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CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-74514——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: pci: Fix memory accounting for pinned/unpinned pages
The account_mem() and unaccount_mem() functions call get_uid() which
increments the reference count of struct user_struct on every invocation.
But we don't decrement the count by calling free_uid(). It also
accounted/unaccounted the pages against the current->mm. But its possible
the unaccount_mem() can be called from a different process context than the
one that originally pinned the pages.
Let's fix this by storing the pinning process user_struct and mm_struct
when accounting for pinned pages, and subsequently free these resources
when the pages are unpinned.
[borntraeger@linux.ibm.com: Fixed whitespace]5hCVE-2026-74515——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: pci: Reject adapter interrupt forwarding if already enabled
The MPCIFC instruction doesn't allow registering adapter interrupts without
first unregistering. So reject any request to enable interrupt forwarding
if its already enabled for the zPCI device. This also fixes overwriting and
thus leaking resources when the ioctl is called multiple times for the same
device.5hCVE-2026-74516——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: Update x2APIC MSR intercepts if AVIC is inhibited while L2 is active
Always update x2APIC MSR intercepts for L1 when AVIC is deactivated, even
if L2 is active and KVM is using a separate MSR bitmap to run L2. If AVIC
is fully enabled prior to running L2, and is then inhibited while L2 is
active (for a VM-scoped inhibit), then KVM will run L1 with AVIC disabled,
but with x2APIC MSR intercepts disabled, i.e. will allow L1 to read most of
the host's APIC state, send arbitrary interrupts, change task priority, and
ultimately trivially DoS the host.
E.g. sending a self-IPI in L1 on HYPERV_REENLIGHTENMENT_VECTOR, 0xee, with
CONFIG_HYPERV=n in the host kernel as a "safe" PoC, yields:
Spurious interrupt (vector 0xee) on CPU#425. Acked
And hacking KVM to abuse kvm_set_posted_intr_wakeup_handler() to register a
handler and WARN on POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR yields:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:5594 at pi_wakeup_handler+0x9/0x10 [kvm_amd], CPU#156: nested_x2apic_t/316940
CPU: 156 UID: 0 PID: 316940 Comm: nested_x2apic_t Tainted: G S U
Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER
Hardware name: Google Astoria-Turin/astoria, BIOS 0.20260209.0-0 02/09/2026
RIP: 0010:pi_wakeup_handler+0x9/0x10 [kvm_amd]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
sysvec_kvm_posted_intr_wakeup_ipi+0x64/0x80
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_kvm_posted_intr_wakeup_ipi+0x1a/0x20
RIP: 0010:vcpu_run+0x1430/0x1e40 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x2c1/0x600 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x580/0x6b0 [kvm]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x6d/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x46ff4b
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---5hCVE-2026-74517——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Cancel delayed I/O APIC EOI handling before destroying vCPUs
Cancel (and flush) the I/O APIC's delayed EOI handling work during the
"pre VM destroy" phase, before vCPUs are destroyed, as processing the EOI
broadcast will inject another IRQ if the line is asserted, i.e. will try
to deliver an IRQ to the target vCPU(s). Canceling the work after vCPUs
are destroyed leads to UAF if the delayed work is processed after vCPUs are
destroyed.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast+0x9bf/0xa20 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:1250
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880499abea0 by task kworker/1:2/1218
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1218 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc7 #5 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.10 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, + 10.1 machine, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events kvm_ioapic_eoi_inject_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94
dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378
print_report+0x139/0x4ad mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 mm/kasan/report.c:595
__kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast+0x9bf/0xa20 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:1250
__kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic+0xd8/0xbf0 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:1345
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h:129
ioapic_service+0x308/0x590 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:492
kvm_ioapic_eoi_inject_work+0x13c/0x190 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:532
process_one_work+0xa59/0x19a0 kernel/workqueue.c:3314
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3397
worker_thread+0x5eb/0xe50 kernel/workqueue.c:3478
kthread+0x370/0x450 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x72b/0xd30 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
Note, the VM is unreachable once kvm_destroy_vm() starts, and scheduling
new work via kvm_ioapic_send_eoi() can only be done via KVM_RUN, i.e.
requires a live vCPU.
Alternatively, KVM could simply destroy the I/O APIC during the "pre" phase
of VM destruction, but that gets more than a bit sketchy as KVM expects the
I/O APIC to exist if ioapic_in_kernel() is true, and nested virtualization
in particular has a bad habit of touching VM-scope state during vCPU
destruction. E.g. attempting to free the PIC during the pre phase would
lead to a NULL pointer dereference in kvm_cpu_has_extint(), and it's not
hard to imagine the I/O APIC having a similar flaw.5hCVE-2026-74518——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: fix list corruption in allocate_file_region_entries()
allocate_file_region_entries() tops up resv->region_cache with freshly
allocated file_region descriptors. The allocation uses GFP_KERNEL, so
resv->lock is dropped around it: the new entries are gathered on a
stack-local list head, allocated_regions, and spliced into
resv->region_cache once the lock is re-acquired.
The splice used list_splice(), which moves the entries but does not
re-initialize the source head, so allocated_regions is left pointing at an
entry that now lives on resv->region_cache. The top-up runs in a while
loop that re-checks the cache deficit after re-acquiring the lock. For a
shared mapping the resv_map is shared by every mapper of the hugetlbfs
inode, so a concurrent region_chg()/region_add()/region_del() on the same
resv_map can consume cache entries during the unlocked window and force a
second iteration. That iteration calls list_add() on the stale head and
corrupts the list; with CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST the __list_add_valid() check
trips:
list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (ffffc900011ff7f8),
but was ffff88814c281460. (next=ffff88814c545640).
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:31!
allocate_file_region_entries+0x191/0x420
region_chg+0x267/0x300
hugetlb_reserve_pages+0x387/0xc80
hugetlbfs_file_mmap+0x2ce/0x3f0
mmap_region+0x1348/0x1a80
do_mmap+0x85e/0xb90
vm_mmap_pgoff+0x18c/0x330
ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2a1/0x3e0
do_syscall_64+0xd7/0x420
Without CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST the bad list_add() silently links a kernel-stack
address into resv->region_cache, leading to later use-after-free.
This was observed as a real host panic on a dense KVM host where a QEMU
guest-RAM hugetlbfs file was mapped MAP_SHARED by both QEMU and a separate
SPDK/DPDK vhost-user target, generating concurrent region_* traffic on one
shared resv_map.
Use list_splice_init() so the source head is re-initialized empty after
each splice, making the retry loop safe.5hCVE-2026-74519——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinctrl: devicetree: don't free uninitialized dev_name on error path
dt_remember_or_free_map() duplicates dev_name for each map entry. If
kstrdup_const() fails, dt_free_map() frees dev_name in all num_maps
entries, including entries that have not been initialized.
Some pinctrl drivers, including pinctrl-imx, allocate the map with
kmalloc() and leave dev_name for the core to initialize. The untouched
entries therefore contain uninitialized data which is passed to
kfree_const().
Reproduced on qemu's mcimx6ul-evk (pinctrl-imx) with failslab injection
while binding the pinctrl-consuming device, under KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: double-free in dt_free_map+0x34/0xa4
Free of addr c425a900 by task init/1
kfree from dt_free_map+0x34/0xa4
dt_free_map from dt_remember_or_free_map+0x184/0x198
dt_remember_or_free_map from pinctrl_dt_to_map+0x33c/0x4c8
pinctrl_dt_to_map from create_pinctrl+0x9c/0x5c0
Initialize all dev_name fields to NULL before duplicating the device
name, making the full-map cleanup safe after a partial failure.5hCVE-2026-74452——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/panthor: reject firmware sections with oversized data
In panthor_fw_load_section_entry(), the data size to copy is calculated
without validating it against the allocated section_size:
section->data.size = hdr.data.end - hdr.data.start;
If a crafted firmware sets data.size larger than the allocated memory,
this could cause a heap buffer overflow in panthor_fw_init_section_mem()
memcpy(section->mem->kmap, section->data.buf, section->data.size);
Additionally, if the section->data.size exceeds the BO size, could this
memset underflow the size calculation, leading to a massive out-of-bounds
zeroing of kernel memory?
memset(section->mem->kmap + section->data.size, 0,
panthor_kernel_bo_size(section->mem) - section->data.size);
Reject section entries whose initial data is larger than the section size.5hCVE-2026-74501——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: fix use-after-free in ump_to_endpoint()
create_midi2_ump() registers a card-owned snd_ump_endpoint and stores a
back-pointer to its per-interface snd_usb_midi2_ump object in
ump->private_data, but it never installs an ump->private_free hook and
never clears that pointer.
If a later step of snd_usb_midi_v2_create() fails, its error path calls
free_all_midi2_umps(), which kfree()s the snd_usb_midi2_ump object while
the already-registered endpoint keeps pointing at it. The created
/dev/snd/umpC*D* node stays exposed, so the first operation of any UMP
open, ump_to_endpoint(), dereferences the dangling ump->private_data and
reads rmidi->eps[dir] out of freed memory.
A malicious USB MIDI 2.0 device that makes creation fail after the
endpoint is registered can thus trigger a slab use-after-free read on a
subsequent open of the UMP node.
Clear the endpoint's back-pointer before freeing the object, and let
ump_to_endpoint() tolerate a NULL private_data so the open/close/trigger
callbacks fail cleanly (their callers already handle a NULL endpoint)
instead of dereferencing a stale pointer.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>5hCVE-2026-74520——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/iommufd: Fix IOPF group ownership UAF
iopf_group_alloc() links each last-page IOPF group into the generic IOPF
pending list before invoking the domain fault handler.
iommufd_fault_iopf_handler() also queued an accepted group in the
IOMMUFD deliver list without removing it from the generic pending list.
When detach or HWPT replacement drops the device's IOPF reference count
to zero, an IOMMU driver may call iopf_queue_remove_device(). That
function responds to and frees groups through the generic pending list
without removing the same groups from IOMMUFD's deliver list or response
xarray. A later read, response, or cleanup can then access the freed
group and cause a UAF.
Fix this by dequeuing an accepted group from the generic pending list
before IOMMUFD queues it for userspace response.
Make iopf_group_response() send a response regardless of pending-list
membership, so the dequeued group can still be completed by IOMMUFD.5hCVE-2026-74521——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: use memcmp() to compare ClientGUIDs
ClientGUID is a fixed-size binary value and can contain embedded NUL
bytes. strncmp() stops comparing at the first NUL byte, so different
ClientGUID values can incorrectly be treated as equal.
Use memcmp() in SMB3 multichannel session binding and
FSCTL_VALIDATE_NEGOTIATE_INFO to compare all SMB2_CLIENT_GUID_SIZE
bytes.5hCVE-2026-74560——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: fix buffer leak in xsk_drop_skb() for AF_XDP multi-buffer Tx
This patch is inspired by the check[1] from sashiko. It says when
overflow happens, the address of cq to be published is invalid.
Actually the severer thing is the whole process of publishing the
address of cq in this particular case is not right: it should truely
publish the address and advance the cached_prod in cq as long as it
reads descriptors from txq.
The following is the full analysis.
xsk_drop_skb() is called in three places, which all discard a partially
built multi-buffer skb:
1) xsk_build_skb() -EOVERFLOW error path: packet exceeds MAX_SKB_FRAGS
2) __xsk_generic_xmit() post-loop cleanup: an invalid descriptor in
the TX ring prevents the partial packet from completing
3) xsk_release(): socket close while xs->skb holds an incomplete packet
In all three cases, the TX descriptors for the already-processed frags
have been consumed from the TX ring (xskq_cons_release), and CQ slots
have been reserved. However, xsk_drop_skb() calls xsk_consume_skb()
which cancels the CQ reservations via xsk_cq_cancel_locked(). Since
the buffer addresses never appear in the completion queue, userspace
permanently loses track of these buffers.
Fix this by letting consume_skb() trigger the existing xsk_destruct_skb
destructor, which already submits buffer addresses to the CQ via
xsk_cq_submit_addr_locked().
Note that cancelling the descriptors back to the TX ring (via
xskq_cons_cancel_n) is not a appropriate option because an oversized
packet that always exceeds MAX_SKB_FRAGS would be retried indefinitely,
which is an obviously deadlock bug in the TX path.
Also move the desc->addr assignment in xsk_build_skb() above the
overflow check so that the current descriptor's address is recorded
before a potential -EOVERFLOW jump to free_err, consistent with the
zerocopy path in xsk_build_skb_zerocopy().
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260425041726.85FB3C2BCB2@smtp.kernel.org/5hCVE-2026-74500——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: fix stack info leak in RME Digiface status
snd_rme_digiface_read_status() reads a four-word status block from the
device into an uninitialised on-stack __le32 buf[4] and, whenever the
vendor control-IN transfer does not return a negative error, copies all
four words into the caller's status[].
snd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full requested size back into the caller's
buffer regardless of how many bytes the data stage actually delivered:
buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL);
err = usb_control_msg(dev, pipe, request, requesttype,
value, index, buf, size, timeout);
memcpy(data, buf, size);
usb_control_msg() returns the transferred length on a short control-IN,
which is a non-negative value, and writes only that many bytes. The
remainder of the copy back is the kmemdup()ed image of the caller's
buffer, so a device answering with a short data stage leaves the
trailing words of buf[] holding leftover kernel stack. The only guard
in the caller is err < 0, so those words are stored into status[].
They then reach user space: snd_rme_digiface_get_status_val() selects a
16-bit halfword of status[] per the control's reg/mask, and the eight
Digiface status controls together expose the whole 16-byte frame to an
unprivileged reader of /dev/snd/controlC*.
Zero-initialise the buffer so a short read yields zeros instead of stack
residue. This mirrors snd_rme_get_status1(), which already clears its
output word before the same kind of vendor read.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>5hCVE-2026-74522——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix use-after-free in __close_file_table_ids()
A ksmbd_file can remain alive after logical close while another session
holds a temporary reference obtained through ksmbd_lookup_fd_inode().
ksmbd_close_fd() currently marks the file closed and drops the idr-owned
reference, but leaves the pointer published in the closing session's idr
until the final reference is dropped.
If the foreign holder performs the final ksmbd_fd_put(), __put_fd_final()
supplies the foreign session's file table to __ksmbd_close_fd(). The object
is then freed without being removed from its owner's idr, and the owner
session later dereferences the stale pointer during file-table teardown.
Remove the volatile id from the owner's idr while ksmbd_close_fd() still
holds that table's lock, and clear volatile_id before dropping
the idr-owned reference. A later foreign final put then only performs
physical destruction and cannot remove the object from the wrong table.5hCVE-2026-74561——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nexthop: avoid unlocked f6i_list walk in nh_rt_cache_flush
nh_rt_cache_flush() walks nh->f6i_list during an RTNL-serialized nexthop
replace without holding nh->lock, racing the unlocked IPv6 route
add/delete that mutate the list under nh->lock and free fib6_info
entries (nh_rt_cache_flush() is inlined into rtm_new_nexthop()):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nh_rt_cache_flush (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:2243)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888012953e18 by task exploit/146
nh_rt_cache_flush (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:2243)
replace_nexthop (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:2610)
rtm_new_nexthop (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:3323)
rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:7076)
Unlike the other f6i_list walks, this one bumps each route's sernum via
fib6_update_sernum_upto_root(), which needs tb6_lock; taking nh->lock
around it would invert the established tb6_lock -> nh->lock order and
deadlock. As the only purpose is to invalidate cached dsts, bump the
IPv6 sernum for the whole netns with rt_genid_bump_ipv6() instead,
mirroring the rt_cache_flush() already done for IPv4 just above.5hCVE-2026-74523——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
qede: sync udp_tunnel ports outside qede_lock in the recovery path
A TX timeout on a qede NIC that has VXLAN/GENEVE tunnel ports
configured wedges the rtnetlink control plane of the whole machine:
NETDEV WATCHDOG: ens6f1 (qede): transmit queue 2 timed out 10226 ms
[qede_tx_timeout:586(ens6f1)]TX timeout on queue 2!
[qede_recovery_handler:2665(ens6f0)]Starting a recovery process
The recovery path deadlocks on the driver's own mutex:
qede_sp_task
rtnl_lock()
mutex_lock(&edev->qede_lock) <- taken
qede_recovery_handler
qede_load
udp_tunnel_nic_reset_ntf
__udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync
info->sync_table == qede_udp_tunnel_sync
mutex_lock(&edev->qede_lock) <- same task: deadlock
The mutex is not recursive, so the kworker blocks on itself with
rtnl_lock held, and neither lock is ever released. Every task that
calls rtnl_lock() afterwards (ip, ovs-vswitchd, lldpad, IPv6
addrconf, sshd) blocks forever while the node still answers ping.
In a vmcore from an affected production node rtnl_mutex.owner
decodes to the very kworker blocked at the innermost mutex_lock()
above.
Re-sync the tunnel ports from qede_sp_task() after the internal lock
is dropped, still under rtnl_lock as the udp_tunnel API requires.
This mirrors qede_open(), which calls udp_tunnel_nic_reset_ntf()
under rtnl without the internal lock.
qede_recovery_handler() now returns whether it has successfully
reloaded an open device, and the caller re-syncs the ports only in
that case. This keeps the old gating exactly: a device that was down
or a failed recovery returns false, as those paths never reached the
udp_tunnel_nic_reset_ntf() call before either.
This was the only user of the qede_lock()/qede_unlock() helpers, so
remove them.5hCVE-2026-74499——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_akai_output()
snd_usbmidi_akai_output() computes its fill-loop bound
buf_end = ep->max_transfer - MAX_AKAI_SYSEX_LEN - 1;
as a signed int, so a small device-advertised bulk-OUT max_transfer
makes buf_end negative. The loop guard then compares the u32
urb->transfer_buffer_length against that negative int: the usual
arithmetic conversion turns buf_end into a large unsigned value, so the
guard stays true and each iteration keeps appending SysEx framing and
payload bytes past the end of the URB transfer buffer, which is only
max_transfer bytes long.
A USB device that advertises a tiny bulk-OUT endpoint can therefore
trigger an attacker-length- and content-controlled heap out-of-bounds
write when a process writes to the created /dev/snd/midiC*D* node.
Return early when there is no room for even one SysEx, so the loop is
never entered with a bound that would wrap. The loop is the last
statement of the function, so bailing out is equivalent to it not
running.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>5hCVE-2026-74524——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: mm: Fix out-of-bounds page-table walk during memory hot-remove
remove_pud_mapping() and remove_p4d_mapping() obtain a child table base
with pud_offset(p4dp, 0) and p4d_offset(pgd, 0), then add the index for
addr.
RISC-V folds page-table levels at runtime. When a level is folded, its
offset helper returns the parent entry itself, but the index can still be
nonzero. Adding it walks past the parent table. Sv48 folds P4D, while Sv39
folds both P4D and PUD, so memory hot-remove can descend into unrelated
memory and pass an invalid page to __free_pages(). This can trigger:
kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1810!
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_ref_count(page) == 0)
arch_remove_memory+0x1e/0x5c
try_remove_memory+0x15e/0x200
remove_memory+0x24/0x3c
Only add the index when the corresponding page-table level is enabled,
matching p4d_offset() and pud_offset().5hCVE-2026-74525——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sxgbe: free TX rings on RX allocation failure
When RX descriptor ring allocation fails, init_dma_desc_rings() only
frees the partially allocated RX rings and returns. The TX rings that
were allocated earlier in the same function are leaked.
Rearrange error labels to clean up TX rings upon RX failures.5hCVE-2026-74526——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mpi3mr: Fix potential deadlock in mpi3mr_fault_uevent_emit
mpi3mr_fault_uevent_emit() runs from the fault watchdog and reset paths
where host I/O may already be blocked. GFP_KERNEL allocations here, both
the local kzalloc_obj() and the ones inside kobject_uevent_env() itself,
can trigger reclaim that waits on that blocked I/O and deadlock.
Use memalloc_noio_save()/restore() to cover the whole call instead of
just the local allocation.5hCVE-2026-74527——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-af: Block VFs from clobbering special CGX PKIND state
PF and VF NIX LFs that share a CGX LMAC reuse the same hardware PKIND
programming. When HiGig2 or EDSA parsing is enabled, a VF NIX LF alloc must
not reset the LMAC RX PKIND or default TX parse config over the PF setup.
Add cgx_get_pkind() and rvu_cgx_is_pkind_config_permitted() so VFs skip
cgx_set_pkind(), rvu_npc_set_pkind(), and NIX_AF_LFX_TX_PARSE_CFG updates
when the LMAC is using NPC_RX_HIGIG_PKIND or NPC_RX_EDSA_PKIND.5hCVE-2026-74528——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: hold conn in hci_past_sync() callback
Avoids giving freed pointers to hci_conn_valid(), which kmalloc may have
reused.
Hold refcount to avoid that.5hCVE-2026-74451——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/panthor: validate firmware interface structure sizes
iface_fw_to_cpu_addr() only checks that the firmware-provided MCU virtual
address points inside the shared section. The returned pointer is later
used as a full firmware interface structure, so accepting an address near
the end of the shared section can still lead to out-of-bounds accesses.
Pass the expected object size to iface_fw_to_cpu_addr() and reject ranges
that do not fit entirely in the shared section.5hCVE-2026-74572——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: zoned: fix deadlock between metadata writeback and transaction commit
When writing out metadata extent buffers in a zoned filesystem,
btree_writepages() holds fs_info->zoned_meta_io_lock across the whole
writeback loop, including the call to btrfs_check_meta_write_pointer() ->
check_bg_is_active().
For the tree-log block group, check_bg_is_active() may fail to activate
the zone and fall back to btrfs_zone_finish_one_bg() to free an active
zone. That path waits for the running transaction to commit while still
holding zoned_meta_io_lock, but the committer needs that same lock to
write out the tree extents, so the two tasks deadlock:
Task A (kworker, metadata writeback) Task B (fsstress, transaction commit)
------------------------------------ -------------------------------------
wb_workfn() btrfs_commit_transaction(T)
btree_writepages() btrfs_write_and_wait_transaction()
btrfs_zoned_meta_io_lock() btrfs_write_marked_extents()
btrfs_check_meta_write_pointer() btree_writepages()
check_bg_is_active() [treelog_bg] btrfs_zoned_meta_io_lock()
btrfs_zone_finish_one_bg() <blocks on zoned_meta_io_lock,
btrfs_zone_finish() held by Task A>
do_zone_finish()
btrfs_inc_block_group_ro()
btrfs_wait_for_commit()
<blocks waiting for commit
of transaction T, done by
Task B>
The sibling branch in check_bg_is_active() already drops zoned_meta_io_lock
around do_zone_finish() for this exact reason. Do the same in the tree-log
branch: release the lock around btrfs_zone_finish_one_bg() and re-acquire
it afterwards. The lock only protects fs_info->active_{meta,system}_bg,
which this branch does not touch, and ctx->zoned_bg keeps a reference to
the block group across the unlock, so nothing is lost while the lock
is dropped.
This hang occasionally reproduces with fstests generic/475 on a zoned
btrfs filesystem.5hCVE-2026-122486.5 MED—
———The WPML Multilingual CMS plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the 'sorting' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 4.9.5 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with translator-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.7h