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Vulnerabilities372,481–372,520 · 372,926

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CVE-2026-80981—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: fix use-after-free of the LLC qentry in smc_llc_srv_add_link() smc_llc_srv_add_link() keeps add_llc pointing into the queue entry: add_llc = &qentry->msg.add_link; smc_llc.c:1482 ... smc_llc_save_add_link_info(link_new, add_llc); smc_llc.c:1494 smc_llc_flow_qentry_del(&lgr->llc_flow_lcl); smc_llc.c:1495 ... u8 *llc_msg = smc_link_shared_v2_rxbuf(link) ? (u8 *)lgr->wr_rx_buf_v2 : (u8 *)add_llc; smc_llc.c:1504 smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys(link, link_new, llc_msg); smc_llc.c:1506 smc_llc_flow_qentry_del() kfree()s the entry, so on a link without a shared v2 receive buffer the pointer handed to smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys() is already freed. Before the Fixes: commit that branch always used lgr->wr_rx_buf_v2 and add_llc was not used after the free. Reproduced on an unpatched tree over rxe, with KASAN, kasan_multi_shot and a link forced to max_recv_sge == 1: the entry is freed and read by the same call, and the freeing frame is smc_llc_srv_add_link() itself. [ 2.523161] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.523499] Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880052194de by task kworker/0:1/11 [ 2.523789] [ 2.523862] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-p0-g2c9dd296545d #35 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 2.523865] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 2.523866] Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_work [ 2.523869] Call Trace: [ 2.523870] <TASK> [ 2.523871] dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 [ 2.523872] print_report+0xd0/0x630 [ 2.523874] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523876] ? smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.523878] kasan_report+0xce/0x100 [ 2.523879] ? smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.523881] smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.523883] ? smcr_buf_reg_lgr+0x2a4/0x660 [ 2.523885] smc_llc_srv_add_link+0xaa2/0x1e50 [ 2.523888] ? _printk+0xba/0xf0 [ 2.523897] ? __pfx_smc_llc_srv_add_link+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523899] ? down_write+0xb0/0x130 [ 2.523903] ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523905] smc_listen_work+0x489e/0x4d00 [ 2.523907] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c6/0x3a0 [ 2.523911] ? __pfx_smc_listen_work+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523913] ? release_sock+0x148/0x1d0 [ 2.523915] ? smc_tcp_listen_work+0xb4f/0xfc0 [ 2.523917] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x80/0xe0 [ 2.523918] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523920] process_one_work+0x633/0x1030 [ 2.523922] ? assign_work+0x11d/0x370 [ 2.523924] worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10 [ 2.523926] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523928] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523929] kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0 [ 2.523931] ? recalc_sigpending+0x15c/0x1e0 [ 2.523934] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523935] ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0 [ 2.523937] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523938] ? __switch_to+0x572/0xdd0 [ 2.523943] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523944] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 2.523947] </TASK> [ 2.523948] [ 2.531253] Allocated by task 48: [ 2.531399] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 [ 2.531570] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 2.531737] __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 [ 2.531905] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370 [ 2.532100] smc_llc_enqueue+0x72/0x560 [ 2.532268] smc_wr_rx_tasklet_fn+0x474/0xa80 [ 2.532491] tasklet_action_common+0x20f/0x8a0 [ 2.532714] handle_softirqs+0x18e/0x590 [ 2.532886] do_softirq+0x3b/0x60 [ 2.533036] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x61/0x70 [ 2.533221] __alloc_skb+0x732/0x890 [ 2.533384] rxe_init_packet+0x16b/0x4f0 [ 2.533567] prepare_ack_packet+0xb8/0x830 [ 2.533760] rxe_receiver+0x495/0x96e0 [ 2.533933] do_work+0x144/0x470 [ 2 ---truncated---11h CVE-2026-80980—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: stop killed, freed and out_of_sync sharing a byte The three connection state flags are single-bit bitfields, so they occupy one byte of struct smc_connection and every store to one is a read-modify-write of the other two: u8 killed : 1; u8 freed : 1; u8 out_of_sync : 1; They are not written under a common lock. smc_cdc_msg_validate() sets out_of_sync from the receive tasklet, while smc_conn_kill() sets killed from process context under lock_sock(), and the receive path does not defer to the backlog when the socket is owned -- smc_cdc_msg_recv() takes only bh_lock_sock(). Give each flag its own byte so a store no longer touches its neighbours. All readers test them as booleans and are unchanged. struct smc_connection grows by two bytes.11h CVE-2026-80979—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: unregister the connection before draining the rx tasklet smc_conn_free() calls smc_ism_unset_conn() only while the link group is still on its device list, and never sets conn->killed. smc_lgr_terminate_sched() unlinks the group immediately and defers killing its connections to a work item, so a connection freed in that window keeps its smcd->conn[] slot with both gates in smcd_handle_irq() open, and the device can re-arm the receive tasklet after tasklet_kill() has returned. On the DMB-nocopy path the ghost send buffer is freed right after that drain, so the re-armed tasklet dereferences it. Unregister unconditionally and drain before the detach at both teardown sites, mirroring rmb_desc, which smc_buf_unuse() releases after the drain. Clear conn->sndbuf_desc before freeing it as well, so a reader that samples the pointer cannot get one that is already freed.11h CVE-2026-89741—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Revert "media: v4l2-dev: fix error handling in __video_register_device()" This reverts commit 2a934fdb01db6458288fc9386d3d8ceba6dd551a. The intentions of that patch were good, but it doesn't work. The idea is that if device_register fails, you have to do a put_device to let the ref counter release resources. However, the V4L2 API says that if video_register_device() fails, then you have to call video_device_release(), which kfree()s the video_device struct. But the put_device() will already have freed the struct, so you end up in a double-free scenario. There is not really a good way of fixing this without breaking video_register_device() into two parts, one that initializes everything, and one that does the actual device_register, and then converting all V4L2 drivers to this new model. That is a massive job, and it is very unlikely that device_register will fail. So rather than ending up in a double-free scenario, just revert this patch, and in that case we'll have a small memory leak. Which is a lot more robust.11h CVE-2026-89742—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rapidio: mport_cdev: fix use-after-free in dma_req_free() dma_req_free() acquires buf_mutex through req->map, drops the mapping reference with kref_put(), and then dereferences req->map again to unlock the mutex. If kref_put() drops the last reference, mport_release_mapping() frees the mapping, and the subsequent mutex_unlock() dereferences a freed object. This is a use-after-free. Fix this by caching map and md before kref_put(), clearing req->map while holding buf_mutex, and using the cached md for mutex unlocking. The bug is reachable from userspace via the RapidIO mport character device interface.11h CVE-2026-89743—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: nsm: bound the device-reported response length nsm_sendrecv_msg_locked() stores the virtqueue used-ring length reported by the NSM device into msg->resp.len without bounding it to the response buffer. A malicious or buggy backend can report a length larger than the response buffer; parse_resp_raw() then copies that many bytes out of the fixed buffer to user space, disclosing adjacent kernel heap (an out-of-bounds read). The request path already floors its length in fill_req_raw(); the response path lacks the symmetric check. Clamp the stored length to the size of the response buffer. Well-behaved devices report no more than the posted buffer size, so conforming traffic is unaffected.11h CVE-2026-890109.8 CRI

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———WAVLINK WN535M1 and WN535M3 routers running firmware prior to M35M1_V250922 contain an unauthenticated OS command injection vulnerability that allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands as root by sending crafted filenames to the sync_server daemon on TCP port 13136. The daemon interpolates attacker-controlled filename input containing shell metacharacters into a shell command string via sprintf() and passes it to system() without sanitization, enabling root-level command execution on the device.13h CVE-2026-80978—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: cap advertised IP tunnel headroom IP tunnel devices derive their advertised needed_headroom from lower output devices. A stack of user-created devices can make the derived value larger than the 16-bit skb header offsets can represent. Once IP output reserves it, skb head expansion can wrap those offsets. The runtime transmit path already caps a growing needed_headroom at 512. Apply the same cap when tunnel configuration publishes needed_headroom derived from a lower output device. Capping the advertised value is safe: IP tunnel transmit still expands the skb when a packet needs more headroom. A nonsensical stacked configuration can therefore incur an extra reallocation, but it cannot publish an unbounded reservation to upper layers.11h CVE-2026-89744—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: device property: fix infinite loop in fwnode_for_each_child_node() When iterate over children of a fwnode that has a secondary fwnode, fwnode_get_next_child_node() can enter an infinite loop if the secondary fwnode has more than one child. Parent Child (Primary fwnode) FWa: {FWa1, FWa2, FWa3} (Secondary fwnode) FWb: {FWb1, FWb2} In this case: ┌─> fwnode_get_next_child_node(FWa, FWa1) │ - fwnode_call_ptr_op(FWa, get_next_child_node, FWa1) returns FWa2 │ │ ... │ │ fwnode_get_next_child_node(FWa, FWa3) │ - fwnode_call_ptr_op(FWa, get_next_child_node, FWa3) returns NULL │ - fwnode_call_ptr_op(FWb, get_next_child_node, FWa3) returns FWb1 │ │ fwnode_get_next_child_node(FWa, FWb1) │ - fwnode_call_ptr_op(FWa, get_next_child_node, FWb1) returns FWa1 └────┘ This cause fwnode_for_each_child_node() to loop indefinitely, reapeatedly output {FWa1, FWa2, FWa3, FWb1, FWa1, ...}. The root cause is that when the current child (FWb1) belongs to the secondary fwnode, calling get_next_child_node() on the parimary fwnode incorrectly returns the first child (FWa1) again instead of NULL. Fix this by dynamically checking the parent fwnode of the current child before calling get_next_child_node(). This approach follows the pattern established in commit b5b41ab6b0c1 ("device property: Check fwnode->secondary in fwnode_graph_get_next_endpoint()").11h CVE-2026-89745—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: debugfs: Fix lockdown check for mmap_prepare Commit 651fdda8406d ("relay: update relay to use mmap_prepare") changed the `mmap` file operation to `mmap_prepare` for relayfs, but the lockdown check in debugfs was not updated accordingly. This prevents debugfs from being locked down when the kernel is in integrity mode if a file uses `mmap_prepare` but not `mmap`. Since the conversion to `mmap_prepare` across the kernel is not yet complete, update the lockdown check to look for both `mmap` and `mmap_prepare` to ensure comprehensive coverage.11h CVE-2026-80977—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: skbuff: don't touch shared zerocopy state in skb_tx_error() skb_tx_error() completes the zerocopy uarg and clears SKBFL_ALL_ZEROCOPY, and skb_zcopy_downgrade_managed() clears SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS. Both live in skb_shinfo(), which every clone shares, while the caller only owns the reference it is about to drop. Through a clone it tells the producer its pages are free and drops SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG for an skb that is still in flight. Open vSwitch reaches this with a non-last OVS_ACTION_ATTR_RECIRC: clone_execute() sends a skb_clone() into ovs_dp_process_packet() while do_execute_actions() keeps forwarding the original, and skb_clone() does not privatise the frags here -- skb_orphan_frags() returns early on SKBFL_DONT_ORPHAN. A flow miss on the clone then strips the marker from the packet still being forwarded, and a later local ESP delivery decrypts in place over frags it does not own privately. Skip it for a cloned skb. Nothing is lost: skb_release_data() clears the zerocopy state once the last reference to the shared data goes.11h CVE-2026-89752—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: memcg: stop reclaim when a limit update is superseded kernfs serializes file operations only per open file, so separate open files can update the same memory.high or memory.max file concurrently. Both handlers store the new limit before synchronous reclaim, but continue to use the writer's local target in the reclaim loop. If another writer raises or removes the limit, the first writer can continue reclaiming toward a stale target. For memory.max, this can leave the writer looping indefinitely once reclaim retries are exhausted. The OOM path sees sufficient margin under the current limit and returns true without killing, while the writer still compares usage against its stale target and records another OOM event. Check the current limit at the start of each reclaim iteration and stop if it no longer matches the writer's target. Reproducer: Populate a cgroup with anonymous memory and disable swapping. Lower memory.max from one open file, then restore it to "max" through another open file after the new limit becomes visible. Without the patch, the first writer remains blocked and repeatedly increments the OOM event counter. With the patch, it returns normally. This was not motivated by a reported production workload. We found it through automated randomized testing for our cgroup observability work and reduced it to the reproducer above.11h CVE-2026-80976—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seg6: reset IP6CB after IPv6 decapsulation decap_and_validate() pulls the outer SRv6 headers and makes the inner packet the skb network header. The IPv6 control block still contains values collected while parsing the outer packet, including nhoff and extension-header flags. End.DX6 and End.DT6 route the inner IPv6 packet directly to the IPv6 input path. An unprivileged user can reach End.DT6 from a user and net namespace by installing a local SID and injecting an outer packet with Hop-by-Hop and Destination Options headers followed by an SRH and a minimal inner IPv6 packet. The outer extension headers leave a large nhoff in IP6CB. After decapsulation, ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu() uses that stale offset on the inner packet and reads beyond the skb head. KASAN reports: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1118/0x1450 ip6_input_finish+0x11b/0x240 seg6_local_input_core+0xed/0x2e0 lwtunnel_input+0x1e9/0x4e0 ipv6_rthdr_rcv+0x525f/0x6c50 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xcb7/0x1450 Before clearing IP6CB for an inner IPv6 packet, save its incoming interface index and L3 slave state. Restore both after the clear and set nhoff to the inner IPv6 base-header nexthdr field. Use IP6CB(skb)->iif rather than skb->skb_iif because VRF processing can replace skb_iif with the L3 master while IP6CB keeps the receiving interface. Preserve IP6SKB_L3SLAVE for the same reason.11h CVE-2026-89746—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix use-after-free with same-name named triggers When two hist triggers on different events are registered with the same name=, the second one reuses the first as named_data. Both are added to tr->hist_vars by save_hist_vars() during event_hist_trigger_parse(), because save_hist_vars() is called before event_trigger_register() while the named reuse is only detected later, in hist_register_trigger(). In the named-data branch hist_register_trigger() then frees the second histogram's hist_data via destroy_hist_data(), but never removes its tr->hist_vars list entry, leaving a dangling pointer and leaking the trace_array reference it holds. A later hist trigger that references a variable makes find_var_file() walk tr->hist_vars and dereference the freed hist_data. The bug is reproducible from userspace by writing three hist triggers to tracefs: cd /sys/kernel/tracing echo 'hist:keys=common_pid:x=common_pid:name=mh' > events/sched/sched_switch/trigger echo 'hist:keys=common_pid:x=common_pid:name=mh' > events/sched/sched_process_fork/trigger echo 'hist:keys=common_pid:vals=$x' > events/sched/sched_process_exit/trigger The third write panics the kernel: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in find_var_file.part.0+0x272/0x290 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888001f8a0e0 by task sh/1 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: sh Tainted: G D N Call Trace: find_var_file.part.0 find_event_var parse_atom parse_expr __create_val_field event_hist_trigger_parse trigger_process_regex event_trigger_write vfs_write ksys_write do_syscall_64 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe Allocated by task 1: event_hist_trigger_parse Freed by task 1: hist_register_trigger+0x618/0xa30 event_hist_trigger_parse The buggy address belongs to freed 2048-byte region Oops: general protection fault ... RIP: find_var_file.part.0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b Fix by removing the hist_data from tr->hist_vars and releasing the trace_array reference in the named-data branch of hist_register_trigger() before freeing the hist_data.11h CVE-2026-80975—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mfd: qnap-mcu: keep the reply buffer alive past a command timeout qnap_mcu_exec() publishes an on-stack buffer to the receive path: unsigned char rx[QNAP_MCU_RX_BUFFER_SIZE]; ... reply->data = rx; reply->length = length; and qnap_mcu_receive_buf() writes into it from the serdev receive path, which runs out of flush_to_ldisc() and is not serialized against qnap_mcu_exec() at all. bus_lock cannot cover it, because qnap_mcu_exec() holds that mutex across wait_for_completion_timeout(). On a timeout qnap_mcu_exec() returns with reply->data still pointing at its own frame. A reply that arrives late, or an unsolicited message from the MCU, is then written into a stack frame that has been left, corrupting whatever runs next on that stack. The same applies when qnap_mcu_write() fails, since that path returns without touching the reply state either. Move the receive buffer into struct qnap_mcu. It is 37 bytes and the structure is devm_kzalloc()ed, so it lives as long as the driver, and a late write lands in memory that is still valid and is reinitialized by the next command. bus_lock keeps commands from sharing it. This deliberately does not clear reply->data or reply->length on the timeout path. Doing so races with qnap_mcu_receive_buf(), which reads both after its if (!reply->length) return size; check: clearing reply->data gives a NULL dereference, and clearing reply->length alone removes the reply->received == reply->length exit condition, so the copy loop runs until the uart chunk is consumed and overruns the buffer. Leaving both set keeps the write bounded by reply->length, which qnap_mcu_exec() has already checked against sizeof(mcu->rx).11h CVE-2026-80974—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mfd: sm501: Fix potential memory leaks during remove The memory allocated for struct sm501_devdata in sm501_pci_probe() and sm501_plat_probe() is not freed by the corresponding remove functions sm501_pci_remove() and sm501_plat_remove(). Fix that by adding a call to kfree().11h CVE-2026-80973—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: 6fire: bound the MIDI event length from the device usb6fire_comm_receiver_handler() forwards a MIDI event using a length byte the device supplies, with no bound and no check that the transfer delivered that many bytes: if (!urb->status) { if (rt->receiver_buffer[0] == 0x10) /* midi in event */ if (midi_rt) midi_rt->in_received(midi_rt, rt->receiver_buffer + 2, rt->receiver_buffer[1]); } receiver_buffer is a 64-byte kzalloc() buffer (COMM_RECEIVER_BUFSIZE), so only 62 bytes follow the two-byte header. receiver_buffer[1] is a u8 the device chooses, so a device that answers with 0x10 and a length of 0xFF makes snd_rawmidi_receive() read 255 bytes starting two bytes into a 64-byte object. The bytes past the buffer are handed to userspace through the rawmidi read path. urb->actual_length is not consulted either, so a short transfer leaves both the type byte and the length byte at their previous values and the handler acts on stale data. The receiver URB is submitted from usb6fire_comm_init() at probe, so the read happens on plug with no user action; forwarding to userspace also needs a MIDI input substream open, since usb6fire_midi_in_received() only calls snd_rawmidi_receive() when rt->in is set. KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), single packet from an emulated device: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snd_rawmidi_receive Read of size 255 at addr ffff000009f64682 by task bash/183 __asan_memcpy snd_rawmidi_receive usb6fire_midi_in_received [snd_usb_6fire] usb6fire_comm_receiver_handler [snd_usb_6fire] Allocated by task 11: usb6fire_comm_init [snd_usb_6fire] usb6fire_chip_probe [snd_usb_6fire] The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of allocated 64-byte region [ffff000009f64680, ffff000009f646c0) Reject the event when the length exceeds the bytes that follow the header, and require the transfer to have delivered the header plus that many bytes. The receiver URB is submitted with a 64-byte transfer_buffer_length, so a genuine device cannot deliver an event longer than those 62 bytes and nothing valid is dropped. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>11h CVE-2026-80972—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: aloop: Check card index validity at probe aloop driver blindly trusts that the given devptr->id value is within the proper card index range at probe. It's OK for the devices the driver itself creates at the module probe time, but if the device is bound manually via sysfs interface, this could be -1 as "none", and this leads to OOB access for index[] and other parameters. Add a sanity check for the card index and warn/correct it if it's a value out of the range.11h CVE-2026-80964—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: virmidi: Check card index validity at probe virmidi driver blindly trusts that the given devptr->id value is within the proper card index range at probe. It's OK for the devices the driver itself creates at the module probe time, but if the device is bound manually via sysfs interface, this could be -1 as "none", and this leads to OOB access for index[] and other parameters. Add a sanity check for the card index and warn/correct it if it's a value out of the range.11h CVE-2026-80965—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: serial-u16550: Check card index validity at probe serial-u16550 driver blindly trusts that the given devptr->id value is within the proper card index range at probe. It's OK for the devices the driver itself creates at the module probe time, but if the device is bound manually via sysfs interface, this could be -1 as "none", and this leads to OOB access for index[] and other parameters. Add a sanity check for the card index and warn/correct it if it's a value out of the range.11h CVE-2026-89747—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix use-after-free in trace_pipe read on sub-buffer order change Writing to buffer_subbuf_size_kb calls ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set(), which frees every sub-buffer of the ring buffer, including the reader page, and replaces them with newly allocated ones. Readers of trace_pipe hold pointers into those pages. ring_buffer_peek() looks up an event under cpu_buffer->reader_lock but returns the event pointer after dropping the lock, and peek_next_entry() then calls ring_buffer_event_length() and ring_buffer_event_data() on it. If the sub-buffer order is changed in that window, the reader dereferences freed memory: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ring_buffer_peek+0x3e0/0x430 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88802a4cf010 by task syz-executor989/6002 Freed by: free_buffer_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:398 [inline] ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set+0x1325/0x18e0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7444 buffer_subbuf_size_write+0x182/0x280 kernel/trace/trace.c:8221 Take trace_access_lock(RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS) around the order change. This is the lock trace_pipe readers already hold across their entire peek-and-print loop, so the swap can no longer race with a reader that is dereferencing a peeked event.11h CVE-2026-80971—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: bcd2000: clear the URB pointers on disconnect bcd2000_free_usb_related_resources() frees both URBs and leaves the pointers behind: usb_kill_urb(bcd2k->midi_out_urb); usb_kill_urb(bcd2k->midi_in_urb); usb_free_urb(bcd2k->midi_out_urb); usb_free_urb(bcd2k->midi_in_urb); The rawmidi device outlives that call. A substream that is still open when the device is unplugged reaches bcd2000_midi_send() from the trigger path on close. That function writes to the freed URB and then hands it to the USB core: bcd2k->midi_out_urb->transfer_buffer_length = BUFSIZE; ... ret = usb_submit_urb(bcd2k->midi_out_urb, GFP_ATOMIC); usb_kill_urb() does not stop a later submission either, so a submit that races the disconnect can requeue the URB after it has been reaped. midi_in_urb is exposed the same way: bcd2000_input_complete() resubmits it from the completion handler. KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bcd2000_midi_send [snd_bcd2000] Write of size 4 at addr ffff00001827d388 by task bpoc/168 __asan_store4 bcd2000_midi_send [snd_bcd2000] bcd2000_midi_output_trigger [snd_bcd2000] snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1 close_substream.part.0 Freed by task 168: usb_free_urb bcd2000_disconnect [snd_bcd2000] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in usb_submit_urb Read of size 8 at addr ffff00001827d3b8 by task bpoc/168 Clear both pointers after freeing and test them on the paths that can still run. Poison the URBs before freeing them: usb_poison_urb() waits for a running completion handler and rejects any later submission, so after it returns the input path is quiesced and only the rawmidi trigger path can still reach bcd2000_midi_send(). No unpoison is needed; the URBs are freed on the next line. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>11h CVE-2026-89748—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix retry exhaustion in simple ring buffer reader swap simple_ring_buffer_swap_reader_page() starts with retry set to 8 and post-decrements it only after a failed link replacement. On the final attempt, a successful replacement leaves retry at zero, while a failed replacement leaves it at -1. The current !retry test reverses both outcomes. It returns an error after a successful final replacement, leaving the link update complete but the reader bookkeeping unfinished. After a failed final replacement, it falls through and updates the head and reader pointers as though the replacement succeeded, which can corrupt the ring. Treat only a negative counter as exhaustion and return the documented -EBUSY error.11h CVE-2026-80970—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: FCP: do not copy out an uninitialised init response fcp_ioctl_init() allocates its response buffer with kmalloc() and copies the whole buffer back to userspace: buf_size = init.step0_resp_size + init.step2_resp_size; void *resp __free(kfree) = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL); ... if (copy_to_user(arg->resp, resp, buf_size)) return -EFAULT; Nothing clears the buffer, and the only writer of its leading step0_resp_size bytes is the step-0 control transfer: err = snd_usb_ctl_msg(dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev, 0), FCP_USB_REQ_STEP0, USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_IN, 0, private->bInterfaceNumber, step0_resp, private->step0_resp_size); if (err < 0) return err; usb_fill_control_urb() does not set URB_SHORT_NOT_OK, so a short or zero-length data stage completes with status 0 and snd_usb_ctl_msg() returns a small actual_length. The only check is err < 0, so a short transfer is accepted as success. snd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full size back unconditionally: buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL); ... memcpy(data, buf, size); Bytes the device never wrote are therefore restored into resp unchanged and copied to userspace. step0_resp_size and step2_resp_size are each validated only to 1..255, so the caller also picks the slab cache, from kmalloc-8 up to kmalloc-512. On 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), device answering step 0 with a zero-length data stage, s0 = s2 = 255: # init_on_alloc off, no spray step0 window [0,255): nonzero=94/255 000: 00 80 60 06 00 00 ff ff 18 00 00 00 57 01 ea 01 010: 08 78 22 13 00 00 ff ff a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff # same kernel, kmalloc-512 pre-seeded with an 8-byte tag step0 window [0,255): nonzero=219/255 tagbytes=232 # identical run, init_on_alloc=1 step0 window [0,255): nonzero=0/255 tagbytes=0 # all three runs step2 window [255,510): device words matched=62/62 a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff is the little-endian kernel text address ffff8000805fc4a8. The step-2 window is unaffected, so the disclosure is exactly the step-0 region. Zero the buffer, and require the step-0 transfer to deliver the full step0_resp_size bytes so a short data stage is reported as an error. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>11h CVE-2026-80969—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: mpu401: Check card index validity at probe mpu401 driver blindly trusts that the given devptr->id value is within the proper card index range at probe. It's OK for the devices the driver itself creates at the module probe time, but if the device is bound manually via sysfs interface, this could be -1 as "none", and this leads to OOB access for index[] and other parameters. Add a sanity check for the card index and warn/correct it if it's a value out of the range.11h CVE-2026-89749—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix crash passing ERR_PTR to kthread_stop() event_test_stuff() calls kthread_run() and unconditionally passes the returned task_struct pointer to kthread_stop(). kthread_run() returns an error pointer such as ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) when kthread creation fails, for example under memory pressure during the boot-time event self-test. kthread_stop() then dereferences the invalid pointer, crashing the kernel. Check the result of kthread_run() before passing it to kthread_stop(). Use WARN_ON() so that a failure to create the self-test thread does not go unnoticed, matching the ring-buffer self-test fix in commit 91542863abad ("ring-buffer: Fix crash passing ERR_PTR to kthread_stop()").11h CVE-2026-542486.5 MED

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———Doco-CD is a GitOps continuous delivery tool that automatically deploys and updates Docker Compose projects/services and Swarm stacks. Prior to version 0.90.1, a trust-boundary flaw in OCI artifact verification allowed artifact-provided deployment config to influence the policy used to verify that same artifact. When global OCI signature verification was enabled via `OCI_TRUST_POLICY` (`enabled: true`), an attacker with write access to the configured OCI tag could publish an unsigned or improperly signed artifact containing `.doco-cd.yml` with `oci.verify: false`. This could cause signature verification to be bypassed and untrusted deployment content to be applied. This primarily impacts users deploying from OCI artifacts where deployment config is read from artifact contents (for example, poll/webhook flows without trusted inline deployment overrides). The issue is fixed by enforcing a strict trust boundary and no-downgrade behavior. First, artifact-contained `.doco-cd.yml` is treated as untrusted for OCI trust-policy override decisions. Second, if global `OCI_TRUST_POLICY.enabled` is `true`, per-deployment `oci.verify: false` cannot disable verification. Some workarounds are available. Do not source deployment config from untrusted OCI artifact contents. Use trusted inline `POLL_CONFIG.deployments` and avoid relying on artifact-contained trust-policy overrides. Restrict write/push permissions for OCI repositories/tags used by doco-cd. Prefer immutable digest pinning and protected release/tag workflows. Monitor for unexpected artifact digest changes and failed/suspicious verification events.9h CVE-2026-542417.4 HIG

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———libde265 is an open source implementation of the h.265 video codec. Versions prior to 1.1.1 use signed 32-bit arithmetic to calculate the sample adaptive offset input-buffer size, allowing a crafted HEVC stream with large dimensions and 16-bit luma samples to cause an integer overflow, an undersized allocation, and an out-of-bounds heap read that may expose heap data in decoded output or crash the decoder. Version 1.1.1 contains a patch.9h CVE-2026-89660—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: Prevent client use-after-free during admin state revocation A stateid holds only a bare pointer to its nfs4_client; a stateid reference does not pin it. The client survives only because __destroy_client() drains its stateids before free_client() runs. nfsd4_revoke_states() drops nn->client_lock across revoke_one_stid(), which dereferences the client to revoke a stateid and read clp->cl_minorversion. A teardown racing the dropped lock can free the client first. Pinning cl_rpc_users under client_lock blocks the DESTROY_CLIENTID and EXCHANGE_ID teardown, which refuses while cl_rpc_users is non-zero. force_expire_client() ignores it: once its wait for cl_rpc_users to reach zero has passed, a later pin goes unnoticed. Under client_lock, skip a client whose cl_time is already zero -- force_expire_client() clears it there before waiting -- otherwise pin cl_rpc_users before dropping the lock. The walk then either sees the expiry and skips, or pins in time for that wait to cover the revoke.11h CVE-2026-89659—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: Prevent client use-after-free during delegation revoke A delegation stateid holds only a bare pointer to its owning nfs4_client and does not keep it alive. The client survives its stateids only because __destroy_client() drains cl_delegations and cl_revoked before free_client() runs. nfs4_laundromat() breaks that invariant: it unhashes an expired delegation from cl_delegations, drops deleg_lock, then revoke_delegation() relinks it onto cl_revoked under cl_lock. In that window the delegation is on neither list, so client_has_state() can report no remaining state. Every teardown path first requires cl_rpc_users to be zero, but the laundromat holds no such reference. A client whose recalled delegation has just timed out can therefore reach free_client() while revoke_delegation() is still about to dereference cl_lock, a use-after-free. Pin the client with cl_rpc_users across the revoke so teardown blocks until it completes, then reap the delegation from cl_revoked. A client already expiring reaps its own, so skip it and leave the delegation on del_recall_lru.11h CVE-2026-542586.5 MED

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———ZoneMinder is a free, open source closed-circuit television software application. Versions prior to 1.36.39, 1.38.4, and 1.39.11 allow an authenticated low-privileged user with coarse `Events=View` and/or `Snapshots=View` permissions to directly fetch media for events belonging to monitors they are not allowed to access. The normal UI correctly hides the restricted monitor and its events, but direct event media views accept an arbitrary `eid` and stream media from the event path without enforcing the event/monitor-level ACL. This exposes private surveillance footage across monitor boundaries. Versions 1.36.39, 1.38.4, and 1.39.11 fix the issue.9h CVE-2026-90443—

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———A web interface reflects a portion of the request URL into a script context and a hyperlink attribute without adequate encoding, and does not require authentication to reach. This allows an unauthenticated network attacker to craft a link that, when visited by a user, executes arbitrary script in the context of the affected application and can redirect the user's browser to an arbitrary external site. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to act with the compromised user's session privileges within the application.9h CVE-2026-90444—

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———A file-transfer interface that requires valid credentials accepts attacker-controlled filenames without restricting shell metacharacters. An automated process later constructs and runs a system command using the uploaded file's name, allowing an authenticated attacker to embed and execute arbitrary operating system commands with the privileges of that process. This allows an attacker to read and modify ingested log data, and could provide a foothold for further movement within the internal network.9h CVE-2026-621028.8 HIG

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———Subscriber Privilege Escalation in Gato GraphQL <= 19.2.3 versions.10h CVE-2026-621039.8 CRI

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———Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection in Everest Forms <= 3.6.0 versions.10h CVE-2026-621059.8 CRI

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———Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection in ThemeREX Addons < 2.45.0 versions.10h CVE-2026-380568.8 HIG

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———A local privilege escalation vulnerability exists in the iDirect iQ200 VSAT terminal running firmware 23.0.1.0. The iQ200 is a rackmount satellite modem deployed across oil and gas, maritime, defense, and remote infrastructure as the primary, and often sole communications link for offshore rigs, vessels, and remote sites. Important context: the device ships from the factory with a pre-configured low-privilege local user account. This account is intended for field technicians who need shell access for maintenance and diagnostics but should not have full administrative control over the device. This built-in account provides the initial access required to exploit this vulnerability. No additional credentials need to be obtained or brute-forced.15h CVE-2026-621068.8 HIG

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———Subscriber Privilege Escalation in SMS Alert Order Notifications <= 3.9.9 versions.10h CVE-2026-90445—

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———An interface that accepts file uploads from authenticated users extracts the contents of uploaded archives without validating that extracted file paths remain within the intended destination directory. This allows an authenticated attacker to craft an archive whose entries traverse outside the destination directory, causing the extraction process to write files to arbitrary locations with the privileges of that process. This could allow an attacker to inject fabricated records into the system's stored data or tamper with application configuration.9h CVE-2026-621078.8 HIG

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———Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection in Masteriyo - LMS <= 3.4.0 versions.10h