210: fix pointer truncation in kfifo on 64-bit ca8210_test_int_driver_write() and ca8210_test_int_user_read() exchange a kmalloc'd buffer pointer through a struct kfifo, but pass a literal '4' as the byte count to kfifo_in()/kfifo_out(). This is correct on 32-bit (pointer = 4 bytes), but on 64-bit only the low 4 bytes of the 8-byte pointer are written into the FIFO. The reader then reads back 4 bytes into an 8-byte local pointer variable, leaving the upper 4 bytes uninitialized stack data. The first dereference of the reconstructed pointer (fifo_buffer[1]) accesses an arbitrary kernel address and generally results in an oops. Use sizeof(fifo_buffer) so the byte count matches pointer width on every architecture. The driver has no architecture restriction in Kconfig, so any 64-bit build with CONFIG_IEEE802154_CA8210_DEBUGFS=y is exposed. Issue has been latent since the driver was added in 2017 because it is most commonly deployed on 32-bit MCUs. Found via a custom Coccinelle semantic patch hunting for short-byte kfifo I/O on byte-mode kfifos used to shuttle pointers.14h CVE-2026-72046—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gve: fix header buffer corruption with header-split and HW-GRO The DQO RX datapath programs a per-buffer-queue-descriptor header_buf_addr at post time and reads the split header back at completion time. Both the post and the read currently index the header buffer by queue position rather than by the buffer's identity: - post (gve_rx_post_buffers_dqo): header_buf_addr is computed from bufq->tail - read (gve_rx_dqo): the header is read from desc_idx (the completion queue head index) This relies on the buffer-queue index and the completion-queue index being equal for the start of every packet, i.e. on the device consuming posted buffers and returning completions in the exact same order. That assumption does not hold once HW-GRO is enabled with multiple flows: coalesced segments are accepted and completed in an order that may differ from the order buffers were posted, and segments from different flows may interleave. That results in two problems: 1. Wrong header slot on read. Because the read offset is derived from the completion index (desc_idx) while the device wrote the header to the address programmed for the buffer's buf_id, the driver can copy a header belonging to a different packet. This shows up as throughput drop (about 30% drop and large numbers of TCP retransmissions) with header-split and HW-GRO both enabled and many streams. 2. Header buffer reused while still owned by the device. The driver advances bufq->head by one per completion and re-posts buffers based on that. Arrival of N RX completions only guarantees that at least N RX buffer descriptors have been read by the device. It does not guarantee that the device has relinquished the ownership of all the buffers corresponding to those N descriptors. With out-of-order completions (e.g. the completion for a packet copied into buffer N arrives before the completion for a packet copied into buffer N-1), the driver can re-post and overwrite a header buffer that the device is still going to write into, corrupting the header of a packet whose completion has not yet been processed. Fix both issues by indexing the header buffer by buf_id on both the post and read paths. Reading from buf_id's slot is therefore always correct regardless of completion ordering (fixes problem 1). Indexing by buf_id also ties each header slot to the lifetime of its buffer state. A buffer state is only returned to the free/recycle lists when its own completion (buf_id) is processed, so its header slot can only be re-posted after the device is done with it. This makes header slot reuse safe under out-of-order completions (fixes problem 2). Allocate (gve_rx_alloc_hdr_bufs) and free (gve_rx_free_hdr_bufs) the header buffers based on num_buf_states to match the buf_id indexing.14h CVE-2026-72045—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: octeontx2-af: cn10k: restrict VF LMTLINE sharing to its own PF rvu_mbox_handler_lmtst_tbl_setup() uses req->base_pcifunc as a direct index into the LMT map table to read another function's LMTLINE physical base address and copy it into the caller's own LMT map table entry. The mailbox dispatcher authenticates req->hdr.pcifunc from the IRQ source, but req->base_pcifunc is a separate payload field and is not sanitized. Reject the request with -EPERM when a VF caller's base_pcifunc is not a valid function under its own PF. is_pf_func_valid() bounds the FUNC field to the PF's configured VF count, keeping the computed index inside the caller's own slot block.14h CVE-2026-72402—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Mask pseudo pointer values in verifier logs print_bpf_insn() masks ldimm64 immediates for pointer-bearing pseudo sources when pointer leaks are not allowed, but the mask only covers BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD and BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE. BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX, BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE, and BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID can also be resolved to kernel pointer values before the verifier log prints the instruction. Include them in the existing pointer classification so the log prints 0x0 instead of the rewritten address.14h CVE-2026-72401—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix insn_aux_data leak on verifier err_free_env path When bpf_check() allocates env->insn_aux_data successfully but later fails to allocate env->succ, it jumps directly to err_free_env. The existing vfree(env->insn_aux_data) sits before the err_free_env label, so that direct jump bypasses it and leaks insn_aux_data. Move vfree(env->insn_aux_data) into err_free_env so all early and late exit paths release it consistently.14h CVE-2026-72400—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seg6: validate SRH length before reading fixed fields seg6_validate_srh() reads fixed SRH fields such as srh->type and srh->hdrlen before checking that the supplied length covers the fixed struct ipv6_sr_hdr fields. The BPF SEG6 encap path reaches this with a BPF program-supplied pointer and length: bpf_lwt_push_encap() and the SEG6 local BPF END_B6 and END_B6_ENCAP actions call bpf_push_seg6_encap(), which forwards the length to seg6_validate_srh() with no minimum-size guard. A 2-byte SEG6 encap header can therefore make the validator read srh->type at offset 2 beyond the caller-supplied buffer. Reject lengths shorter than the fixed SRH at the top of seg6_validate_srh(), before any field is read. This fixes the BPF helper path and keeps the common validator robust.14h CVE-2026-72399—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: enetc: check the number of BDs needed for xdp_frame The size of xdp_redirect_arr array is ENETC_MAX_SKB_FRAGS. However, the number of fragments contained in xdp_frame may be greater than or equal to ENETC_MAX_SKB_FRAGS, which will cause the access to xdp_redirect_arr to be out of bounds.14h CVE-2026-72044—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix stack buffer overflow in multichannel session-key copy Commit 4b706360ffb7 ("ksmbd: fix multichannel binding and enforce channel limit") moved the binding-path session key out of the session-wide sess->sess_key (CIFS_KEY_SIZE = 40) into a new per-channel buffer, and sized both that buffer and the on-stack copy used during binding with SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE (16): struct channel { char sess_key[SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE]; /* 16 */ ... }; ntlm_authenticate() / krb5_authenticate(): char channel_key[SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE] = {}; /* 16 */ char *auth_key = conn->binding ? channel_key : sess->sess_key; The two writers that fill this destination still bound the copy length against CIFS_KEY_SIZE (40), not against the 16-byte buffer: ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() (NTLM key exchange): if (sess_key_len > CIFS_KEY_SIZE) /* 40 */ return -EINVAL; arc4_crypt(ctx_arc4, sess_key, (char *)authblob + sess_key_off, sess_key_len); ksmbd_krb5_authenticate(): if (resp->session_key_len > sizeof(sess->sess_key)) /* 40 */ ... memcpy(sess_key, resp->payload, resp->session_key_len); On a binding SESSION_SETUP, auth_key points at the 16-byte channel_key, so a client that supplies an NTLM EncryptedRandomSessionKey of up to 40 bytes (with NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH), or a Kerberos ticket whose session key is longer than 16 bytes (a normal AES256 key is 32), writes past the 16-byte stack buffer -- up to a 24-byte kernel stack overflow. KASAN reports it as a stack-out-of-bounds write in arc4_crypt() called from ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob(). The destinations must be able to hold the full session key the length checks already permit. Size the per-channel key buffer and the two on-stack channel_key buffers with CIFS_KEY_SIZE, matching sess->sess_key.14h CVE-2026-72284—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Ignore pending PV EOI if the vCPU has since disabled PV EOIs Ignore KVM's internal "service pending PV EOI" request if the vCPU has disabled PV EOIs since the request was made. Asserting that PV EOIs are enabled can fail if reading guest memory in pv_eoi_get_user() fails, i.e. if pv_eoi_test_and_clr_pending() bails early, *and* the vCPU also disables PV EOIs. kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:3338! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 4 UID: 1000 PID: 890 Comm: pv_eoi_test Not tainted 7.0.0-d585aa5894d8-vm #337 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic+0x12b/0x140 [kvm] Call Trace: <TASK> kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1075/0x1c30 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2d5/0x980 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0xb5/0xb40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---14h CVE-2026-72398—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: add INIT verification after cookie unpacking In SCTP handshake, the INIT chunk is initially processed by the server and embedded into the cookie carried in INIT-ACK. The client then returns this cookie via COOKIE-ECHO, where the server unpacks it and reconstructs the original INIT chunk. When cookie authentication is enabled, the cookie contents are protected against tampering, so reusing the unpacked INIT without re-verification is safe. However, when cookie authentication is disabled, the reconstructed INIT can no longer be trusted. In this case, the INIT must be explicitly validated after unpacking to avoid processing potentially tampered data. Add sctp_verify_init() checks after cookie unpacking in COOKIE-ECHO processing paths (sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook()) when cookie_auth_enable is disabled. On failure, the new association is freed and the packet is discarded. Also tighten cookie validation in sctp_unpack_cookie() by verifying the embedded chunk type is SCTP_CID_INIT before treating it as an INIT chunk. Finally, update sctp_verify_init() to validate parameter bounds using the actual embedded INIT length instead of chunk->chunk_end, since the INIT stored in COOKIE-ECHO may not span the entire chunk buffer.14h CVE-2026-72285—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: TDX: Reject concurrent change to CPUID entry count Reject KVM_TDX_INIT_VM if userspace changes cpuid.nent between the initial read and the subsequent copy of the initialization data. tdx_td_init() first reads user_data->cpuid.nent to size the flexible kvm_tdx_init_vm copy. The copied structure also contains cpuid.nent, and that field can differ from the value used to size the allocation if userspace modifies the input concurrently. setup_tdparams_cpuids() later passes init_vm->cpuid.nent to kvm_find_cpuid_entry2(), which uses it as the array bound for the copied entries. Require the copied count to match the value used to size the allocation so that CPUID parsing cannot access beyond the entries actually copied.14h CVE-2026-72286—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Do not allow intra-host migration/mirroring of SNP VMs The intra-host migration/mirroring feature is not fully implemented for SEV-SNP VMs. The proper migration requires additional SNP-specific state such as guest_req_mutex, guest_req_buf, and guest_resp_buf to be transferred or initialized on the destination. The SNP VM mirroring requires vmsa features to be copied as well otherwise ASID would be bound to SNP range while VM is detected as a SEV VM. Reject SNP source VMs in migration/mirroring until proper SNP state transfer is implemented. [sean: let lines poke past 80 chars, tag for stable]14h CVE-2026-72042—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipmi: Fix user refcount underflow in event delivery ipmi_alloc_recv_msg(user) takes the temporary user reference owned by the receive message, and ipmi_free_recv_msg() drops it again. If event delivery fails after allocating receive messages for earlier users, handle_read_event_rsp() rolls those messages back with ipmi_free_recv_msg(). That rollback path still drops user->refcount explicitly after freeing each message. The extra put can free a user that remains linked on intf->users, so later event delivery may dereference a freed user or trip refcount_t's addition-on-zero warning when ipmi_alloc_recv_msg() tries to acquire another reference. Remove the stale explicit put and the now-dead user assignment. Keep the list_del() and ipmi_free_recv_msg() calls; they are the required rollback operations.14h CVE-2026-72041—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: espintcp: use sk_msg_free_partial to fix partial send sk_msg_free_partial() ensures consistency of the skmsg at every iteration, without having to manually handle uncharges and offsets. This simplifies the code, and fixes some bugs in skmsg accounting when we don't send the full contents.14h CVE-2026-72040—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipmi: fix refcount leak in i_ipmi_request() When a caller provides a `supplied_recv` message to i_ipmi_request(), the function increments the user's `nr_msgs` reference count. If an error occurs later, the out_err cleanup path only frees the recv_msg if the function allocated it itself (i.e., !supplied_recv). In the supplied_recv case the cleanup is skipped, leaving the reference count elevated. The caller ipmi_request_supply_msgs() does not release the supplied_recv on error, so the reference is permanently leaked. Fix this by explicitly reverting the reference count operations when a supplied recv_msg with a valid user pointer is present in the error path: decrement nr_msgs and drop the user's kref.14h CVE-2026-72038—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: liquidio: fix BAR resource leak on PF number failure If cn23xx_get_pf_num() fails, the function returns without unmapping either BAR. Unmap both BARs before returning from the error path. Found by manual code review.14h CVE-2026-72037—

—

——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: lan743x: Initialize eth_syslock spinlock before use lan743x_hardware_init() calls pci11x1x_strap_get_status() during the PCI11x1x probe sequence. That helper acquires the Ethernet subsystem hardware lock via lan743x_hs_syslock_acquire(), which relies on adapter->eth_syslock_spinlock to serialize access. The spinlock is currently initialized only after the strap status is read. With CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK enabled, taking the zeroed initialized spinlock can trip the spinlock debug check. Fix by initializing adapter->eth_syslock_spinlock before reading the strap status so the probe path never attempts to lock an uninitialized spinlock.14h